The Defender Scoreboard report (CC BY 4.0): exploited vs detectable vs patchable, every figure with its method, caveat and denominator, plus the corpus block and any method-change notes. Cite as "CVE Security Defender Scoreboard, cve-security.com/scoreboard".
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already communicate read-only and idempotent behavior. The description adds value by disclosing the CC BY 4.0 license and the citation requirement, which is a genuine behavioral constraint beyond annotations. No contradiction exists with readOnlyHint=true.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
At roughly 30 words, the description is compact and every phrase carries information: license, report contents, and citation. It is front-loaded with the resource name. It is slightly dense as a single long sentence, but nothing is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a parameterless, read-only report getter, the description covers what the report contains and how to cite it, which compensates for the missing output schema. It does not specify the response format, but that is not essential for this tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, so parameter documentation is unnecessary; the baseline of 4 applies. The description appropriately focuses on report content rather than inputs.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies the resource (Defender Scoreboard report) and details its contents: exploited vs detectable vs patchable, method/caveat/denominator, corpus block, and method-change notes. This distinguishes it from siblings like get_cve or search_cves. However, it lacks an explicit verb like 'returns' or 'fetches' and does not directly contrast with sibling tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The content description makes the use case clear: an agent should call this when the user needs scoreboard statistics with methodology, caveats, and denominators. It does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, so it falls short of full routing guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Each tool targets a distinct retrieval task: single CVE lookup, EPSS movers, scoreboard report, update stream, package query, and catalog search. There is minimal overlap, and the descriptions reinforce the clear boundaries between tools.
Tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern: get_ for direct retrievals, query_package for package-specific lookup, and search_cves for catalog search. All names are snake_case and use clear, predictable verbs.
Six tools is a well-scoped surface for a CVE intelligence server, covering all major entry points without redundancy. Each tool earns its place and there is no bloat or thinness.
The domain is read-only vulnerability intelligence, and the set covers individual CVE records, searchable catalog discovery, package-specific CVE lookup, trend analysis, update streams, and periodic reporting. There are no obvious dead ends for the stated purpose.
