UltraProbe
MISP MCP Server
A Model Context Protocol server for MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform), with built-in prompt injection defense powered by prompt-defense-audit.
Why this exists: MISP holds operational threat intel β IOCs, threat actor profiles, attack patterns. When you connect an LLM agent to MISP via MCP, two new attack surfaces emerge:
Adversarial seeding. A threat actor who can submit content into your MISP instance (or a federated feed) can plant prompt-injection payloads designed to hijack downstream LLM agents.
Sensitive intel leakage. A manipulated LLM can be coerced into returning intel above its authorized TLP level.
This server wraps every outgoing MISP response in
prompt-defense-audit's output scanner, blocking high-risk patterns before they reach the LLM. Read-only by design β no write tools exposed.
Tracks: MISP/MISP#10745 β MCP server for MISP
Features
π‘οΈ Defense built in β every MISP response scanned for prompt-injection / XSS / shell-injection patterns before being returned
π Read-only by design β no event/attribute mutation tools; an LLM cannot modify your threat-intel platform
π§° 8 high-utility tools covering events, attributes, search, tags, feeds, galaxies
β‘ Zero-config beyond
MISP_URLandMISP_API_KEYπͺΆ Stdio transport β works with Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue, Cline, any MCP client
π MIT license β fork freely, use commercially
Related MCP server: Cyberbro MCP Server
Quick start
1. Install
npm install -g @ultralab/misp-mcp-serverOr use npx directly in your MCP client config (no install needed).
2. Configure your MCP client
Claude Desktop (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS, %APPDATA%/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on Windows):
{
"mcpServers": {
"misp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@ultralab/misp-mcp-server"],
"env": {
"MISP_URL": "https://misp.your-org.example",
"MISP_API_KEY": "your_misp_api_key_here"
}
}
}
}Cursor / Continue / Cline β similar pattern, see your client's MCP config docs.
3. Restart your MCP client and start asking
"What MISP events are tagged tlp:white from the last 7 days?"
"Show me event 12345 β I'm investigating a phishing report."
"What threat actor galaxies do we have configured?"
"Find all attributes matching the IP 198.51.100.42."Tools exposed
Tool | Purpose |
| Health check + server version |
| Paginated event headers |
| Full event with attributes (scanned for injection) |
| Search by tag / type / value / date range |
| Direct IOC lookup |
| All configured tags (TLP, taxonomy, etc.) |
| Configured threat-intel feeds |
| Threat actor / campaign clusters |
Mutation tools intentionally not included. An LLM with write access to MISP is a supply-chain compromise vector. If you need agent-driven MISP mutations, build a per-tool allowlist with human-in-the-loop confirmation.
Defense layer
Every tool response is run through prompt-defense-audit's scanOutput before being returned to the LLM client.
High-risk patterns (critical / high severity) β response is blocked and replaced with a safe summary. Example trigger patterns:
Script-tag injection (
<script>...</script>)Iframe / object injection
JavaScript URLs (
javascript:)Shell-command patterns in unexpected contexts
Known prompt-injection vector signatures from
prompt-defense-audit's 17+ vector library
Low/medium-risk patterns β response annotated with a [defense] prefix listing matched patterns but still returned.
Opt out (not recommended)
PROMPT_DEFENSE_DISABLED=trueUse only if you fully trust your MISP instance + all federated feeds and need raw response fidelity for a specific debugging scenario.
Environment variables
Variable | Required | Default | Notes |
| β | β | Base URL of your MISP instance (e.g. |
| β | β | MISP automation API key (Profile β Auth Keys) |
| β |
| Set to |
| β |
| Set |
For enterprise users
The free OSS defense layer ships with prompt-defense-audit (17+ regex-based vectors, ~3ms latency, deterministic).
For deployments that need:
π Persistent audit logs of every MISP query an LLM has made
π₯ Team policies (per-role allowlists, per-TLP gating, escalation flows)
π Jurisdictional compliance (EU GDPR / TW εθ³ζ³ / δΈε PIPL data-residency)
π¨ Live threat intel updates to the defense ruleset (new injection vectors pushed daily)
π SLA-backed uptime and response
β Upgrade path: route MCP server through Quartz Cloud β Taiwan-domiciled runtime AI firewall, drop-in passthrough.
Development
git clone https://github.com/ppcvote/misp-mcp-server.git
cd misp-mcp-server
npm install
npm test # smoke tests, no live MISP
npm run dev # tsx watch mode
npm run build # produce dist/Architecture
LLM client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.)
β stdio
βΌ
@ultralab/misp-mcp-server
β
ββ src/tools.ts β 8 read-only tool definitions + dispatch
ββ src/misp-client.ts β minimal MISP REST API wrapper
ββ src/index.ts β MCP Server + scanOutput() defense layer
β
βΌ
MISP REST API (/events, /attributes, /tags, /feeds, /galaxies)Project context
Built by Ultra Lab β a one-person AI products company in Taiwan, focused on AI safety, threat intel, and the supply chain between LLM agents and operational security tooling.
This server is part of a broader thesis: the MCP ecosystem will be a major prompt-injection vector unless servers default to defensive output handling. We're shipping reference implementations for high-leverage targets (MISP first, OpenCTI / TheHive / Vault next) to anchor the standard.
Companion projects:
prompt-defense-auditβ the underlying detection engineultraprobeβ CLI scanner for AI app system promptsquartz.twβ paid runtime firewall (audit logs, team policies, jurisdictional moat)
License
MIT Β© 2026 Ultra Lab β see LICENSE.
Contributing
PRs welcome. Please:
Keep the read-only invariant. Mutation tools must be argued explicitly with a threat-model writeup.
Add a test for any new tool.
If you add new MISP API coverage, link to the relevant OpenAPI spec section in your PR.
For discussion, see MISP/MISP#10745.
Available Tools
8 toolsmisp_get_eventA
Fetch a single MISP event by id, including its attributes (IOCs). The response is scanned for prompt-injection payloads before being returned.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | MISP event id (numeric or UUID) |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full burden. It discloses that the response is scanned for prompt-injection payloads, but does not mention read-only nature, error handling, or rate limits.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise with two sentences: one for purpose and one for a behavioral detail. No wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description includes the inclusion of attributes and the scanning behavior, which is sufficient for a simple fetch tool. No output schema, but the description gives enough context for expected response content.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema covers the id parameter with a description, and the description does not add additional meaning beyond what is in the schema. Baseline score for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states that the tool fetches a single MISP event by id, including its attributes. This distinguishes it from sibling tools like misp_list_events and misp_search_events.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description does not explicitly state when to use this tool versus alternatives, but the purpose of fetching a single event by ID is implicit. No exclusions or guidance is provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
misp_list_eventsA
List MISP events (most recent first). Returns event headers (id, info, date, threat level, tags). For detailed attributes, call misp_get_event with an id. Default page size is 20; max 100.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| page | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations provided, so description carries full burden. Discloses ordering, return fields, default and max page size, and that it's a listing operation. Could mention error handling or authentication but sufficient for basic behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no redundancy. First sentence states purpose and return, second gives usage guideline and limits. Highly efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a list tool with 2 simple params and no output schema, description covers return fields, ordering, pagination limits, and sibling relationship. Lacks details on empty results or errors but is reasonably complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema has 0% description coverage, so description must compensate. Explains limit parameter with default and max values, but page parameter is only implied as part of pagination without explicit explanation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Clearly states it lists MISP events with ordering (most recent first) and specifies return fields (id, info, date, threat level, tags). Distinguishes from sibling misp_get_event which returns detailed attributes.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly directs to misp_get_event for detailed attributes, providing a clear alternative. Implies this tool is for listing headers only, but does not explicitly state when not to use it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
misp_list_feedsA
List configured MISP threat-intel feeds (enabled and disabled). Use this to understand which external sources are feeding the instance.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must disclose behavioral traits. It states it lists both enabled and disabled feeds, which is useful, but it does not explicitly state that it is read-only or describe any other implications like rate limits.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two concise sentences that get straight to the point. Every sentence adds value with no redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the simplicity of a zero-parameter list tool and no output schema, the description sufficiently covers the purpose and usage context. It could mention output format but is not critically incomplete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has no parameters, and schema coverage is 100%. With zero parameters, the baseline is 4, and the description does not need to add parameter details.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states 'List configured MISP threat-intel feeds' with a specific verb and resource, distinguishing it from sibling tools that handle events, galaxies, tags, etc.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It says 'Use this to understand which external sources are feeding the instance', providing a clear context. However, it does not explicitly exclude other tools or mention alternatives when not to use.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
misp_list_galaxiesA
List MISP galaxies (threat actor profiles, campaign clusters, technique catalogs). Galaxies are MISP's structured representation of MITRE ATT&CK, threat actors, etc.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, and the description does not disclose behavioral traits such as read-only nature, authentication needs, or rate limits. Listing operations are typically safe, but the description should explicitly state this.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences with no wasted words. The description is front-loaded with the primary action and includes relevant examples.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a parameter-less list tool, the description adequately explains what galaxies are and gives examples. However, it could mention the lack of result limits or pagination for completeness.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has zero parameters, and the description provides context about what galaxies represent, which adds value beyond the empty schema. Baseline 4 applies per guidelines.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool lists MISP galaxies, with specific examples like threat actor profiles and MITRE ATT&CK. It distinguishes the tool's function well from siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance on when to use this tool versus sibling tools like misp_list_tags or misp_list_events. No context on prerequisites or alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
misp_list_tagsA
List all tags configured on the MISP instance. Useful for discovering taxonomy values (TLP levels, malware families, campaign names) before running a tag-scoped search.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It accurately describes a read-only listing operation with no destructive behavior, which is sufficient for this simple tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two concise sentences: the first states the purpose, the second provides usage context. No unnecessary words or redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a parameterless list tool with low complexity, the description fully covers what the tool does and when to use it. No output schema is needed, so completeness is achieved.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters; the description need not add parameter details. Baseline score of 4 applies as no additional information is required.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states 'List all tags configured on the MISP instance' with a specific verb and resource. It also explains the usefulness for discovering taxonomy values, distinguishing it from sibling tools like misp_list_events or misp_get_event.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description includes a usage scenario: 'before running a tag-scoped search'. While it doesn't explicitly state when not to use, it provides clear context and no sibling tool covers the same purpose.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
misp_search_attributesA
Search MISP attributes (IOCs) directly. Faster than searching events when you have a specific IOC type/value pair to look up.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| value | No | ||
| type | No | ||
| category | No | ||
| tag | No | ||
| limit | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries full burden. It only mentions speed but does not disclose what the tool returns (e.g., list of attributes, count), authentication needs, or side effects. There is no behavioral context beyond the purpose.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, highly concise, and front-loaded with the purpose. No unnecessary words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool has 5 parameters, 0% schema coverage, and no output schema, the description is incomplete. It lacks parameter explanations, output format, and error handling information. The use case comparison is helpful but insufficient for full agent understanding.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description does not explain any of the 5 parameters (value, type, category, tag, limit). The description adds no meaning beyond what the parameter names imply, leaving the agent with insufficient guidance on how to use each parameter.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states it searches MISP attributes (IOCs) and explicitly distinguishes from searching events by claiming it's faster for specific IOC type/value pairs. It differentiates from sibling tools like misp_search_events.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly says when to use this tool ('when you have a specific IOC type/value pair') and implies when not to use it (for broader events search) by referencing the alternative approach.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
misp_search_eventsA
Search MISP events by tag, type, value, category, or date range. Useful for threat hunting (e.g. all events tagged with a CVE, or matching an IOC value).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| value | No | IOC value to search for (substring match) | |
| type | No | Attribute type (e.g. ip-src, domain, sha256) | |
| category | No | Attribute category (e.g. Network activity, Payload delivery) | |
| tag | No | Tag name (e.g. tlp:white, malware:trickbot) | |
| from | No | Start date YYYY-MM-DD | |
| to | No | End date YYYY-MM-DD | |
| limit | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must carry full burden. It does not disclose behavioral traits such as pagination behavior (though a limit parameter exists), output format, or implications of missing parameters. The description is minimal on what happens when no results are found or how search works (substring? exact?).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise with two sentences, front-loading the core action and providing a brief example. No wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity of 7 optional parameters, no output schema, and zero annotations, the description is adequate but not complete. It lacks details on return format, search behavior, and when to use this tool over siblings. The example adds some context but leaves gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 86%, so the input schema already provides adequate descriptions for most parameters. The tool description adds no additional meaning beyond the schema, achieving the baseline for high coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool searches MISP events by multiple criteria (tag, type, value, category, date range) and provides an example use case for threat hunting. It effectively distinguishes from siblings like misp_get_event (single event) and misp_search_attributes (search attributes).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description suggests use for threat hunting but lacks explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidelines. It does not refer to sibling tools or conditions that would make this tool preferable over others like misp_list_events or misp_search_attributes.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
misp_versionA
Health check β return the MISP server version and capability flags. Use this to verify connectivity before issuing other queries.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Since no annotations are provided, the description carries full burden. It reveals the tool is read-only and returns version/flags, but could mention it's lightweight or has no side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, front-loaded with purpose, zero filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no parameters, no output schema, and a simple operation, the description fully covers what an agent needs.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
No parameters exist, so baseline 4 applies. The description adds no param info as none is needed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool is a health check that returns server version and capability flags. It distinguishes from sibling tools which focus on events, feeds, and filters.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly advises using it to verify connectivity before other queries, providing clear when-to-use guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
8 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
misp_get_event - First observed
misp_list_events - First observed
misp_list_feeds - First observed
misp_list_galaxies - First observed
misp_list_tags - First observed
misp_search_attributes - First observed
misp_search_events - First observed
misp_version
TDQS
Each tool targets a distinct operation: event retrieval, listing, feed listing, galaxy listing, tag listing, attribute search, event search, and health check. No overlap in purpose.
All tools follow a consistent 'misp_verb_noun' pattern using snake_case, with clear verbs (get, list, search) and nouns describing the resource.
8 tools is appropriate for a read-focused MISP client, covering key browsing and search operations without being excessive or insufficient.
Covers essential reading operations (events, attributes, feeds, galaxies, tags) but lacks any creation, update, or deletion tools, limiting its usefulness for full MISP workflows.
Maintenance
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