Get Threat Transcripts

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already establish readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds value beyond annotations by disclosing the semantic nature of the returned data: provenance, not analysis, and stubs rather than prose. This corrects a realistic misreading of the tool name (transcripts as analyst discussion) and tells the agent what not to expect from the output.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the key distinction (provenance vs. analysis), then enumerates the useful return components, then gives the caveat and routing guidance. It is slightly dense — the full enumeration of the 7 phases and gate metrics could be trimmed — but every clause earns its place, as it shapes an agent's expectations about content the name misleadingly implies.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists so return-value mechanics are covered structurally. For a one-parameter read-only tool, the description is complete: what it returns, what it does not contain, how the parts fit together (phases, gates, score, handoff log, correlation highlights), and how to choose among siblings. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with the single threat_id parameter fully documented (type, description, example 'TL-2026-0042'), so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description does not add parameter-specific semantics beyond the example already in the schema, which is acceptable at full coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States precisely what is returned: the 'PIPELINE PROVENANCE record,' and immediately disambiguates it from analysis with 'how its profile was produced, not analysis of the threat itself.' The description names the resource (pipeline phases, quality gates, handoff log) with enough specificity that an agent can distinguish it from get_threat, get_threat_enrichment, and get_attribution_evidence without opening their schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit usage guidance is given: 'Use this to judge how thoroughly a threat was worked and to find its related-threat/IOC leads,' followed by named alternatives with their purposes ('use get_threat or get_threat_enrichment for the analysis, and get_attribution_evidence for why it is attributed'). The description also sets a negative expectation — handoff messages are routing stubs, not analyst prose — preventing a likely misuse.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.