cve-intelligence
Server Details
CVE intelligence: exploitation (KEV/EPSS), detection coverage, fixed versions. All tools keyless.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
Available Tools
6 toolsget_cveARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Full intelligence record for one CVE: per-scorer CVSS, EPSS, CISA KEV/ransomware/SSVC, four remote-detection modalities plus the Sigma log-detection layer, per-product fixed versions (fixed = first patched build; affected_through = the last vulnerable build, so upgrade past it), news/community coverage, intelligence summary. No key required over MCP; an API key on the HTTP request (Authorization: Bearer cvs_live_…) is honored for attribution. Absence semantics: a null field means this dataset holds no such record. The source may still hold one.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | CVE id, such as CVE-2024-3400 |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and idempotentHint, and the description adds useful non-obvious behavior: no key is required over MCP, an API key is honored only for attribution, and null fields carry a specific absence semantic. This goes well beyond the annotation metadata without contradicting it.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single dense paragraph, but it front-loads the core purpose and packs in essential semantics like fixed-not-affected_through and absence behavior. No sentence is filler, though the structure could be tightened with clearer separation of concerns.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, the description carries the burden of explaining the return value, and it does: it lists all major data categories, defines fixed vs affected_through, and clarifies null semantics. An agent has enough context to invoke the tool correctly and interpret the response.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already documents the single 'id' parameter with a format and example ('CVE-2024-3400'), so schema coverage is 100%. The description reinforces that the tool targets one CVE but adds no parameter-level detail beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'Full intelligence record for one CVE' and enumerates specific content: CVSS, EPSS, KEV, fixed versions, detection modalities, and news coverage. This clearly identifies the resource and differentiates it from search-oriented siblings like search_cves or get_scoreboard.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'for one CVE' plus the detailed record contents make the intended use case clear: when an agent already has a CVE id and needs the full intelligence profile. It does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use the tool, but the context is unambiguous.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_epss_moversARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
CVEs whose EPSS exploitation probability rose the most recently. window is "7d" (default) or "30d". Each rise is measured between same-EPSS-model-version scores, so a model release (which shifts the whole distribution) never appears as a mover. A rise raises the priority of a CVE; observed exploitation is recorded through CISA KEV. Returns cve_id, current score, the delta, KEV status and url, largest rise first.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | 1..100 (default 25) | |
| window | No | Rise window (default 7d) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnlyHint and idempotentHint annotations, the description discloses important behavioral nuances: rises are compared within the same EPSS model version so model releases never create false movers, and KEV status is included as observed-exploitation context. It also states the ordering (largest rise first), which is not derivable from annotations or the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded: the core purpose appears in the first clause, followed by parameter default, a key methodological caveat, output fields, and ordering. Every sentence contributes useful information; there is no filler or repetition of the tool name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only tool with only two optional parameters and no output schema, the description is fully self-sufficient. It tells the agent what is returned, the ordering, the available windows and defaults, and why the mover signal is reliable, leaving no critical gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema already fully describes both parameters, including the enum for window, the range for limit, and defaults. The description adds contextual meaning for window by explaining that it is the rise window, but it does not materially expand on limit or introduce semantics beyond the schema, so the baseline of 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states what the tool does: it returns CVEs whose EPSS exploitation probability rose most recently. It also lists the exact output fields (cve_id, current score, delta, KEV status and url), which is specific and unambiguous. However, it does not explicitly contrast itself with sibling tools like search_cves or get_updates, so the differentiation is implicit rather than stated.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use the tool: when you want recent EPSS movers, and it explains the window choices (7d or 30d) and default. It does not explicitly state when not to use it or point to alternatives, leaving some routing inference to the agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_scoreboardARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
The Defender Scoreboard report (CC BY 4.0): exploited vs detectable vs patchable, every figure with its method, caveat and denominator, plus the corpus block and any method-change notes. Cite as "CVE Security Defender Scoreboard, cve-security.com/scoreboard".
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already communicate read-only and idempotent behavior. The description adds value by disclosing the CC BY 4.0 license and the citation requirement, which is a genuine behavioral constraint beyond annotations. No contradiction exists with readOnlyHint=true.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
At roughly 30 words, the description is compact and every phrase carries information: license, report contents, and citation. It is front-loaded with the resource name. It is slightly dense as a single long sentence, but nothing is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a parameterless, read-only report getter, the description covers what the report contains and how to cite it, which compensates for the missing output schema. It does not specify the response format, but that is not essential for this tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, so parameter documentation is unnecessary; the baseline of 4 applies. The description appropriately focuses on report content rather than inputs.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies the resource (Defender Scoreboard report) and details its contents: exploited vs detectable vs patchable, method/caveat/denominator, corpus block, and method-change notes. This distinguishes it from siblings like get_cve or search_cves. However, it lacks an explicit verb like 'returns' or 'fetches' and does not directly contrast with sibling tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The content description makes the use case clear: an agent should call this when the user needs scoreboard statistics with methodology, caveats, and denominators. It does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, so it falls short of full routing guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_updatesARead-onlyInspect
The publication change stream: what this site published, stamped with OUR publish time (first_published, kev_added, detection_added, remediation_added). Pass since (YYYY-MM-DD, strictly-after) on the first call, then the returned next_cursor to continue. Optional cve scopes the stream to one CVE's change history. Events for withdrawn CVE ids are omitted.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve | No | Scope to one CVE's change history, such as CVE-2024-3400 | |
| type | No | ||
| limit | No | ||
| since | No | ||
| cursor | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, lowering the threshold. The description adds genuine behavioral context beyond that: 'stamped with OUR publish time' clarifies that the timestamps are the site's publication moments, not the CVE's own dates (preventing a real misinterpretation), and 'Events for withdrawn CVE ids are omitted' discloses an important filtering behavior. Both add value over the read-only annotation. No contradiction with annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single information-dense paragraph with the purpose front-loaded, followed by pagination mechanics and optional scoping. Every sentence earns its place: purpose, timestamp semantics, since format, cursor continuation, cve filter, and the withdrawal exclusion. Slightly long as one block, but efficient with no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a cursor-based stream with 5 parameters and no output schema, the description covers the critical calling mechanics: how to start (since), how to continue (cursor), and available filters (cve, type), plus what event types exist. Gaps are the limit parameter's semantics and the exact shape of returned events (no output schema to fall back on), but the essential continuation pattern an agent must know is fully specified. Fairly complete given the complexity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is only 20% (just the cve parameter has a description), so the description must compensate — and it does. It explains the since format (YYYY-MM-DD, strictly-after), the cursor continuation pattern (returned next_cursor), the cve scoping semantics, and enumerates the four type values. Only the limit parameter is left unaddressed. Strong compensation for the sparse schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description identifies a specific resource ('the publication change stream: what this site published') and a distinctive mechanism (cursor-based pagination stamped with OUR publish time). This distinguishes it from siblings like get_cve (single lookup), search_cves (search), and get_epss_movers (movers) without naming them. It's clear and specific, though it doesn't explicitly contrast with any sibling.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides concrete, actionable usage instructions: pass since in YYYY-MM-DD strictly-after on the first call, then use the returned next_cursor to continue, with optional cve/type scoping. This is explicit call-pattern guidance. However, it doesn't state when to choose this tool over alternatives such as search_cves, so the when-vs-alternatives dimension is only partially covered (clear context, no exclusions).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
query_packageARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
CVEs affecting one open-source package, by purl (pkg:npm/lodash) or ecosystem + name (Maven names are group:artifact). Returns the CVE list KEV-first with each OSV version range VERBATIM: events plus one render-safe projection: fixed (the upgrade targets) or affected_through (the last VULNERABLE version, so upgrade past it). This tool does not evaluate version membership; compare versions on your side with your ecosystem’s own semantics. Covers CVE-linked, GitHub-reviewed OSS advisories via OSV.dev; absence is not evidence of safety.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | No | Package name, verbatim (for example @babel/core or org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core) | |
| purl | No | Package URL, such as pkg:npm/lodash or pkg:maven/org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core | |
| ecosystem | No | OSV ecosystem (npm, PyPI, Maven, Go, crates.io, Packagist, RubyGems, NuGet, …) or purl type (pypi, cargo, composer, gem, golang, …) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Even though annotations already indicate read-only and idempotent behavior, the description adds substantial behavioral context: KEV-first ordering, verbatim OSV range output, the events/fixed/affected_through projection, the explicit refusal to evaluate version membership, and the coverage caveat that absence is not evidence of safety. This goes well beyond what annotations provide.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but every sentence earns its place: purpose, input modes, output format, version-range semantics, and an important coverage caveat. The main action is front-loaded and there is no filler or repetition of the schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description correctly takes on the burden of explaining return values. It covers what is returned (CVE list, KEV-first), how version ranges are represented (fixed vs affected_through), and what the tool does not do. For a read-only package advisory lookup, nothing critical is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful semantics beyond the schema by clarifying purl vs ecosystem+name usage, flagging Maven group:artifact format, and giving concrete examples like pkg:npm/lodash, which helps an agent construct correct parameter combinations.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'CVEs affecting one open-source package' and immediately distinguishes the query modes (purl vs ecosystem + name). It clearly separates this from siblings like search_cves and get_cve by emphasizing a single package's advisory list.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear context for when to use the tool: when you need CVEs for one package, identified by purl or ecosystem + name. It does not explicitly name alternatives or exclusions, but the package-scoped scenario is unmistakable and no misleading guidance is present.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
search_cvesARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Search the catalog. Free text (q) and/or structured filters: vendor (slug), cwe (CWE-nnn), technique (ATT&CK id, such as T1190), year ("2024,2025"), sev ("critical,high"), kev (0|1), kev_from / kev_to (ISO days, half-open CISA listing window; imply kev=1), kev_vendor (the CISA vendorProject string verbatim, such as "Microsoft"), ransomware (0|1), detect (0|1, a detection signal we track), fix (0|1; fix=0 means the fix status was computed and this dataset holds no actionable vendor fix), automatable (0|1, CISA SSVC Automatable; 1=yes, 0=CISA assessed no, unassessed CVEs match neither), epss_gte (0..1), eco (OSS ecosystem, such as npm or PyPI), pkg (pkg_key, such as npm/lodash; for ranges use query_package), page, limit (1..50). Filter-only queries return the /browse slice ordered KEV-first then EPSS.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | No | ||
| cwe | No | ||
| eco | No | ||
| fix | No | ||
| kev | No | ||
| pkg | No | ||
| sev | No | ||
| page | No | ||
| year | No | ||
| limit | No | ||
| detect | No | ||
| kev_to | No | ISO day, exclusive upper bound on the CISA listing date | |
| vendor | No | ||
| epss_gte | No | ||
| kev_from | No | ISO day, inclusive lower bound on the CISA listing date | |
| technique | No | ATT&CK technique id, such as T1190 or T1059.001 | |
| kev_vendor | No | CISA's vendorProject, verbatim (for example 'Palo Alto Networks') | |
| ransomware | No | ||
| automatable | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnly and idempotent annotations, the description discloses important behaviors: KEV-first then EPSS ordering for filter-only queries, kev_from/kev_to implying kev=1, the precise meaning of fix=0, automatable's unassessed-neither semantics, and the tracked detection signal. These details materially shape how an agent interprets results without contradicting annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but every clause adds signal, and the opening sentence immediately establishes the tool's purpose before the parameter list. Parenthetical per-parameter explanations keep it scannable despite covering 19 parameters, with no filler or repetition of schema type information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Input-side behavior is exceptionally well covered given 19 parameters and no required fields. However, with no output schema, return value structure is only partially disclosed: ordering is stated for filter-only queries, but not for free-text queries, pagination defaults, or the full response shape. This is a modest gap in an otherwise thorough definition.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 21%, so the description carries nearly the entire semantic burden for 19 parameters. It provides concrete formats (CWE-nnn, ATT&CK ids, ISO days, epss_gte 0..1), exact enum meanings, examples like 'Microsoft' and 'npm/lodash', and cross-parameter implications. This is far beyond what the bare schema provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a clear verb-resource pair, 'Search the catalog', and then enumerates the full set of search dimensions. It differentiates itself from siblings like get_cve by framing this as multi-filter catalog search rather than single-record lookup, and it routes range queries to query_package.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives concrete usage context, including that filter-only queries return the /browse slice ordered KEV-first then EPSS, and it explicitly names query_package as the alternative for pkg ranges. It does not systematically state when to prefer get_cve or get_updates instead, but the context is clear enough for a competent agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
4 tool updates
- Changed
get_cve1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / id / descriptionPrevious value: -"CVE id, e.g. CVE-2024-3400"New value: +"CVE id, such as CVE-2024-3400"
- Changed
get_updates1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / cve / descriptionPrevious value: -"Scope to one CVE's change history, e.g. CVE-2024-3400"New value: +"Scope to one CVE's change history, such as CVE-2024-3400"
- Changed
query_package2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / name / descriptionPrevious value: -"Package name, verbatim (e.g. @babel/core, org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core)"New value: +"Package name, verbatim (for example @babel/core or org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core)" - changed
Input schema / properties / purl / descriptionPrevious value: -"Package URL, e.g. pkg:npm/lodash or pkg:maven/org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core"New value: +"Package URL, such as pkg:npm/lodash or pkg:maven/org.apache.logging.log4j/log4j-core"
- Changed
search_cves2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / kev_vendor / descriptionPrevious value: -"CISA's vendorProject, verbatim (e.g. 'Palo Alto Networks')"New value: +"CISA's vendorProject, verbatim (for example 'Palo Alto Networks')" - changed
Input schema / properties / technique / descriptionPrevious value: -"ATT&CK technique id, e.g. T1190 or T1059.001"New value: +"ATT&CK technique id, such as T1190 or T1059.001"
1 tool update
- Changed
search_cves3 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / kev_fromAdded value: +{ + "description": "ISO day, inclusive lower bound on the CISA listing date", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / kev_toAdded value: +{ + "description": "ISO day, exclusive upper bound on the CISA listing date", + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / kev_vendorAdded value: +{ + "description": "CISA's vendorProject, verbatim (e.g. 'Palo Alto Networks')", + "type": "string" +}
1 tool update
- Changed
get_updates1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / cveAdded value: +{ + "description": "Scope to one CVE's change history, e.g. CVE-2024-3400", + "type": "string" +}
1 tool update
- Added
get_epss_movers
1 tool update
- Changed
search_cves2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / automatableAdded value: +{ + "enum": [ + "0", + "1" + ], + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / techniqueAdded value: +{ + "description": "ATT&CK technique id, e.g. T1190 or T1059.001", + "type": "string" +}
2 tool updates
- Added
query_package - Changed
search_cves2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / ecoAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +} - added
Input schema / properties / pkgAdded value: +{ + "type": "string" +}
4 tool updates
- First observed
get_cve - First observed
get_scoreboard - First observed
get_updates - First observed
search_cves
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TDQS
Each tool targets a distinct retrieval task: single CVE lookup, EPSS movers, scoreboard report, update stream, package query, and catalog search. There is minimal overlap, and the descriptions reinforce the clear boundaries between tools.
Tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern: get_ for direct retrievals, query_package for package-specific lookup, and search_cves for catalog search. All names are snake_case and use clear, predictable verbs.
Six tools is a well-scoped surface for a CVE intelligence server, covering all major entry points without redundancy. Each tool earns its place and there is no bloat or thinness.
The domain is read-only vulnerability intelligence, and the set covers individual CVE records, searchable catalog discovery, package-specific CVE lookup, trend analysis, update streams, and periodic reporting. There are no obvious dead ends for the stated purpose.