agent-intern
This server bridges Claude Code to Google's Antigravity CLI (Gemini 3.5 Flash) and OpenAI Codex as sub-agents, enabling text Q&A, image generation, and coding tasks — all on your existing quota.
Antigravity (Gemini 3.5 Flash)
antigravity_ask: Start a new conversation for text-based Q&A, code help, file summarization, or any prompt-based task.antigravity_continue: Resume a prior conversation pinned to a specific workspace, maintaining context across follow-ups.antigravity_image: Generate images from a description; the file is saved locally and the path is returned.antigravity_swarm: Fan out multiple independent prompts to concurrent Gemini workers — useful for summarizing N files or querying N repos simultaneously.antigravity_image_swarm: Run N image generation tasks concurrently, returning all output paths in one result.watch=trueflag: Open a browser window that streams live steps (narration, commands, completions) with the final answer rendered as Markdown.antigravity_status: Check bridge version, update availability, and agy CLI health — without spending any quota.
OpenAI Codex
codex_ask: Initiate new coding sessions with real sandbox support (read-only,workspace-write,danger-full-access).codex_continue: Resume a specific prior Codex session.codex_ask_watch: Watch Codex's steps live in a browser during a new session.codex_swarm: Execute multiple Codex prompts in parallel.codex_status: Check Codex CLI compatibility and state directory health.
General
Specify a
workspaceparameter on any tool to provide file context from a specific project directory.In swarm mode, a failing worker is reported in place while others continue returning results.
Allows using Google's Antigravity (Gemini 3.5 Flash) as a sub-agent inside Claude Code for text answers and image generation, without additional API keys.
Claude Code × Antigravity + Codex + Copilot + Cursor + Grok + Kimi — MCP Bridge
Drive six external coding CLIs — Google's Antigravity (Gemini 3.8 Flash), OpenAI Codex, the GitHub Copilot CLI, Cursor, and the two experimental newcomers Grok Build and Kimi Code — as sub-agents inside Claude Code. Text answers, image generation, real repo work, and parallel swarms, on quota you already pay for.
One MCP server, six backends — four verified, two experimental. It exposes Google Antigravity, OpenAI Codex, the GitHub Copilot CLI, Cursor, and now xAI's Grok Build and Moonshot's Kimi Code to Claude Code as clean MCP tools so you can delegate work to a different model family mid-task — without leaving your terminal, and on the subscriptions you already have. Each backend is independent: install one, or all six.
🛰️ Antigravity (
agy, Gemini 3.8 Flash High). Fast, cheap tool-calling — and the only backend with an image model. Its headless print mode (agy -p) historically had a stdout bug: it wrote the answer to the controlling terminal instead of its stdout, so anything capturing stdout got nothing (and, under a TUI, agy's text leaked into the host's prompt). agy 1.0.15 fixed this on Windows —-pnow writes the clean answer to stdout — so the bridge prefers stdout and falls back to reading agy's own transcript files only when stdout is empty (older agy, non-Windows, or--sandboxruns). It still detaches agy from the terminal so older versions can't leak.🤖 Codex (
codex exec, OpenAI). A strong reasoner for real code/repo work. It writes its final message straight to a file the bridge asks for (no scraping), supports model selection, and has a real, enforced sandbox.🐙 Copilot (
copilot -p, GitHub). GitHub's agentic coder. Stdout-native like Codex (-sprints just the answer), with model selection (--model), a best-effort tool/path permission knob, and a deterministic resume mechanism (the bridge sets each session's UUID itself).✳️ Cursor (
cursor-agent -p, Cursor). Cursor's agentic coder, with the widest model menu — GPT, Claude, Grok, and Composer via--model(validated againstcursor-agent models). Stdout-native like Codex/Copilot (--output-format textprints just the answer), an agent-enforced sandbox (read-only via--mode ask), and a deterministic resume mechanism (the bridge mints each chat's id itself viacreate-chat). No image model.🧪 Grok Build (
grok -p, xAI) — EXPERIMENTAL. xAI's terminal coding agent, and the only backend besides Codex with a real OS sandbox — though only on Linux/macOS. Stdout-native (--output-format jsonreturns the answer and the session id), with-rresume,streaming-jsonfor watch mode, and full swarm support. Never verified end-to-end — see below.🌙 Kimi Code (
kimi -p, Moonshot) — EXPERIMENTAL. Moonshot's terminal coding agent (Kimi K2 family). Stdout-native (--output-format text), resumes per working directory (-c). No sandbox — print mode auto-executes every tool, like Antigravity. Never verified end-to-end — see below.
They share the same niceties: a *_continue to resume a thread, a live "watch" window
to see the agent work, a unified agent_swarm that runs many tasks in parallel across
all backends at once, and *_status diagnostics that spend no quota. (Kimi is the one exception:
no watch or swarm support yet — see Experimental backends.)
Grok Build and Kimi Code ship unverified, and I need your help. I don't have a Grok or Kimi subscription, so no authenticated round-trip has ever run against either backend. Everything up to each CLI's auth wall is verified live — flag surface, error shapes, model list, on-disk layout — but everything behind it comes from vendor docs and could be wrong. If you have either subscription, one issue from the verification template is the single most useful contribution you can make. Even confirming one checkbox helps. Full detail →
This runs unsandboxed code with your privileges. agy -p auto-executes its tools
(read/write files, run shell commands, reach the network) with no usable approval gate — its
--sandbox blocks only shell commands, leaving file writes and network egress wide open.
codex exec also runs autonomously, but its sandbox flag (default read-only) is a real,
enforced boundary. copilot -p runs headless with --allow-all-tools; its sandbox maps to
best-effort tool/path permissions (read-only denies the local write/shell tools) — safer than
agy, but not an OS sandbox like Codex's. cursor-agent -p runs headless with --trust (and
--force for writes); its sandbox is agent-enforced (read-only = --mode ask, which makes the
write/shell tools unavailable) — best-effort like Copilot, not an OS sandbox. grok -p runs
headless with --always-approve; its sandbox maps to a real OS profile (Landlock/Seatbelt) —
but only on Linux and macOS, and on Windows grok silently continues without enforcement, so
read-only there rests on an agent-enforced tool allowlist. kimi -p has no sandbox at all and
auto-executes every tool, like agy. In all six cases
the workspace argument is a starting context, not a security boundary. Only use these with trusted prompts on trusted
content; for real isolation, run the bridge inside a container or VM. Full details →
Why you'd want this
🧠 Second opinion | Ask a different model family — Gemini or GPT — mid-task without switching tools. |
🎨 Image generation | Have Gemini draw an image and get the saved file back — no extra API key or image tool. |
🛠️ Real coding sub-agent | Hand a focused repo task to Codex with a real |
💸 Cheap delegation | Burn Antigravity / Codex quota on grunt work instead of Claude tokens. |
🐝 Parallel fan-out | Run N tasks at once, mixing Gemini and Codex workers in a single swarm. |
📁 Cross-repo reads | Point a worker at another project directory and let it read/answer there. |
🔌 Zero new auth | Piggybacks the logins you already did — no keys for the bridge to manage. |
Related MCP server: mcp-cli-tools
The backends at a glance
The bridge normalizes every CLI into the same shape, but they differ where it matters. Pick per task. The four verified backends first; the two experimental ones follow.
🛰️ Antigravity ( | 🤖 Codex ( | 🐙 Copilot ( | ✳️ Cursor ( | |
Model | Selectable via | Selectable via | Selectable via | Selectable via |
Best at | Fast, cheap tool-calling; quick answers | Heavier reasoning; real code/repo work | Agentic coding; real code/repo work | Agentic coding; wide model menu (GPT/Claude/Grok/Composer) |
Image generation | ✅ | ❌ no image model | ❌ no image model | ❌ no image model |
Sandbox | ❌ no real boundary ( | ✅ real, enforced: | ⚠️ best-effort: tool/path permissions ( | ⚠️ agent-enforced: mode/force ( |
How the answer is read |
| Written to a file via | stdout ( | stdout ( |
Continue mechanism | Pins the workspace's conversation id ( | Resumes the session id ( | Resumes a self-set session UUID ( | Mints a chat id ( |
Auth | OS credential store (AI Pro session) |
| OS credential store ( |
|
In a swarm | Runs with an isolated | Fresh one-shot — needs no isolation | Fresh one-shot — needs no isolation | Fresh one-shot — needs no isolation |
🧪 The two experimental backends — and how you can help
Grok Build and Kimi Code are wired in exactly like the other four, with one honest difference: no authenticated round-trip has ever run against either. I don't have a SuperGrok / X Premium+ subscription or a Kimi plan, so I cannot prove they answer. They ship anyway because a bridge nobody can install is a bridge nobody can verify — and because the parts that usually rot are already pinned down.
What is verified live (each CLI installed, run, and observed — just never logged in):
🧪 Grok Build ( | 🌙 Kimi Code ( | |
Verified against | grok 1.0.3 / Windows | kimi 0.29.1 / Windows |
Flag surface | ✅ read off the open-source clap definitions (xai-org/grok-build), then confirmed against live | ✅ confirmed against live |
Auth failure mode | ✅ exit 1 + | ✅ exit 1 + stderr |
Model list | ✅ | ⚠️ none — Kimi has no |
On-disk layout | ✅ | ✅ |
Concurrency | ✅ parallel | ❔ untested |
What is NOT verified — everything behind the auth wall:
the happy-path answer itself: Grok's
jsonenvelope (text/sessionId) and Kimi's stdout answer;that
-r/-creally restore context;Grok's
streaming-jsonevent stream, which watch mode renders;whether Grok's sandbox profiles behave as documented (and note: auth is checked before
--sandboxand-mare validated, so a bad value can't even be observed while logged out — which is why the bridge validates both client-side).
Deliberately scoped out for Kimi: agent_swarm and watch support. Both would depend on Kimi's
stream-json envelope, and adding an unverified dependency on top of an unverified backend is how
you get two bugs that mask each other. Grok gets both, because its stream format is documented in
detail and its error events were observed live.
How to help
If you have either subscription, please open a verification issue. The template is a checklist — tick only what you actually saw. The first box ("a fresh ask returned a real answer") is worth more than all the others combined, and takes about a minute:
# 1. Does the setup look right? (spends no quota)
# -> call grok_status / kimi_status from Claude Code
# 2. Does it answer?
# -> call grok_ask("say hi") / kimi_ask("say hi")
# 3. If it fails, does the raw CLI fail the same way?
grok -p "say hi" --output-format json
kimi -p "say hi" --output-format textThat last command is the one I can't run from here, and it's what separates "the bridge is wrong" from "the CLI changed". Partial reports are welcome; so is a plain "it didn't work, here's the error".
How it works
All six backends run headless and one-shot per call; the bridge's job is to get a clean answer out of each and hand it to Claude Code as a plain string.
flowchart LR
A([Claude Code]) -- "MCP tool call" --> B["bridge<br/>(server.py)"]
B -- "antigravity_*" --> C[agy -p]
B -- "codex_*" --> D[codex exec]
B -- "copilot_*" --> E[copilot -p]
B -- "cursor_*" --> F[cursor-agent -p]
C -- "json / stream-json (1.1.8+)<br/>else stdout or transcript.jsonl / .db" --> B
D -- "output-last-message file" --> B
E -- "stdout (-s silent)" --> B
F -- "stdout (--output-format text)" --> B
B -- "plain text" --> AAntigravity. On agy 1.1.8+ the bridge asks for structured output and reads a contractual
field instead of guessing: plain calls use --output-format json and return its response, while
watch mode uses --output-format stream-json and rebuilds the answer from the stream's
terminal result event (the same shape the Cursor bridge already used). Both also carry a
conversation_id, which the bridge records so antigravity_continue pins exactly the thread it
last ran in that workspace.
Older agy has no such flag, so the original path stays: on 1.0.15+ (Windows) agy -p writes its
clean answer to stdout and the bridge returns that; on older agy — or non-Windows, or a --sandbox
run — stdout is empty and the bridge falls back to agy's own transcript at:
~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/brain/<conv-id>/.system_generated/logs/transcript.jsonlFor that fallback it locates the conversation via cache/last_conversations.json (falling back to the
newest brain/ directory touched since launch), streams the transcript, and returns the final
source=MODEL, status=DONE, type=PLANNER_RESPONSE entry — the answer, minus the intermediate
tool-calling steps (or the SQLite .db agy dual-writes, when no JSONL exists). This fallback still
runs on 1.1.8+ whenever a run yields no result, so nothing depends on the structured path alone.
Codex. codex exec is well-behaved: the bridge passes -o/--output-last-message <file> and
codex writes its final message straight there — no scraping. Continue works by capturing the session
id from codex's own rollout files (~/.codex/sessions/.../rollout-*.jsonl) and resuming with
codex exec resume <id>, falling back to the newest on-disk session for that cwd after a server
restart.
Copilot. copilot -p "<prompt>" -s runs a prompt non-interactively and prints the clean final
answer to stdout — the bridge reads it there, no scraping. It runs headless with --allow-all-tools --no-ask-user --no-auto-update (so it never blocks on a prompt), and disables copilot's flaky
builtin GitHub-API MCP by default for predictable latency (COPILOT_GITHUB_MCP=1 re-enables it).
Continue is deterministic: copilot's --session-id <uuid> both sets a new session's id and
resumes an existing one, so the bridge generates the UUID itself, pins it to the workspace, and
resumes that exact session — falling back after a restart to the newest on-disk session
(~/.copilot/session-state/<id>/workspace.yaml) whose recorded cwd matches.
Cursor. cursor-agent -p --output-format text --trust "<prompt>" runs a prompt non-interactively
and writes the clean final answer straight to stdout — the bridge reads it there, no scraping
(--trust trusts the workspace so it never blocks on a prompt). Continue is deterministic and
race-free: cursor-agent create-chat mints a fresh chat and prints its id, so the bridge mints the
id itself, pins it to the workspace, and resumes that exact chat with -p --resume <chatId> — no
rollout-scraping. After a restart it falls back to the newest on-disk chat under
~/.cursor/chats/<md5(workspace)>/<chat-id>/ whose meta.json cwd matches (the chat-dir hash is
itself md5 of the workspace path).
Set up in 60 seconds
Prerequisites — install whichever backend(s) you want, and sign in once each:
Antigravity: install
agyand sign in to Antigravity once (via the IDE oragy -i).Codex: install
codexand runcodex loginonce (ChatGPT account or API key).Copilot: install
copilot(npm i -g @github/copilot, orwinget install GitHub.Copilot) and runcopilotthen/loginonce (or set aCOPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKENenv var).Cursor: install
cursor-agent(curl https://cursor.com/install -fsSL | bash) and runcursor-agent loginonce (or set aCURSOR_API_KEYenv var).
You don't need all six — the tools for a missing CLI simply report "not found" via their *_status
tool.
Recommended — no clone, you control updates
With uv installed, register the bridge straight from
PyPI under mcpServers in ~/.claude.json — no
path to hardcode, no git pull to remember:
"agent-intern": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["agent-intern"]
}uvx pins to the version it first caches and does not auto-upgrade, so you never run an update you
didn't choose — important, since the bridge runs unsandboxed code: a surprise (or
compromised) release can't execute until you opt in. You still get told when there's something to
opt into: any *_status call reports whether a newer release is out, and Claude is instructed to
pass that on when it sees it. (There's a startup check too, but it writes to stderr — that only
reaches your MCP logs, not you.) Upgrade deliberately and restart Claude Code:
uvx agent-intern@latest # fetch + run the newest release (refreshes uv's cache)Prefer hands-off auto-updates? Put"args": ["agent-intern@latest"] in the config instead —
every launch runs the newest release. Convenient, but it pulls new code without asking each time.
From source
Clone it instead if you want to hack on the bridge or pin a local copy:
git clone https://github.com/SinanTufekci/agent-intern.git
cd agent-intern
pip install fastmcp
python test_smoke.py # 4 real round-trips (ask, continue, image, swarm) — prints four PASS linesThe smoke test costs a tiny bit of quota and takes ~30–60 s. It exercises the Antigravity path.
Then point Claude Code at the absolute path to server.py under mcpServers in ~/.claude.json:
"agent-intern": {
"command": "python",
"args": ["C:\\path\\to\\server.py"]
}"agent-intern": {
"command": "python3",
"args": ["/path/to/server.py"]
}Restart Claude Code. Twenty-one tools appear, each prefixed mcp__agent-intern__:
Antigravity (5):
antigravity_ask,antigravity_continue,antigravity_image,antigravity_image_swarm,antigravity_statusCodex (3):
codex_ask,codex_continue,codex_statusCopilot (3):
copilot_ask,copilot_continue,copilot_statusCursor (3):
cursor_ask,cursor_continue,cursor_statusGrok (3, experimental):
grok_ask,grok_continue,grok_statusKimi (3, experimental):
kimi_ask,kimi_continue,kimi_statusShared (1):
agent_swarm— fans a list of tasks out across five backends in one run (everything but Kimi)
The single-prompt tools — Antigravity, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, and Grok — take a watch=true
flag for the live browser view (Watch mode). Kimi has no watch mode yet.
Your client learns how to use the bridge on its own. The server ships MCP instructions — a
short routing guide (when to reach for each tool, which backend to pick, and to pass workspace so
the sub-agent has repo context) that a client like Claude Code injects into the model's context on
connect, as an "MCP Server Instructions" block. So the host model knows how and when to drive these
tools without you explaining them — you can just ask for the result.
"Use antigravity_ask to summarize the README of this repo in three bullets." → Claude routes the prompt through the bridge, agy reads the file under the workspace root, and the answer comes back as a plain string. Swap in
codex_ask,copilot_ask, orcursor_askto have GPT, Copilot, or Cursor do the same.
Tools
🛰️ Antigravity
Tool | Purpose |
| Start a new Antigravity conversation. |
| Continue the conversation rooted at |
| Generate an image; saves the file (extension corrected to the real bytes) and returns its path + format/size. |
| Generate several images in parallel (one worker per prompt). |
| Setup diagnostics: the bridge's own version + whether a newer release is available, remaining AI Pro quota per model family (agy 1.1.11+), plus agy version/compat, state dirs, and newest-transcript readability. Spends no quota. |
🤖 Codex
Tool | Purpose |
| Start a new Codex session. |
| Continue the Codex session rooted at |
| Setup diagnostics: codex version, login status ( |
🐙 Copilot
Tool | Purpose |
| Start a new Copilot session. |
| Continue the Copilot session rooted at |
| Setup diagnostics: copilot version, an auth hint (no |
✳️ Cursor
Tool | Purpose |
| Start a new Cursor chat. |
| Continue the Cursor chat rooted at |
| Setup diagnostics: the bridge's own version + whether a newer release is available, plus cursor version and login status ( |
🧪 Grok Build (experimental — unverified)
Tool | Purpose |
| Start a new Grok session. |
| Continue the Grok session rooted at |
| Setup diagnostics: the bridge's own version + whether a newer release is available, plus grok version, auth state, and the model list — the last two both from |
🌙 Kimi Code (experimental — unverified)
Tool | Purpose |
| Start a new Kimi session. No |
| Continue the Kimi session rooted at |
| Setup diagnostics: bridge version + update check, kimi version, whether a provider is configured ( |
🐝 Shared
Tool | Purpose |
| Run several tasks in parallel across five backends — each task names its |
workspace defaults to the MCP server's current working directory. Point it at a real project dir
for context-aware answers — every backend gives the model access to files under that root (Codex,
Copilot, and Cursor honoring their sandbox).
sandbox now applies to Antigravity too. It used to be silently ignored there, so an agy task
written as {"backend": "agy", "sandbox": "read-only"} ran completely unrestricted while reading as
though it were fenced. "read-only" maps to agy's plan mode, "danger-full-access" says plainly
that the worker is unrestricted, and "workspace-write" is refused — agy has no write scoping to
offer, and accepting it would promise a fence that doesn't exist. Omitting sandbox leaves an
Antigravity worker unrestricted, unlike every other backend, whose default is read-only: that
long-standing default is left alone so existing file-writing swarms keep working, so fence agy
explicitly when you want it fenced.
antigravity_image forces agy to save to an explicit absolute path — without one, agy
falls back to its own scratch dir (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/scratch/). It then
corrects the file extension to match the real bytes: agy's image model picks the
format itself (JPEG for photo-like images, PNG for flat graphics), so a requested
out.png may come back as out.jpg. The returned path always reflects the true
format.
🤖 Codex bridge — the well-behaved sibling
codex exec writes its final message to a file the bridge asks for via -o/--output-last-message,
so the answer comes back without any scraping (where agy needed a transcript workaround before 1.0.15
fixed its stdout). Three things make Codex worth reaching for over Antigravity:
Real sandbox.
sandboxacceptsread-only(default — reads and answers, writes nothing),workspace-write(may edit files under the workspace), ordanger-full-access(no sandbox — avoid). Unlike agy's no-op--sandbox, codex's-sactually enforces this.codex exechas no interactive approval gate, so this flag is your safety boundary — opt into write access deliberately.Model selection works.
modelmaps to codex's-m. (agy's--modelworks in print mode too as of 1.0.16; every backend now exposes the samemodelknob, except Kimi, which has no list to validate against.)Stronger reasoning. Codex is a coding agent, not an image model — there's no
codex_image. Its strength is reasoning and real code/repo work; hand it the jobs that need a heavier model.
Auth. Uses your existing Codex login (ChatGPT account or API key). Run codex login once; check
with codex_status. No new keys for the bridge to manage.
codex exec runs the model as an autonomous agent with no interactive approval gate. The
sandbox flag (default read-only) is the real boundary, but workspace-write /
danger-full-access let it modify files — and a swarm runs N agents at once. Only use it with
trusted prompts on trusted content.
🐙 Copilot bridge — GitHub's agentic coder
The GitHub Copilot CLI (copilot, from @github/copilot) is stdout-native like Codex:
copilot -p "<prompt>" -s runs a prompt non-interactively and prints just the final answer to
stdout, so the bridge reads it there — no scraping. What makes it worth reaching for:
Model selection.
modelmaps to copilot's--model;autolets Copilot pick. Unlike the agy and cursor tools, the bridge can't validate this — copilot exposes no non-interactive model list — and the working set is account-dependent: on a Copilot Pro account here,autoworked whilegpt-5.3-codex,claude-sonnet-4.6, and even GitHub's own--helpexamplegpt-5.4were all rejected as "not available". So omitmodel(account default) or passautounless you know your plan's ids; an unavailable one errors immediately with copilot's message, costing a call.Deterministic, race-free continue. copilot's
--session-id <uuid>both sets a new session's id and resumes an existing one, so the bridge generates the UUID itself and pins it to the workspace — no rollout-scraping. After a restart it falls back to the newest on-disk session (~/.copilot/session-state/<id>/workspace.yaml) whose recordedcwdmatches.Fast by default. Runs with
--allow-all-tools --no-ask-user --no-auto-update, and disables copilot's builtin GitHub-API MCP (--disable-builtin-mcps) because its flaky HTTP connect can stall a call up to ~60 s. SetCOPILOT_GITHUB_MCP=1to keep it (for Copilot's issue/PR/repo tools).
Sandbox is best-effort, not enforced. Unlike Codex's OS sandbox, copilot's boundary is
tool/path permissions. The sandbox knob maps to copilot flags for a uniform cross-backend field:
read-only(default) — auto-approves tools so it runs headless, then denies the localwriteandshelltools (--deny-tool). Best-effort: it is not an OS sandbox, and network/MCP tools can still act. For a hard read-only boundary, usecodex_askinstead.workspace-write— writes allowed, but file access stays confined to the workspace (no--allow-all-paths).danger-full-access—--allow-all(tools + all paths + all URLs). Avoid.
Auth. Uses your existing Copilot login — run copilot then /login once (stored in the OS
credential store), or set COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN for headless use. Check
with copilot_status. If copilot isn't on PATH (the winget install can land off a stale PATH),
set COPILOT_BIN to its full path — e.g.
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WinGet\Packages\GitHub.Copilot_*\copilot.exe.
copilot -p runs the model as an autonomous agent with --allow-all-tools (required to run
headless). Its sandbox is best-effort tool/path permissions, not an OS sandbox — safer than
agy, weaker than Codex's read-only. Only use it with trusted prompts on trusted content.
✳️ Cursor bridge — the widest model menu
Cursor's agent CLI (cursor-agent, from cursor.com/cli) is stdout-native
like Codex and Copilot: cursor-agent -p --output-format text --trust "<prompt>" runs a prompt
non-interactively and writes just the final answer to stdout, so the bridge reads it there — no
scraping (--trust trusts the workspace so it won't block on a prompt). What makes it worth reaching
for:
The widest model menu.
modelmaps to cursor's--model(e.g.auto,gpt-5.2,claude-opus-4-8-high,composer-2.5,cursor-grok-4.5-high) — GPT, Claude, Grok, and Composer in one place, ~190 ids at the time of writing. cursor bakes the effort and speed axes into the id (…-low/-high/-xhigh/-max, each with a-fasttwin), and also accepts a bracket form on the family base, e.g.claude-opus-4-8[context=1m,effort=high]. The bridge validates againstcursor-agent modelsand rejects a typo up front (like agy), accepting either an exact id or a family base. Omitmodelto use your Cursor account default. cursor reshuffles this list often — runcursor-agent models(orcursor_status) rather than trusting an example here.Deterministic, race-free continue.
cursor-agent create-chatmints a fresh chat and prints its id, and-p --resume <chatId>resumes that exact chat — so the bridge mints the id itself, pins it to the workspace, and resumes deterministically (no rollout-scraping, same idea as Copilot's self-set session id). After a restart it falls back to the newest on-disk chat under~/.cursor/chats/<md5(workspace)>/<chat-id>/whosemeta.jsoncwdmatches (the chat-dir hash is itself md5 of the workspace path).
Sandbox is agent-enforced, not an OS sandbox. Like Copilot, cursor's boundary is which tools the
agent can reach, not an OS jail. The sandbox knob maps to cursor's mode/force flags for a uniform
cross-backend field:
read-only(default) —--mode ask: thewriteandshelltools are unavailable, so cursor analyzes and answers but makes no edits (verified: it refuses to write files). Agent-enforced and best-effort — it is not an OS sandbox. For a hard read-only boundary, usecodex_askinstead.workspace-write—--force: edits and commands allowed, file access rooted at--workspace.danger-full-access—--force --sandbox disabled(OS sandbox off). Avoid.
(Cursor also exposes an OS-level --sandbox enabled/disabled; the bridge drives the uniform field via
mode/force.)
Auth. Uses your existing Cursor login — run cursor-agent login once (OS credential store), or
set CURSOR_API_KEY for headless use. Check with cursor_status. If cursor-agent isn't reliably on
PATH (the installer drops a cursor-agent.CMD shim a bare name can't launch on Windows), set
CURSOR_BIN to its full path — mirrors the AGY_BIN/CODEX_BIN/COPILOT_BIN overrides.
cursor-agent -p runs the model as an autonomous agent with --trust (and --force when
writes are allowed). Its sandbox is agent-enforced (read-only makes the write/shell tools
unavailable), not an OS sandbox — safer than agy, weaker than Codex's read-only. Only use it with
trusted prompts on trusted content.
🧪 Grok Build bridge — a real sandbox, on two of three platforms
EXPERIMENTAL — never verified end-to-end. Everything below the "Auth" line is confirmed against a live grok 1.0.3; the answer path is not. See Experimental backends, and please report what you find.
xAI's Grok Build (grok, installed with
curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh | bash, or irm https://x.ai/cli/install.ps1 | iex on
Windows) is stdout-native like Codex/Copilot/Cursor: grok -p "<prompt>" --output-format json runs a
prompt non-interactively and writes a single JSON result object to stdout. What makes it interesting:
It's open source. xai-org/grok-build publishes the actual CLI source, so this bridge's flag surface was read off the real clap definitions rather than inferred from docs — then confirmed against
grok --help. That's a much stronger footing than a docs-derived bridge, and it caught a live discrepancy: xAI's own headless docs use-m grok-buildin their examples, but the real default on 1.0.3 isgrok-4.5.The answer carries its own session id.
--output-format jsonreturns{"text": …, "sessionId": …, "usage": …}, so the bridge pins that id and resumes the exact session with-r <id>— no id-minting dance like Cursor's, no rollout-scraping like Codex's. After a restart it falls back to-c, grok's own "most recent session for this cwd", so continue survives without ever reading grok's opaque SQLite session store.Free auth + model checks.
grok modelsanswers while logged out (exit 0, printingYou are not authenticated.and the catalogue), sogrok_statusand model validation cost nothing and need no login.
Sandbox is real — on Linux and macOS. This is the only backend besides Codex with an OS-enforced boundary, but read the platform caveat:
read-only(default) —--sandbox read-onlyplus a--toolsallowlist (read_file,list_dir,grep,glob,web_search,web_fetch) plus--no-subagents.workspace-write—--sandbox workspace: writes land in the workspace,~/.grok, and temp.danger-full-access—--sandbox off. Avoid.
On Windows, grok's OS sandbox does not apply. It's implemented with Landlock (Linux) and
Seatbelt (macOS); where it can't be applied, xAI's docs say grok "logs a warning and continues
without enforcement." That's why read-only here doesn't lean on the profile alone — the tool
allowlist is agent-enforced and holds on every platform. An allowlist, not a denylist, precisely
because it fails safe: a future grok that adds a new write tool can't silently slip through it.
Note that MCP meta-tools stay available under an allowlist, so a configured MCP server could still
write. For a hard boundary on every platform, use codex_ask.
Every mode also passes --always-approve: grok's headless mode does not auto-approve on its own
(unlike agy and Kimi), and there's no human to answer a prompt. Containment comes from the profile and
the allowlist, not from the approval gate.
Auth. grok login (browser OAuth), grok login --device-code (headless), or an XAI_API_KEY env
var; credentials cache in ~/.grok/auth.json. Needs a SuperGrok or X Premium+ subscription. Check
with grok_status. Set GROK_BIN to override the executable path — though the bridge already
falls back to the installer's own ~/.grok/bin when grok isn't on PATH, which matters because the
installer appends to the user PATH and that never reaches an already-running server process.
GROK_HOME relocates the whole data dir. The bridge disables grok's background auto-updater per call
via GROK_DISABLE_AUTOUPDATER=1 — a CLI that updates itself mid-session has broken this project
before.
🌙 Kimi Code bridge — no sandbox, per-directory sessions
EXPERIMENTAL — never verified end-to-end. See Experimental backends.
Moonshot's Kimi Code (kimi, npm
@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) runs the Kimi K2 family. kimi -p "<prompt>" --output-format text writes
the clean final answer to stdout.
Continue is per-directory. Kimi scopes sessions to the working directory and exposes
-c/--continue, so the bridge just re-runs withcwd=workspaceand-c— no id to capture, and no restart problem. (-S/--session <id>exists but is deliberately unused: its on-disk format couldn't be verified.)No model validation. Kimi has no
modelscommand; aliases are user-defined in~/.kimi-code/config.tomlunder[models."<alias>"].modelis a lenient pass-through, so a bad alias surfaces as Kimi's own run-time error.-prefuses--autoand--yolo(verified live on 0.29.1: "Cannot combine --prompt with …") because print mode is already self-approving — so the bridge passes neither.
Kimi has no sandbox and no sandbox argument. Print mode auto-executes every tool call with no
approval gate — the same posture as agy's print mode. No flag makes it safe. Only use it with
trusted prompts on trusted content.
Auth. kimi login (device-code OAuth) or an API key in ~/.kimi-code/config.toml (it does not
read a bare env var). Check with kimi_status, which reads kimi provider list as the auth proxy.
Set KIMI_BIN to override the executable path; KIMI_CODE_HOME relocates the data dir.
No swarm or watch support, deliberately — both would depend on Kimi's stream-json envelope,
which no one has confirmed. They'll follow a successful verification report.
👁️ Watch mode — Agent Intern (experimental)
Pass watch=true to any single-prompt tool — antigravity_ask, antigravity_continue,
antigravity_image, codex_ask, codex_continue, copilot_ask, copilot_continue, cursor_ask,
cursor_continue, grok_ask, or grok_continue — to watch
the agent work live in a little chat-style browser window called Agent Intern. The agent
still runs headless; alongside it the bridge serves a tiny page on 127.0.0.1 and opens it in a
small, chromeless app window that renders the exchange as a conversation: your prompt shows as a
chat bubble, the agent's live steps stream in a collapsible "thinking" trace — its planner narration
(▸), the real commands it runs ($), and completions (✓), read live (from agy's
--output-format stream-json on 1.1.8+ — its transcript on older agy — or codex's / copilot's JSON
event stream, or cursor's / grok's streaming-json) — and the final
answer arrives as a Markdown card (and, for
antigravity_image with watch=true, the generated image shown inline). A *_continue run
opens with the prior turns of the conversation shown as history, so it reads as one ongoing
thread rather than a blank new window. (A watched cursor_continue is the exception — Cursor stores
its transcript in an opaque SQLite blob, so its window opens without visible prior-turn history.)
Cross-platform & best-effort. Prefers a Chromium browser (
--appmode) for the windowed look; falls back to a normal browser window. If nothing can open, the run still completes and returns normally.Window size. Set
AGY_WATCH_WINDOW_SIZE(e.g.AGY_WATCH_WINDOW_SIZE=480,700) to resize the window; default is560,760. Press Enter / Esc in the window to close it.One window, reused — but concurrent runs stay separate. Repeated sequential watch calls reuse the already-open window instead of stacking a new one (the open page resets itself for the new run; the swarm dashboard rebuilds for the new fan-out). A run that starts while another watched run is still working gets its own window instead — so two concurrent single-worker runs (e.g. a
codex_askand acopilot_askat once) each stream into their own view and never clobber each other. If you closed the window, the next run opens a fresh one. SetAGY_WATCH_ALWAYS_NEW=1to force a new window every time.Access control. The viewer is an HTTP server, and it serves your prompts, the answers, and the real commands the agents ran — so it binds
127.0.0.1on an ephemeral port and requires two things on every request: a loopbackHostheader (which is what makes DNS rebinding fail — a rebound page arrives under the attacker's hostname) and a per-process token carried in the URL, which stops another local process or another user on a shared machine from simply connecting. The bridge puts the token in every URL it opens, so none of this is visible in normal use. Worth knowing because the server starts lazily but is never stopped: onewatch=truerun leaves the port listening for the life of the MCP server.Chat layout & history. Prompts render as chat bubbles (labelled CLAUDE, since the MCP client writes them) — long ones clamp to a few lines with a show more / show less toggle — and answers as Markdown cards tagged with the backend (AGY / CODEX / COPILOT / CURSOR). A
*_continuerun seeds the window with the conversation's prior turns, read from each backend's own session store (agy's transcript, codex's rollout, copilot'sevents.jsonl; Cursor's store is opaque, so a watchedcursor_continueopens without visible history). The swarm's per-worker detail window uses the same chat design for its one task.Progress, keyboard & copy. Each panel shows a time progress bar (elapsed / timeout). The swarm dashboard adds an overall done/total bar and per-row time bars; use ↑/↓ to select a worker and ↵ to open its detail window. Answers render as Markdown with a copy button, and a "jump to latest" badge appears if you scroll up.
Coarse, not token-level. The backends flush their step stream in chunks, so you get a handful of live steps, not character streaming. The returned value is identical to the non-watch call. Nothing is sent anywhere but your own machine.
🐝 Swarm — run agents in parallel
agent_swarm fans a list of tasks out to workers that run truly
concurrently (capped at max_concurrency, default 4), then returns every
worker's result in one block. Each task names its own backend, so a single
swarm can mix Antigravity (Gemini), Codex, Copilot, and Cursor workers — hand the
reasoning-heavy jobs to Codex, Copilot, or Cursor and the quick ones to Gemini, all at
once. Good for independent sub-tasks: summarise N files, ask the same question
about N repos, fix N bugs. (antigravity_image_swarm stays separate — it
generates N images, and only agy has an image model.)
agent_swarm(tasks=[
{"backend": "antigravity", "prompt": "Summarise src/auth.py in 2 bullets."},
{"backend": "codex", "prompt": "Find and fix the failing test in tests/",
"sandbox": "workspace-write", "workspace": "./repo"},
{"backend": "copilot", "prompt": "Explain what src/api.py exposes.",
"sandbox": "read-only", "workspace": "./repo"},
{"backend": "cursor", "prompt": "Draft a docstring for src/utils.py.",
"model": "auto", "workspace": "./repo"},
{"backend": "grok", "prompt": "List the public exports of src/index.ts.",
"sandbox": "read-only", "model": "grok-4.5", "workspace": "./repo"},
])How it stays correct under concurrency. The single-agent agy tools serialize
through a lock because agy rewrites last_conversations.json on every call, so
concurrent runs sharing one state dir would race. The swarm sidesteps this: each
agy worker runs with its own isolated HOME/USERPROFILE, so agy's
brain/, cache/, and last_conversations.json never collide — no lock needed.
Auth still works because agy reads it from the OS credential store, not from
~/.gemini (verified on agy 1.0.9). Codex, Copilot, and Cursor workers need no such
isolation — each is a fresh one-shot (codex exec with its own -o file; copilot -p with its own self-set session id; cursor-agent -p with its own minted chat id). Each worker's cwd is its real workspace,
so file access is unchanged. Measured ~2.8× speedup at 3 agy workers (the AI Pro
backend does not serialize per-account); higher max_concurrency trades
quota/rate-limit pressure for wall-clock.
Per-task fields —
backend(antigravity/codex/copilot/cursor/grok) andpromptare required;workspacedefaults to the server cwd;sandboxandmodelapply to Codex, Copilot, and Cursor (ignored for Antigravity). Swarm workers are one-shot — there is no*_continuefor a swarm worker's session.Error isolation — a worker that fails is reported in place; the others still return.
watch=true— opens a thin live Agent Swarm dashboard (one row per worker, with a backend badge, repo, prompt, and latest step). Click a row to pop that agent into its own window streaming its full step log.
A swarm launchesN unsandboxed agents at once — N× the prompt-injection
"lethal trifecta" surface of a single call (see Security). Only use
it with trusted prompts on trusted content. Codex workers honor their
enforced sandbox; Copilot and Cursor workers honor their best-effort sandbox;
Antigravity workers have no real boundary.
Model & auth
🛰️ Antigravity | 🤖 Codex | 🐙 Copilot | ✳️ Cursor | |
Model | Selectable via the | Selectable via the | Selectable via the | Selectable via the |
Auth | Piggybacks whatever credential store | Uses your existing Codex login — ChatGPT account or API key. Run | Uses your existing Copilot login — run | Uses your existing Cursor login — run |
⚠️ Security
All six backends run the model as an autonomous agent. The difference is whether you get a real boundary: Codex enforces one everywhere and Grok on Linux/macOS only; Copilot and Cursor offer best-effort ones; Antigravity and Kimi offer none.
Antigravity — no usable boundary
agy -p executes its own tools — reading and writing files, running shell commands, reaching
the network — with no approval gate. Through agy 1.1.2 that was simply how print mode worked,
with no opt-out at all. As of 1.1.3 it is a choice the bridge makes: agy finally gates headless
tool calls, and the bridge deliberately opts out with --dangerously-skip-permissions, because a
gated -p can do no useful work (it soft-denies even a plain file read, and print mode has no way
to prompt). The posture below is therefore unchanged — assume every call runs arbitrary code with
your privileges. The one exception is the opt-in plan=True described in the last bullet; it is
a real restriction, but an agent-enforced one, so it does not change the default posture. Re-verified empirically on agy 1.0.9 / Windows, with the 1.1.3 amendment noted:
Print mode runs out-of-workspace file writes and live network fetches even without
--dangerously-skip-permissions— that flag was a no-op for-pthrough 1.1.2. As of 1.1.3 it is load-bearing: without it every tool-using call is soft-denied, and the bridge now always passes it (it must precede-p, whose value is the prompt). There is still no agy flag that makes print mode both safe and useful.agy 1.0.5 integrated a permission system (its logs show
toolPermission=request-review), but it still does not gate print-mode execution — a fresh-prun created a file outside the workspace with no prompt. agy 1.0.12 reshuffled how that permission config merges (per-project files under~/.gemini/config/projects/now take precedence over~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/settings.json), and 1.0.13 made "Always Approve" rule matching strict (non-regex) by default with aregex:opt-in and relaxed its redirection checks — but those are config/interactive-approval changes, they add no print-mode approval gate, and the bridge reads none of it.--sandboxis not a usable boundary. agy 1.0.6 fixed its propagation into-p(the 1.0.6/1.0.7 changelog calls this "sandbox isolation correctly enforced") and it now does block terminal/ shell command execution — but re-verified on 1.0.9 that it leaves thewrite_to_filetool and network wide open: under--sandboxthe model still wrote a file outside its workspace. agy 1.0.9 hardened the sandbox's command path (stricter exact-match command checks;.gitadded to its dangerous-paths list), but none of that closes the out-of-workspacewrite_to_filehole. On top of that, a--sandboxrun whose blocked terminal command halts it writes no JSONL transcript (only the SQLite.db, re-confirmed on 1.0.9). The bridge can now read that.db, but still never passes--sandbox— it's no boundary, with file writes and network left open.✅
plan=Trueis the first Antigravity restriction that actually holds — opt-in, per call, onantigravity_ask/antigravity_continue, and gated at agy 1.1.12 (older agy parses--modeand ignores it in print mode, so the bridge refuses rather than handing back an unrestricted run that reports success). It maps to agy's--mode plan: agy investigates and writes an implementation plan into its own directory instead of touching yours. Verified on 1.1.20 through the bridge's own code path, with a control: the identical prompt —cmd /c echo SHELLRAN > <absolute path>— executed and created the file on a normal call, and onplan=Truecreated nothing at all, answering with a plan document. File reads still work, so it is genuinely useful rather than merely inert. Note what it is not: it constrains agy's agent loop, so it is agent-enforced like Copilot's and Cursor's modes, not an OS boundary — for that, use Codex (with the Windows caveat in Security firmly in mind). Two consequences worth knowing: it survives--dangerously-skip-permissions(which the bridge still passes, because dropping it would soft-deny the reads plan mode exists to allow), and it is mutually exclusive with the slash-command shield — agy silently disables plan mode when--disable-slash-commandsis present, so the bridge drops that flag and rejects a prompt whose first token is a slash command instead.
Codex — a real sandbox you should use
codex exec also has no interactive approval gate, but its sandbox flag is a genuine boundary
that codex enforces:
read-only(default) — reads and answers; writes nothing. Safe for untrusted questions on trusted content.workspace-write— may edit files under the workspace. Opt in deliberately, per task.danger-full-access— no sandbox at all. Avoid.
Because there's no approval prompt, the flag you pass is the safety decision — choose it per call.
⚠️ On Windows, as of codex 0.149.1, that boundary is currently too tight to be useful — and it fails silently. Every command is refused under both
read-onlyandworkspace-write(down topwd) withrejected: blocked by policy: codex's policy engine can't classify thepwsh -Command <...>wrapper codex itself builds. Shell commands are how codex reads files, so a sandboxed run sees nothing of your workspace — and says nothing about it. Asked for the version in a localpyproject.tomldeclaring0.27.0, it web-searched and answered1.2.0from an unrelated GitHub repo; with the sandbox off,0.27.0. Exit 0 both times. Known upstream (#40060, #38886). The bridge can't fix it, but it no longer launders it: any answer whose run had commands refused comes back with a visible[agent-intern] WARNINGnaming the count. Until it's fixed upstream, treat a sandboxed codex answer on Windows as unsourced unless that warning is absent.
Copilot — best-effort, not an OS sandbox
copilot -p runs headless with --allow-all-tools (required — otherwise it blocks on per-tool
permission prompts). Its sandbox maps to copilot's tool/path permission flags, which are a
real-ish but not enforced boundary:
read-only(default) — auto-approves tools to run headless, then denies the localwriteandshelltools (--deny-tool). Blocks local file edits and command execution, but it is not an OS sandbox: other tools (including network/MCP) can still act. Weaker than Codex'sread-only.workspace-write— writes allowed, but file access stays confined to the workspace (no--allow-all-paths).danger-full-access—--allow-all(tools + all paths + all URLs). Avoid.
For a hard read-only boundary, prefer codex_ask.
Cursor — best-effort, agent-enforced
cursor-agent -p runs headless with --trust (and --force when writes are allowed). Its sandbox
maps to cursor's mode/force flags — an agent-enforced, not OS-level, boundary:
read-only(default) —--mode ask: the localwriteandshelltools are unavailable, so cursor analyzes and answers but makes no edits (verified: it refuses to write files). Like Copilot, this is agent-enforced and not an OS sandbox. Weaker than Codex'sread-only.workspace-write—--force: edits and commands allowed, file access rooted at--workspace.danger-full-access—--force --sandbox disabled(OS sandbox off). Avoid.
For a hard read-only boundary, prefer codex_ask.
Grok — real, but only on Linux and macOS
grok -p runs headless with --always-approve (its headless mode does not auto-approve on its own,
and nothing is there to answer a prompt). Its sandbox maps to grok's OS profile plus a tool
allowlist:
read-only(default) —--sandbox read-only+--tools read_file,list_dir,grep,glob,web_search,web_fetch--no-subagents.
workspace-write—--sandbox workspace: writes confined to the workspace,~/.grok, temp.danger-full-access—--sandbox off. Avoid.
The profile is enforced by Landlock (Linux ≥ 5.13) and Seatbelt (macOS). On Windows there is
no mechanism, and per xAI's docs grok "logs a warning and continues without enforcement" — so on
Windows the only thing standing between read-only and your disk is the agent-enforced tool
allowlist. Treat Windows read-only as best-effort (Copilot/Cursor tier), not as a jail. The bridge
uses an allowlist rather than a denylist so that a future grok with a new write tool fails safe; note
that MCP meta-tools remain available under an allowlist regardless.
⚠️ This backend is unverified — including these sandbox claims, which could
not be exercised, because grok checks auth before it validates --sandbox.
Kimi — no boundary at all
kimi -p has no sandbox and no sandbox argument. Print mode auto-executes every tool call with
no approval gate — the same posture as Antigravity, and verified live on 0.29.1 in the sense that -p
rejects --auto/--yolo precisely because it is already self-approving. No flag makes it safe.
Assume every kimi_ask runs arbitrary code with your privileges.
What that means for you
The
workspaceargument is only a starting context, not a security boundary — Antigravity and Kimi can and do act outside it; Codex is bounded by its enforcedsandbox; Grok by its OS profile on Linux/macOS and by a tool allowlist elsewhere; Copilot by its best-effort tool/path permissions; Cursor by its agent-enforced mode/force.An Antigravity or Kimi call effectively runs arbitrary code with your user privileges. A Copilot or Cursor call does too outside its best-effort denials; a Grok call does on Windows outside its allowlist; a Codex call does unless you keep it at
read-only.Only invoke these with trusted prompts on trusted content. Untrusted input here is the classic prompt-injection lethal trifecta: private-data access + code execution + network egress.
For real isolation, run the whole bridge inside a container or VM.
The bridge itself does only cross-platform filesystem reads under ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/,
~/.codex/, ~/.copilot/, and ~/.cursor/ — no private APIs, no token theft. The risk above is
entirely in what the sub-agents are allowed to do.
FAQ
It runs the official agy, codex, copilot, and cursor-agent CLIs under your own logins — no
private APIs, no token theft, no quota abuse. It just bridges what the CLIs already do. That said, your
AI Pro / Antigravity, OpenAI / Codex, GitHub Copilot, and Cursor ToS apply, and you're responsible for
staying within them.
No. Each backend is independent — install only the CLI(s) you want. The tools for a missing backend
report "not found" via their *_status tool (antigravity_status / codex_status /
copilot_status / cursor_status / grok_status / kimi_status) and never crash the server.
It does now, by default. The server ships an instructions block that Claude Code loads with the
tool list, and as of 0.29.0 that block tells it to offer delegation in one line before
starting a task that fits — bulk mechanical work, a job that splits into independent parallel
subtasks, or a second opinion on a risky diff — and to ask rather than just spend your quota.
It's also told to ask once per task, not once per turn, and to drop it if you decline, because a
suggestion on every task is nagging rather than help.
MCP instructions are guidance, though, not a rule the harness enforces — so if you want it reliably
proactive, put it where Claude Code treats it as an instruction. Add this to your project or global
CLAUDE.md:
## Delegating to sub-agents
The `intern` MCP server bridges Antigravity/Gemini, Codex, Copilot and Cursor as sub-agents
running on my own subscriptions. Before starting bulk mechanical work (a rename across many
files, boilerplate, a first-pass port), or anything that splits into independent parallel
subtasks, propose delegating it in one line and wait for my answer — e.g. "this is 6
independent files, shall I farm it out to Gemini in parallel?". Pass `workspace` = the repo
root. Don't propose it for small tasks or work that needs our conversation's context.Turn it the other way — "never delegate without me asking first" — and that works too: the same file, the opposite sentence.
Use Antigravity for fast, cheap tool-calling, quick answers, and image generation (it's the
only backend with an image model) — and it now lets you pick the model too (agy's --model). Use
Codex for heavier reasoning, real code/repo work, or when you want a real, enforced
workspace-write sandbox. Use Copilot for agentic coding on your GitHub Copilot plan, or as a
second coding opinion alongside Codex — noting its sandbox is best-effort, not enforced. Use
Cursor for agentic coding on a Cursor plan, or when you want the widest model menu —
GPT, Claude, Grok, and Composer, all via model — noting its sandbox is agent-enforced, like
Copilot's.
Grok and Kimi are experimental and unverified — reach for them to help verify them, or if they're the subscription you actually have. Grok is the more capable of the two here: real OS sandbox (Linux/macOS), watch mode, and swarm support. Kimi has no sandbox and no swarm/watch yet.
All of them let you choose a model (except Kimi, which can't validate one); in a swarm
you can mix five of the six. See The backends at a glance.
Less likely now. As of agy 1.0.15 the bridge prefers agy's stdout on the happy path (1.0.15
fixed the print-mode stdout bug on Windows — -p now writes the clean answer there), which removes
its dependence on agy's undocumented transcript schema for normal runs. It still falls back to
reading the JSONL transcript, or the SQLite .db agy dual-writes, when stdout is empty (older agy,
non-Windows, or --sandbox runs) — so a schema change would only bite that fallback path. Re-verified
working on 1.0.15 (stdout answer clean under tool use; transcript/.db fallback intact; live ask
round-trip + antigravity_status diagnostics pass). Still, if you rely on the fallback, pin a
known-good agy version.
Yes. Pass model to antigravity_ask/antigravity_continue (or per task in agent_swarm) — it maps
to agy's --model, taking any slug from agy models (e.g. "gemini-3.1-pro-high",
"claude-sonnet-4-6"). Omit it to use the "model" field in agy's settings.json, which
defaults to gemini-3.8-flash-high — speed-optimized for cheap tool-calling.
agy 1.1.5 renamed every model, replacing the old human labels ("Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)") with
stable slugs (gemini-3.1-pro-high) — the old form is no longer accepted, so pass slugs. The
default has since moved three times: 1.1.6 added the gemini-3.6-flash family and took it, the
gemini-3.7-flash family arrived by 1.1.16 and took it in turn, and 1.1.25 added
gemini-3.8-flash and moved the default onto that (verified through the bridge: a call passing no
model answers as Gemini 3.8 Flash). The same release also dropped the whole gemini-3.5-flash
family, which no changelog entry mentions — a 3.5 slug from older docs is now rejected up front.
The full list, re-checked live on 1.1.25:
gemini-3.8-flash-low|medium|high, gemini-3.7-flash-low|medium|high,
gemini-3.6-flash-low|medium|high, gemini-3.1-pro-low|high,
claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-opus-4-6-thinking, gpt-oss-120b-medium. Note the slug bakes in the
reasoning effort, which is why the flash and pro models appear once per level. agy self-updates in
the background, so treat any list written down here — this one included — as a snapshot; agy models
and antigravity_status are the live answer.
agy 1.0.5 added --model, but through ~1.0.14 switching to a different model in -p hung the
call, so earlier bridge versions stayed single-model. Re-verified on agy 1.0.16 that the hang is
fixed — a Claude model answers as Anthropic Claude, a Gemini model as Gemini, each in seconds. One
caveat the bridge handles for you: agy silently ignores an unknown model (it falls back to the
default with no error), so the bridge validates your slug against agy models and rejects a typo up
front. (That validation is also what agy 1.1.11 broke, by making agy models print
<slug>\t<human label> instead of a bare slug — see Status & caveats. Fixed as
of bridge 0.24.0; on 0.23.x with agy 1.1.11+, pass no model at all.)
Yes — that's the antigravity_image tool, on the Antigravity backend. agy's print mode generates
real images on your AI Pro quota; antigravity_image drives it, saves the file to a path you choose
(or a timestamped default in your workspace), fixes the extension to match the real bytes (agy picks
JPEG or PNG itself), and returns the path. Verified on agy 1.0.9 / Windows. Codex has no image
model — it's a coding agent.
No. It uses the same quota you already pay for — AI Pro for Antigravity, your Codex plan for Codex, your GitHub Copilot plan for Copilot, your Cursor plan for Cursor. The smoke test spends a negligible amount.
The final answer is request/response — the CLIs return it all at once, so the tools return when the
agent finishes (each call typically takes 10–30 s; Copilot's reasoning models can run longer). If you
want to watch the agent work as it goes,
pass watch=true to any single-prompt tool: it opens the Agent Intern browser window and
live-streams the agent's steps — see Watch mode. It's coarse (a handful of steps, not
token-by-token), and the returned value is identical to the non-watch call.
The single-agent tools are serialized inside the server: agy rewrites last_conversations.json
on every call, so concurrent runs sharing one state dir would race and could return the wrong
conversation. A threading.Lock makes extra requests queue rather than race. (On agy 1.1.8+ the
bridge also records the conversation_id agy reports for each run and prefers it when pinning a
continue, so that resolution no longer depends on the shared file — but the lock stays, since agy's
state dir is still shared and a fresh server process starts with nothing recorded.)
For real parallelism use agent_swarm — each agy worker runs in its own isolated state
dir (and Codex/Copilot/Cursor workers need none), so they don't race and the lock isn't needed (~2.8×
at 3 workers). That's the supported way to run many calls at once, across any backend.
The isolated state dir is a redirected HOME, and on macOS that also hides agy's stored
credentials (the login keychain is resolved through $HOME), so isolated workers there fall back to
running serialized in your real HOME — correct, but without the speedup. Windows is unaffected
(Credential Manager is HOME-independent). See the swarm auth note.
Status & caveats
🧪 Grok Build and Kimi Code ship UNVERIFIED — help wanted. Two new backends, neither ever exercised against an authenticated account, because I have neither subscription. This is a deliberate trade: shipping them unverified is the only way anyone can verify them, and the parts that historically rot — flag surfaces, model ids, error shapes — are pinned down live against grok 1.0.3 and kimi 0.29.1. Grok's are unusually solid, since its CLI is open source: every argv the bridge builds was read off the real clap definitions and confirmed to parse. What's unproven is everything behind each CLI's auth wall — the answer itself, resume, and Grok's streaming events. That verification gap already caught one live docs error (xAI documents
grok-buildas the model; the real default isgrok-4.5), which is a fair warning about what else the docs may be wrong about. If you have either subscription, one issue from the verification template closes this gap. Full detail →🐛
agent_swarmantigravity workers died with "authentication timed out" on macOS — fixed (#2). Each swarm worker gets an isolatedHOMEso agy's per-process state can't collide. The module shipped asserting that auth survives it because agy reads credentials from the OS credential store — true on Windows (Credential Manager is keyed to the user session; re-verified on 1.1.12 thatagy modelsinside a fake HOME returns the full list) and false on macOS, where the login keychain is resolved through$HOME. So every antigravity worker started a fresh OAuth flow and died at agy's 60 sauthentication timed out, whileantigravity_ask— which never touches HOME — kept working. Isolation is now conditional, decided two ways:Proactively, by probing once per process:
agy -p "/usage"inside a throwaway isolated HOME. On agy 1.1.11+ that's free (the CLI answers it, no agent turn, no quota), but the quota table comes from your account, so it can't be answered without working credentials. Skipped on Windows, where it can't fail.Reactively, because a probe is a proxy and this one can't be tested on the platform it exists for: any worker that fails with an authentication signature flips the process to serialized mode and retries itself there, so you get an answer even if the probe was wrong or unavailable.
In serialized mode the antigravity workers run in your real HOME behind the same lock the single-agent tools use — correct everywhere, at the cost of the parallelism (other backends stay parallel; a watched worker shows a note instead of live steps, since the step feed reads the isolated transcript).
AGY_BRIDGE_NO_HOME_ISOLATION=1forces it without a probe. Diagnosed by inspection from the report; not reproduced on a Mac — if you're on macOS, please confirm on #2.🐛 agy 1.1.11 killed the
modelargument — fixed (#3). agy madeagy modelsmachine-readable, turning each line from a bare slug into a tab-separated<slug>\t<human label>record (gemini-3.6-flash-high\tGemini 3.6 Flash (High)). The bridge read the whole line as the slug, so its up-front validation rejected every valid model with an error that listed the very slug it had just refused:unknown agy model 'gemini-3.6-flash-high'; expected one of: gemini-3.6-flash-high<TAB>Gemini 3.6 Flash (High), …. Reproduced end-to-end throughantigravity_ask;modelwas unusable on all three antigravity tools (omitting it still worked — the default model path never touched this code). The parser now keeps the first tab field, which reads both formats, and drops any field containing whitespace (a slug never has a space, so such a line is chatter). Note 1.1.12's changelog advertises--output-format jsonfor themodelsandagentssubcommands, but the shipped binary has no such flag (agy models --output-format json→flags provided but not defined: -output-format), so TSV is what there is to parse. The live slug list is unchanged from 1.1.6, and this suite stayed green through the break because every model test mocked the old format — the new tests pin both formats down. The change is in no changelog entry: the guard test was green on 1.1.10, #3 reports the break on 1.1.11, and it was reproduced here on 1.1.12.✨
antigravity_statusnow reports your remaining AI Pro quota — for free. agy 1.1.11/1.1.12 answer read-only slash commands in print mode itself: no agent turn, no quota spend, no conversation left behind (1.1.11:/usage,/quota,/credits,/model,/effort,/skills; 1.1.12:/permissions,/hooks,/help,/config,/changelog). The status tool runsagy -p "/usage"and adds a row per model family —quota: Gemini Models [ok] Weekly 100%, Five Hour 100%— flagging a family at 0% as a problem, since every call against it fails until its window resets. Version-gated at 1.1.11 as a safety gate: on older agy the same argv is a prompt, so a diagnostic advertised as free would quietly spend a call. The probe is the one bridge call that deliberately omits--disable-slash-commands(a regression test asserts it), and it degrades to nothing on older agy rather than reporting a false problem.🐛 codex's Windows sandbox refuses every command — and codex answers anyway. Re-verifying the bridge against codex 0.149.1 (from 0.144.1) turned up the worst failure shape there is: one that reports success. Under both
read-onlyandworkspace-write, every command codex tried came backrejected: blocked by policy— down topwd— because the policy engine can't classify thepwsh -Command <...>wrapper codex itself builds. Shell commands are how codex reads files, so it saw nothing of the workspace. It did not say so. Asked for the version in a localpyproject.tomldeclaring0.27.0, it ran a web search and answered1.2.0, a version from an unrelated GitHub repository; a second run said0.1.0. With the sandbox off, the same prompt answered0.27.0. Exit 0 and a full-ofile every time. Not local: there is no exec policy in this machine'sconfig.toml, and it is open upstream (#40060, #38886).The bridge can't fix a CLI that reports success, but it no longer passes the result off as sound: any answer whose run had commands refused now comes back with a visible
[agent-intern] WARNINGnaming the count and the policy. It appends rather than raises on purpose — underread-onlya model that tries to write is supposed to be blocked, and that run's answer is perfectly good; what was unacceptable was the silence.🐛
codex_continuewas broken outside a git repo — fixed.codex exec resumeenforces the trusted-directory check just like a fresh run, and the bridge passed--skip-git-repo-checkonly on fresh runs, on the reasoning that resume inherits the session's recorded cwd and sandbox. So a continue in a plain directory died with "Not inside a trusted directory and --skip-git-repo-check was not specified" — while the fresh ask that created that very session had just succeeded. It only bit outside a git repo, which is why a green hermetic suite and everyday use inside a project never saw it; the test that covered this argv actively asserted the flag was absent.codex exec resume --helplists it, so the fix is the supported one. Re-verified live: ask then continue in a non-git workspace now both answer.✅ Re-verified copilot on 1.0.80 (from 1.0.69) — eleven releases, nothing to change. The one entry that could have reached this bridge was 1.0.71's "reject malformed
--allow-tooland--deny-toolpatterns with an error message", since read-only mode is a pair of--deny-toolpatterns. Re-verified live on 1.0.80: they still parse, a workspace file read answers, and a write is still refused ("Blocked: I can't write files in this environment", no file created). 1.0.79's BREAKING rename of the sandbox settingallowDevToolCaches→allowDevToolAccessis a config key this bridge never reads.✅
agent_swarmhonourssandboxon Antigravity workers — it used to ignore it. Every other backend took a per-tasksandboxpolicy; Antigravity dropped the key on the floor, so{"backend": "agy", "sandbox": "read-only"}was a task that looked fenced and ran with nothing holding it back. Plan mode is the first thing agy has that can honour the request, so"read-only"now maps onto it,"danger-full-access"names the unrestricted posture out loud, and"workspace-write"raises rather than implying a scoping agy cannot do.Verified live on 1.1.20 in the parallel isolated-HOME path — the one that builds its own argv rather than going through
_run_agy, so it had to be threaded explicitly — with both workers in a single swarm running the samecmd /c echo RAN > <absolute path>: theread-onlyworker created nothing and returned a plan document, the unfenced one created its file. The version gate and the slash-command guard run at task-normalization time, so a bad plan request fails the whole swarm up front rather than N calls in.Two deliberate omissions. An omitted
sandboxstill leaves an agy worker unrestricted, unlike every other backend: flipping that default would silently turn existing file-writing swarm tasks into plan documents. Andschemais not wired into the swarm at all — both Antigravity swarm paths read the answer from the isolated transcript, wherestructured_outputdoes not exist, so it would mean moving the most load-bearing read path in the swarm onto JSON stdout. The structured-output caveat below is the other half of that reasoning: a schema that follows field order rather than content, run across N parallel workers, is N confidently wrong answers.⚠️
schemareturns structured output — and agy fills it in a pass that doesn't re-read the question. Passing a JSON Schema toantigravity_ask/antigravity_continuemaps to agy 1.1.8's--json-schema, and the tool returns agy'sstructured_output— exactly the declared fields, as JSON text you canjson.loads. Note the proseresponseon the same run is not the same thing: it carries the model's raw emission, agy's internaltoolAction/toolSummarykeys, and sometimes a sentence of prose ahead of the JSON. A run that yields no structured output raises rather than handing you prose to parse.The caveat is worth more than the feature. agy populates the schema in a finishing pass that does not reason about the content again, so any field the turn never actually established gets guessed from the shape of the schema. Measured on 1.1.20, classifying "this broke my build and wasted my whole afternoon":
prompt
schema
result
plain classify request
enum: ["positive","negative"]positive — 3 runs out of 4
plain classify request
same enum, order reversed
negative — 2 of 2
same, plus a
reasonfieldreasonfirst, then the enumreason came back "Completed sentiment classification task."
"state the verdict and why, then report it"
the original, biased enum
negative — 3 of 3
It was following field order, not the sentence. So use
schemato shape an answer the turn has already worked out — extraction, formatting, pulling fields out of something the model just read — and do not delegate the judgment itself to it. Ask for the reasoning in the prompt; the schema is the envelope, not the thinker.✅ Re-verified on agy 1.1.21–1.1.25 — the only drift was the model catalog, and it moved in both directions. Five releases, re-checked live on Windows. Plumbing all held:
antigravity_askround-tripped through the real argv on both the default-model path and an explicit--model, the--output-format jsonobject still carriesconversation_id/status/response,agy modelsstill emits<slug>\t<label>, the/usagequota table still parses, and the JSONL transcript read path still resolves. What changed is data, not code:gemini-3.8-flasharrived and took the default (gemini-3.8-flash-{low,medium,high}). Its changelog entry scopes it to "when connecting with aGEMINI_API_KEY", but it is in the catalog on ordinary AI Pro browser auth too, and--model gemini-3.8-flash-highround-tripped clean.The whole
gemini-3.5-flashfamily was dropped, and no changelog entry says so. 1.1.22 was still naming 3.5 Flash in a fix, so this is the same class of silent catalog change as the 1.1.11 TSV break — every 3.5 example in these docs had quietly become a guaranteed rejection.
Nothing broke, because validation reads the live list rather than a baked-in one; the two guard tests added after the last drift are what fired, one per direction. Two upstream fixes also landed on shapes this bridge depends on, both moving toward it: 1.1.23 fixed subcommands such as
modelshanging on an inherited, unclosed stdin — the exact hanglist_agy_modelshas always spawned with a closed stdin to dodge — and 1.1.24 fixed headless runs with piped stdout/stderr hanging on exit, which is every call this bridge makes. One false alarm worth knowing: agy leaves an empty conversation directory behind when it self-updates, andantigravity_statusreports it asnewest transcript [!!]. The read path is fine — the next real call writes a transcript and the row goes green.VERIFIED_AGY_VERSION→(1, 1, 25).✅ Re-verified on agy 1.1.13–1.1.20 — no code change needed, and two upstream fixes moved toward the bridge. Eight releases of drift, re-checked live on Windows:
antigravity_askandantigravity_continueboth round-tripped through the real argv (the continue pinned its conversation and recalled a codeword), agy's--output-format jsonobject still carriesconversation_id/status/response,agy modelsstill emits<slug>\t<label>, the/usagequota table still parses into per-family rows, and all three version gates (supports_json_output,supports_disable_slash_commands,supports_print_usage) resolve true. The two changes that touch this bridge both make it more correct:1.1.18 made a valueless
-pand a stray trailing argument hard errors. That is precisely the mis-parse the bridge is built to avoid —--print --sandbox 'do the task'used to run with the prompt--sandboxand the sandbox silently off. The bridge already passes the prompt as-p's value and already appends-plast, so nothing changed here except that agy now enforces the rule instead of failing quietly. Re-verified with a prompt whose first character is a dash.Print-mode exit codes got honest, in both directions. 1.1.18 made a dropped agent stream exit non-zero rather than reporting a clean success with an empty response; 1.1.20 stopped treating benign tool errors and permission denials as fatal. The bridge raises on any non-zero exit, so both edits sharpen a signal it was already trusting.
Also worth knowing, though nothing here had to move: 1.1.13 fixed two long-standing hazards in exactly the code path this bridge falls back to — transcript corruption when a background message appended while context compaction was rewriting it (which left JSON that no longer parsed) and unbounded growth of the on-disk conversation database. That fallback is the bridge's most fragile read path, and it is now sturdier upstream. 1.1.14 and 1.1.20 also shifted agy's default permission posture (workspace reads auto-granted under the default review mode; access outside the workspace narrowed to read-only) —
--dangerously-skip-permissionsstays load-bearing, so the Security note is unchanged.Docs-only drift, now fixed: agy grew the
gemini-3.7-flashfamily and moved the default onto it, so an untouched install runsgemini-3.7-flash-high, not thegemini-3.6-flash-highevery doc here named (verified in a throwaway HOME with nosettings.jsonat all). Nothing broke — validation reads the live list — but the guard test only ever noticed a model agy dropped, which is why a whole new family and a moved default sailed through a green suite. A second guard now fails when agy offers a family the docs don't mention.VERIFIED_AGY_VERSION→(1, 1, 20). Not adopted, and not exercised beyond confirming agy still lists them:--json-schema, 1.1.15's--input-format stream-json(one process, many turns),--mode accept-edits|plan, and 1.1.16'sagy mcpsubcommands. Nothing here needs them today.✅ Re-verified the rest of agy 1.1.11/1.1.12 — nothing else broke. The slash shield still holds: 1.1.11 replaced the silent fall-through for interactive-only commands with an explicit refusal that recommends the exact flag this bridge already passes (
agy -p "/clear"→ exit 2, "pass --disable-slash-commands to send /clear to the model as literal text"), andantigravity_ask("/clear Reply with the single word BRIDGE…")returnedBRIDGEend-to-end. The read-only set is why the shield stays load-bearing — unshielded, a prompt opening with/modelwould get agy's table instead of an answer. 1.1.12 also stopped swallowing startup diagnostics (including the--conversationnot-found warning the continue path can trigger): they go to stderr, so stdout stays a pure JSON result object — verified with a deliberately bogus--conversation(exit 0, clean JSON, warning on stderr). Benign wins: a Windows crash resolving the conversation transcript path is fixed (the artifact watch mode'slog_uripoints at), headless-pnow settles a choice itself instead of stalling on a question nobody can answer (fewer timeouts), and 1.1.11 made retries honor the server's retry delay and stopped an empty credits response reading as "Out of credits".VERIFIED_AGY_VERSION→(1, 1, 12).--effortstays unadopted, now with a harder reason: it isn't universal —--model claude-sonnet-4-6 --effort lowfails with "--effort is not supported for model", while the gemini slugs already bake the level in. Everything else (Vim editing mode, artifact-viewer polish, plugin enablement, admin controls and MCP progress callbacks — agy as an MCP client) is off the bridge's path.🛡️ agy 1.1.9 broke print mode for any prompt starting with a slash — fixed by
--disable-slash-commands. 1.1.9 made-pexpand slash commands and skills instead of sending them to the model as text, so a prompt whose first token names a registered command is executed as that command and never reaches the model. Verified live on 1.1.10 through this bridge:antigravity_ask("/help")came back with agy's own help page, not an answer. That is not just wrong output — agy's registered set includes side-effecting commands (/goalstarts an autonomous long-running task,/schedulecreates cron jobs), and bridge prompts routinely carry text the caller did not author, so an untrusted string beginning/schedule …would have run it. Every agy argv path now passes--disable-slash-commands(one change in_agy_base_argscovers ask, continue, both watched runners, and both swarm workers). Version-gated: the flag doesn't exist before 1.1.9, and neither does the expansion. Prompts starting with a POSIX path (/etc/hosts …) were never affected — they match no command — but that was luck, not a boundary. SetAGY_BRIDGE_ALLOW_SLASH_COMMANDS=1to keep the expansion if you want-p "/my-skill <args>"to invoke a skill.🐛 Non-ASCII answers were being mangled on Windows — fixed. Every backend emits UTF-8, but the bridge spawned them with bare
text=True, which decodes using the locale codepage (locale.getpreferredencoding()— cp1254 on a Turkish Windows, cp1252 elsewhere). Any non-ASCII answer came back corrupted:dosyasıarrived asdosyası, exactly'dosyası'.encode('utf-8').decode('cp1254'). Every bridge plus the swarm workers now decode UTF-8 explicitly witherrors="replace", the patterncursor_bridge.pyalready used. A regression test asserts no subprocess call reintroduces baretext=True. ASCII-only answers were never affected, which is why this survived so long.✅ Re-verified on agy 1.1.9 and 1.1.10. Beyond the slash-command break above: 1.1.10 fixed
--model/--effortbeing silently ignored in headless-p(they were applied after model configuration had already initialized, so the run fell back to the persisted/default model). The bridge validates and passes--modelon every call, so on 1.1.8–1.1.9 themodelargument was a no-op even though a typo was still correctly rejected — if you pinned a model in that window, you were served the default. Re-confirmed working on 1.1.10 through the bridge (model="claude-sonnet-4-6"→ a Claude answer, not Gemini). No code change was needed for it. 1.1.10 also added a non-blocking advisory banner when the same conversation is open in another CLI instance — the shapeantigravity_continueand the swarm can produce — so_parse_json_resultnow locates the result object instead of requiring stdout to start with{; leading and trailing chatter are both absorbed rather than degrading into a raw JSON blob in your answer.VERIFIED_AGY_VERSION→(1, 1, 10). Nothing else in 1.1.9/1.1.10 reaches the bridge — the rest is interactive-TUI, hooks, auth, and MCP-client work.✅ Verified on agy 1.1.7 and 1.1.8 — nothing broke, and 1.1.8 made the bridge sturdier. 1.1.8 gave print mode an
--output-formatflag (text|json|stream-json). The existing text path was confirmed live on 1.1.8 first (ask, pinned continue, and--modelall clean), then the bridge switched its plain ask/continue calls to--output-format json, because reading a contractualresponsefield beats trusting the layout of bare text. The real prize is theconversation_idagy returns with it: the bridge records it and pins a laterantigravity_continueto exactly the conversation it last ran in that workspace, instead of inferring it fromlast_conversations.json— shared state agy rewrites for every session, including your own interactive TUI work in the same folder. Practical difference:antigravity_continuenow resumes the bridge's own thread, where before it could land on a conversation you'd since started in the Antigravity TUI. Older agy is unaffected — the flag is version-gated (pre-1.1.8 has no such flag), and any non-JSON stdout falls back to the previous text path, so a silently-ignored flag degrades instead of crashing.VERIFIED_AGY_VERSION→(1, 1, 8). Not adopted:--json-schema(works; nothing here needs it). Nothing else in 1.1.7/1.1.8 reaches the bridge — the rest is interactive-TUI, plugin-hook, and MCP-client work.✅ Watch mode reads agy's live event stream instead of scraping its transcript. On agy 1.1.8+ the watched runners request
--output-format stream-jsonand consume agy's typedinit/step_update/resultevents straight off stdout. Verified before the rewrite that they arrive incrementally (a 17 s run spread its 18 events over 12.4 s), and confirmed live that a watched run's step count grows while agy works. The stream carries the real command as a nested object (the transcript stored tool args JSON-encoded inside a string), streaming text fragments, and aconversation_id— so a watched run now pins later continues just like a plain one. This retires the timer-based transcript polling, which matters beyond tidiness: agy has announced JSONL is being replaced by SQLite, and watch was the last path that would have broken when it goes. Pre-1.1.8 agy keeps the original transcript path, re-verified live.⚠️ Behavior change: multi-step answers now include the model's narration. agy's
responseis the whole turn; the old transcript scrape returned only the last planner response. Identical for a single-step ask, different for a chatty multi-step one (one measured run: 297 chars vs 128, the full answer ending in the old one). The full turn is now returned on every path —responseis agy's own contract for what the turn produced, and the old last-step rule silently dropped content whenever the model did the work and then closed with a short "Done."✅ Re-verified on agy 1.1.6 — no code change needed. 1.1.6 added the
gemini-3.6-flashfamily toagy modelsand moved thesettings.jsondefault to Gemini 3.6 Flash (High); the default path and--model gemini-3.6-flash-highboth round-tripped clean, and the JSONL + SQLite read paths still match agy's unchanged conversation schema. Its one bridge-adjacent fix — print mode now surfacing the real conversation-creation error instead of a misleading "no active conversation" — only improves the diagnostic the bridge already reads on failure. Everything else (Markdown custom agents,/copyand/codesearchpolish, background-task hardening) is interactive-TUI or client-side work that doesn't reach the bridge. Docs-only: the model list and default examples now name the 1.1.6 slugs, and the guard test advertisesgemini-3.6-flash-highagainst the live list.⚠️ Verified on agy 1.1.5 — it renamed every model, so old
modelvalues now fail. 1.1.5 replaced agy's human-readable model labels with stable slugs, andagy modelsreports only those:"Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)"is nowgemini-3.1-pro-high, and the Claude entries areclaude-sonnet-4-6andclaude-opus-4-6-thinking(the mapping is not 1:1 — checkagy models, orantigravity_status, for the current list). Since the bridge validatesmodelagainstagy models, an old label is rejected up front with the valid list — you lose the call, not your money, and never silently run on the wrong model. Pass slugs and you're fine. Nothing in the bridge's machinery needed changing (validation was always format-agnostic — which is exactly why the entire test suite stayed green while every documented example went stale), so this release is docs plus one new test that checks the models we advertise against the liveagy modelslist. Everything else in 1.1.5 is interactive-TUI, MCP-client, or background-task work that doesn't reach the bridge; its new--effortflag is a second axis we don't pass, because the slug already pins the effort variant.✅ Verified on agy 1.1.4 — no code change was needed. 1.1.4 relaxed the 1.1.3 headless gate so that
-pnow honors your persistedsettings.jsonpolicies (permissions, file access, sandbox mode, auto-execution, artifact review) instead of blanket-denying.--dangerously-skip-permissionsstill overrides those policies, so the flag stays load-bearing and stays exactly where it is — re-verified live against a workspace deliberately absent fromtrustedWorkspaces, with apermissions.allowlist naming neither file nor command access: a workspace file read returned the right contents, and a terminal command and a file write both executed. Worth knowing: that flag is now the only thing between a bridge call and your ownsettings.jsonpolicy, and dropping it would get you whatever that file says rather than 1.1.3's deny-everything. 1.1.4 also stopped/btwside-questions from leaking into the conversation list as duplicates carrying the parent's title — that list is what conversation pinning reads, so one way to resume the wrong thread is gone.✅ Verified on agy 1.1.3 — base dir,
last_conversations.json(still keyed by workspace path), thebrain/.../transcript.jsonlpath, the transcript schema, and the-p/-c/--print-timeoutflags are all unchanged; a liveantigravity_ask+ conversation-pinnedantigravity_continueround-trip returns clean over stdout andantigravity_statusdiagnostics pass. 1.1.3 broke and the bridge fixed the one thing that mattered: headless-pno longer auto-approves tool calls, it soft-denies them (print mode cannot prompt), so without a flag even "readpyproject.tomland report the version" returned nothing — exit 0, empty stdout, the reason only on stderr. The bridge now passes--dangerously-skip-permissionson every agy path, which restores file writes, terminal commands and workspace reads (a live bridge round-trip reads this repo's real version again). The flag must precede-p, whose value is the prompt — otherwise the flag becomes the prompt and the task is silently dropped. 1.1.2 also made an unresolvable--modelhard-fail in-pinstead of silently falling back to the settings.json default (the bridge'svalidate_modelstill rejects a typo up front, without spending a call). 1.1.0's execution-mode system (--mode,request-review) remains a no-op for the bridge:-pis spawned with DEVNULL stdin, so that interactive gate never engages.--sandboxbehavior is likewise unchanged (blocks the terminal, not file writes). The print-mode stdout path (fixed on 1.0.15, Windows) still applies; the transcript stays the fallback.✅ Verified on codex-cli 0.144.1 —
codex exec,-o/--output-last-message,codex exec resume, the--jsonevent stream, and the~/.codex/sessions/.../rollout-*.jsonllayout the continue path reads are all in place; a livecodex_askround-trip +codex_statuspass. (Bumped from the 0.141.0 baseline: flags, session layout and the round-trip all re-verified unchanged.)✅ Verified on copilot 1.0.69 —
copilot -p -s(clean stdout answer),--session-idset-then-resume,--model,--output-format json(watch stream), and the~/.copilot/session-state/<id>/workspace.yamllayout the continue fallback reads are all in place; livecopilot_ask/copilot_continueround-trips + a mixedagent_swarmpass. (Bumped from 1.0.68: 1.0.69 adds a--resumeconvenience flag the bridge doesn't need;--session-idstill both sets a fresh id and resumes it — re-verified live, ACK then codeword recall.)✅ Verified on cursor-agent 2026.07.23 —
cursor-agent -p --output-format text --trust(clean stdout answer),create-chat+-p --resume <id>,--model(validated againstcursor-agent models),--output-format stream-json(watch stream), and the~/.cursor/chats/<md5(workspace)>/<chat-id>/meta.jsonlayout the continue fallback reads are all in place; livecursor_ask/cursor_continueround-trips + a mixedagent_swarmpass.The deferred live round-trip has since been done, on that same 2026.07.23. It had been skipped the first time because the Cursor account was at its usage limit, leaving the run path confirmed only by structure. End-to-end through the bridge now:
cursor_askread a workspace file and answered from it,cursor_continueresumed the pinned chat and recalled it, and aread-onlyrun refused to write — "I'm in Ask mode … I can't create or write files", no file created — so cursor's agent-enforced mode holds in practice and not just in--help. Every model id the docs name still validates against the live list, which has grown from 193 ids to 204 with no CLI release: the catalogue moves on its own, socursor-agent modelsstays the only current answer.🖥️ Console-detach — before 1.0.15 agy
-pwrote its answer to the controlling terminal, not stdout; under a TUI that text leaked into the host's prompt (seen on 1.0.9). 1.0.15 fixed this on Windows (stdout now carries the answer), but the bridge still spawns agy detached (CREATE_NO_WINDOW/ a new POSIX session), which prevents the leak on older/other platforms and is harmless on 1.0.15+.💾 SQLite migration — handled — agy still dual-writes a
.dbper conversation; on the fallback path, when the JSONL transcript is absent (already true for--sandboxruns, and the announced future default)_read_responsefalls back to reading the.db, verified to match across 100+ conversations. See the FAQ.🐛 agy stdout bug — fixed on 1.0.15 —
-pnow prints the clean answer to stdout in a non-TTY subprocess (Windows), so the bridge prefers stdout and only scrapes the transcript when stdout is empty (older agy, non-Windows, or--sandbox). (Codex and Copilot never had this problem — both are stdout-native.)👁️ Watch mode is experimental — pass
watch=trueto any single-prompt tool to open the Agent Intern window and watch the agent work live (coarse steps; image shown inline). Best-effort and cross-platform; see Watch mode.🔒 Sandbox — agy's
--sandboxblocks only shell commands, so it's no boundary and the bridge never passes it. Codex'ssandboxis real and enforced — use it; defaultread-only. Copilot'ssandboxis best-effort (tool/path denials, not an OS sandbox); defaultread-only. Cursor'ssandboxis agent-enforced (mode/force; read-only =--mode askmakes write/shell unavailable, not an OS sandbox); defaultread-only. See Security.
Requirements
Python 3.10+
For the Antigravity tools:
agy1.0.0+ onPATH(state-file layout re-verified on 1.0.15; behaviour re-verified on 1.1.25) and an active Antigravity / AI Pro sessionFor the Codex tools:
codexonPATHand logged in (codex login) — verified on codex-cli 0.149.1 (note its Windows sandbox caveat)For the Copilot tools:
copilotonPATHand logged in (copilot→/login, or aCOPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKENenv) — verified on copilot 1.0.80For the Cursor tools:
cursor-agentonPATHand logged in (cursor-agent login, or aCURSOR_API_KEYenv) — verified on cursor-agent 2026.07.23For the Grok tools (experimental):
grokonPATHand logged in (grok login, or anXAI_API_KEYenv) plus a SuperGrok / X Premium+ subscription — flag surface verified on grok 1.0.3, answer path unverifiedFor the Kimi tools (experimental):
kimionPATHand logged in (kimi login, or an API key in~/.kimi-code/config.toml) — flag surface verified on kimi 0.29.1, answer path unverified
Each backend is independent — install only the CLI(s) you plan to use; the other tools simply report "not found" via their *_status tool.
Ifagy isn't reliably on PATH (e.g. a new terminal or reboot drops it on Windows), set the
AGY_BIN env var to its full path and the bridge will use that instead of "agy" — e.g.
AGY_BIN=%LOCALAPPDATA%\agy\bin\agy.exe. Likewise, set CODEX_BIN if codex isn't reliably on
PATH (the native Windows installer puts it under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\OpenAI\Codex\bin\), and
**COPILOT_BIN** if copilot isn't (the winget install lands under
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WinGet\Packages\GitHub.Copilot_*\copilot.exe). Finally, set
**CURSOR_BIN** if cursor-agent isn't reliably on PATH (the installer drops a cursor-agent.CMD
shim a bare name can't launch on Windows). **GROK_BIN** and **KIMI_BIN** do the same for the two
experimental backends — though the Grok bridge already falls back to the installer's own
~/.grok/bin on a PATH miss, which matters because that installer appends to the user PATH and
the change never reaches an already-running server.
The bridge uses only cross-platform Python (Path.home(), subprocess) and reads paths under
~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/, ~/.codex/, ~/.copilot/, ~/.cursor/, ~/.grok/, and
~/.kimi-code/, which the CLIs write the same way on every OS. Developed and verified on Windows; macOS and Linux should work unmodified
provided the CLIs run there. If you test it on those platforms, please open an issue / PR to confirm.
🌐 Community & Acknowledgments
Qiita (Japan): A huge thanks to
@falloutand the Japanese developer community for featuring this project and providing invaluable feedback!
💡 Path Resolution Fix: Thanks to their community's real-world testing, we identified and resolved a Windows PATH edge case where the MCP server inherits a stale
PATHat startup and can't findagy. TheAGY_BINenvironment-variable fallback was implemented directly inspired by their report!
License
MIT. Do whatever you want with it.
Available Tools
21 toolsagent_swarmAgent swarm (mixed Antigravity + Codex + Copilot + Cursor, parallel)A
Run SEVERAL tasks IN PARALLEL across ALL backends in a single swarm.
Each task is its own worker and names the backend to run on, so one swarm can
mix Antigravity (Gemini), Codex, Copilot, Cursor, and Grok workers — they run
truly concurrently (capped at max_concurrency) and every answer comes back in
one labelled block. A worker that fails is reported in place; the others still
return.
SECURITY: this launches N unsandboxed agents at once — N times the prompt-injection surface of a single call (see the module SECURITY note). Only use it with trusted prompts on trusted content.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| tasks | Yes | One object per parallel worker: - backend: "antigravity" (alias "agy"/"gemini"), "codex", "copilot" (alias "gh"/"github"), "cursor", or "grok" (alias "xai"; EXPERIMENTAL — see grok_ask) (required) - prompt: the question or instruction (required) - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd) - sandbox: "read-only" (default), "workspace-write", or "danger-full-access". Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox everywhere; Grok's is enforced on Linux/macOS only; Copilot's and Cursor's are agent/tool-level, not OS boundaries — see copilot_ask / cursor_ask / grok_ask. ANTIGRAVITY is the odd one: "read-only" maps to agy's plan mode (it investigates and writes a plan instead of editing files or running commands — see antigravity_ask's `plan`, and note it is agent-enforced, and needs agy 1.1.12+), "danger-full-access" states plainly that the worker is unrestricted, and "workspace-write" is REFUSED because agy has no write scoping to offer. Omitting it leaves an Antigravity worker unrestricted — that is the long-standing default, unlike every other backend here, so fence it explicitly if you want it fenced. - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`, Copilot's/Cursor's `--model`, Grok's `-m`, or Antigravity's `--model` (an agy slug like "claude-sonnet-4-6"; validated against each backend's model list). Omit for each backend's default. | |
| watch | No | If true, open the live "Agent Swarm" dashboard window (one row per worker, with a backend badge; click a row for its full step log). | |
| timeout_s | No | Per-worker timeout in seconds. Default 180. | |
| max_concurrency | No | Max workers running at once (default 4). Higher = faster but more quota/rate-limit pressure and more agents at once. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description discloses meaningful behavior beyond the annotations: workers run "truly concurrently," results return "in one labelled block," failed workers are "reported in place," and successful ones still return. The security warning about "N unsandboxed agents" and the prompt-injection surface adds important context that aligns with openWorldHint=true and readOnlyHint=false.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and well-structured: a front-loaded purpose statement, a brief explanation of worker behavior, and a clearly separated security warning. Every sentence earns its place and none merely repeats the schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a complex, high-risk tool with an output schema and 100% schema coverage, the description covers the essential invocation context: parallel execution, backend mixing, failure behavior, concurrency cap, and security caveats. Nothing critical is missing for an agent to decide whether and how to call it.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds useful behavioral meaning for the tasks parameter — that each task is its own worker, names a backend, and can mix backends in one swarm — and clarifies that max_concurrency caps real parallelism. It does not add much on the other parameters, but the schema already documents them thoroughly.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and scope: "Run SEVERAL tasks IN PARALLEL across ALL backends in a single swarm." This clearly distinguishes agent_swarm from the single-backend sibling tools like antigravity_ask or codex_ask, and the title reinforces the mix of backends and parallel execution.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear context for when to use the tool: multiple tasks, multiple backends, parallel execution. It also provides an explicit exclusion: "Only use it with trusted prompts on trusted content." However, it does not explicitly name single-task sibling tools as alternatives, leaving the when-not-to-use guidance slightly incomplete.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
antigravity_askAsk Antigravity (new conversation)A
Ask Antigravity (agy CLI, Gemini by default) a question in a NEW conversation.
Uses your existing AI Pro authentication (silent-auth via Windows Credential
Manager). Returns the model's final response as text. Good for fast
tool-calling and short tasks; for heavier reasoning pick a bigger model or
use the host model directly.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| plan | No | If true, run agy in PLAN mode (agy 1.1.12+): it investigates and writes an implementation plan instead of touching anything. Verified on 1.1.20 that a file write and a shell command are both refused and diverted into a plan document under agy's own directory — even when the prompt insists, and even though the bridge still passes --dangerously-skip-permissions — while file READS answer normally. Use it to point Antigravity at a repo you don't want it editing. Two caveats. It is agent-enforced, not an OS sandbox: it constrains agy's agent loop, so treat it as a strong default rather than a boundary you'd rely on against a hostile prompt (Codex has the real one — see codex_ask's sandbox, and its Windows caveat: as of codex 0.149.1 a sandboxed run there refuses every command and answers anyway). And it is exclusive with the bridge's slash-command shield, because agy silently disables plan mode when that shield is on; a prompt whose first token is a slash command is therefore rejected up front rather than run. Raises on agy older than 1.1.12, which ignores --mode in print mode, rather than silently running your prompt unrestricted. Default false. | |
| model | No | Optional model slug to run this conversation on (agy's --model), e.g. "gemini-3.1-pro-high" or "claude-sonnet-4-6". Omit to use the model set in agy's settings.json (gemini-3.8-flash-high as of agy 1.1.25). Must be one of `agy models` — an unknown slug is rejected up front (agy would otherwise silently ignore it and fall back to the default). agy 1.1.5 replaced the old human labels ("Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)") with these slugs, and the default has since moved to the gemini-3.8-flash family; the old form is no longer accepted. Note 1.1.25 also DROPPED the gemini-3.5-flash family with no changelog entry, so a 3.5 slug you saw in older docs is now rejected. See antigravity_status / `agy models` for the valid slugs. | |
| watch | No | If true, open a live "watch" view in your browser that streams agy's steps (narration + the real commands it runs) as it works. agy still runs headless; the same final text is returned. Best- effort and cross-platform — if the browser can't open, the run completes normally. Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Question or instruction for Antigravity. | |
| schema | No | Optional JSON Schema (an object, or its JSON text). When given, agy is asked to produce output matching it (agy 1.1.8's --json-schema) and this tool returns the VALIDATED OBJECT as JSON text instead of prose — json.loads it. What comes back is agy's own `structured_output`, which carries exactly the declared fields; agy's prose `response` on the same run also picks up its internal toolAction/toolSummary keys and can be prefixed with a sentence, so the two are NOT interchangeable. If agy produces no structured output the call RAISES rather than handing back prose you would have to parse anyway. Needs agy 1.1.8+. IMPORTANT — write the prompt so the ANSWER is in the turn, and let the schema only shape it. agy fills the schema in a finishing pass that does not re-reason about the content, so a field the turn never established gets guessed from the schema itself. Measured on 1.1.20 with "this broke my build and wasted my whole afternoon": with enum ["positive","negative"] it answered "positive" 3 times out of 4, and simply REVERSING the enum to ["negative","positive"] flipped it to "negative" 2 out of 2 — it was following field order, not the sentence. Adding a `reason` field did not help; the reason came back "Completed sentiment classification task." Asking the prompt to state the verdict and why, and keeping the same biased enum, was correct 3 out of 3. So: extraction of what the model has already worked out is reliable; a judgment delegated to the schema is not. | |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for agy to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working directory for the conversation. Defaults to cwd. Choose an existing project dir for context-aware responses. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond annotations (readOnlyHint=false, openWorldHint=true), the description adds authentication context (silent-auth via Windows Credential Manager) and the text-return behavior. The plan and watch parameter descriptions go further by disclosing that agy can run shell commands/write files and what plan mode blocks; the only minor gap is that the main description does not itself warn that the default mode may mutate the workspace.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The main description is four sentences with the core purpose front-loaded, and every sentence adds value: identity, auth, return type, and usage guidance. No filler or repetition of the title.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Between the main description and the very rich input schema, an agent has everything needed to invoke the tool safely: authentication, default model, return format, side-effect caveats, version requirements, error/raise behavior, and workspace semantics. The output-schema signal covers return-value documentation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and the parameter descriptions are unusually detailed (plan-mode caveats, model slug rules, JSON-schema behavior, watch, timeout, workspace), so the main description need not add parameter meaning. It does not go beyond the schema here, earning the baseline 3.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first sentence names a specific verb and resource ('Ask Antigravity ... a question in a NEW conversation') and adds the concrete identity 'agy CLI, Gemini by default'. It also states the output contract ('Returns the model's final response as text'), which separates it from continuation and status siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives explicit placement guidance: 'Good for fast tool-calling and short tasks; for heavier reasoning pick a bigger model or use the host model directly.' The emphasized 'NEW conversation' also tells an agent to reserve this tool for fresh conversations rather than antigravity_continue.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
antigravity_continueContinue Antigravity conversationA
Continue the Antigravity conversation rooted at this workspace.
Resumes the exact conversation id recorded for workspace (via agy's
--conversation flag), not agy's global "most recent", so it stays correct
even if agy was used elsewhere in between. On agy 1.1.8+ that id is the one
agy itself reported for this bridge's last run in the workspace, so a
follow-up resumes THIS thread even if you have since started a separate
conversation in the same folder from Antigravity's own interface.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| plan | No | If true, run this turn in agy's PLAN mode (1.1.12+) — it investigates and writes an implementation plan instead of editing files or running commands, while reads still work. Per-invocation like `model`, so a follow-up can plan even if the original ask was unrestricted. See antigravity_ask's `plan` for what it does and does not guarantee. Default false. | |
| model | No | Optional model slug for this turn (agy's --model), e.g. "claude-sonnet-4-6". agy's model is per-invocation, not baked into the conversation, so a follow-up can run on a different model than the original ask — omit to use agy's settings.json default. Validated against `agy models`; an unknown slug is rejected (agy would silently ignore it). | |
| watch | No | If true, open a live "watch" view in your browser that streams agy's steps as it works (same return value, best-effort). Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Follow-up message. | |
| schema | No | Optional JSON Schema for this turn — returns the validated object as JSON text instead of prose. Per-invocation like `model` and `plan`. See antigravity_ask's `schema`. Needs agy 1.1.8+. | |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for agy to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working directory used by the prior conversation. Defaults to cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already signal mutating, open-world, non-idempotent behavior. The description adds useful behavioral context: the exact conversation id routing, version-dependent behavior on agy 1.1.8+, and the guarantee that it resumes THIS thread even if a separate conversation was started in the same folder. No contradiction with annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two short, purposeful paragraphs. The first states the core purpose; the second adds a necessary edge-case clarification about global 'most recent' versus the exact conversation thread. Every sentence earns its place with no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With 100% schema coverage, rich per-parameter descriptions, an output schema, and safety/open-world annotations, the description only needs to disambiguate conversation routing behavior, which it does thoroughly. It is complete enough for an agent to select and invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, and each parameter already has a detailed description, so the tool description does not need to explain parameters. It adds some conceptual context about how workspace maps to the recorded conversation id, but the schema carries the semantic load.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states exactly what the tool does: 'Continue the Antigravity conversation rooted at this workspace' and explains it resumes the exact conversation id recorded for the workspace. This clearly distinguishes it from starting a new ask and from other sibling tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The first sentence frames when to use the tool, and the second paragraph clarifies that it uses the workspace-recorded conversation id rather than agy's global 'most recent', preventing common misuse. It does not explicitly name antigravity_ask as the alternative for starting new conversations, so it stops short of full when/not guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
antigravity_imageGenerate an image with AntigravityA
Generate an image with Antigravity (Gemini image model via agy CLI).
Drives agy to produce a raster image on your existing AI Pro quota, saves it, and returns the absolute file path plus its real format and byte size. The host can then read the path to view the image.
agy picks the image format itself (JPEG for photo-like images, PNG for flat graphics), so the returned path's extension is corrected to match the actual bytes (a requested out.png may come back as out.jpg). Runs a normal, unsandboxed agy session — same privileges/caveats as the other tools (see the module SECURITY note).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch | No | If true, open the live "watch" window that streams agy's steps and shows the finished image inline (same return value, best-effort). Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Description of the image to generate. | |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for agy to complete. Default 240 (image generation is slower than text). | |
| workspace | No | Working directory for the conversation. Defaults to cwd. | |
| output_path | No | Where to save. Absolute, or relative to `workspace`. If omitted, a timestamped name under `workspace` is used. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond annotations (readOnlyHint false, openWorldHint true), the description adds valuable behavioral context: it consumes AI Pro quota, saves the image, returns path/format/size, and notes that the extension may be corrected. It also mentions unsandboxed session and same privileges as other tools.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise, with two paragraphs that front-load the main purpose. Every sentence adds essential information (quota, file output, format behavior, security note). No redundancy or fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers key aspects: output details (path, format, byte size), format selection, execution context (unsandboxed, same privileges), and quota usage. It references a security note from elsewhere. An output schema exists but is not shown; still, the description sufficiently explains return values.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the description adds minimal extra detail for parameters. It restates that output_path can be absolute/relative and timeout_s default is 240, but these are already in the schema. The format correction note is a minor addition.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states that the tool generates an image using Antigravity (Gemini image model via agy CLI). It distinguishes itself from sibling tools like antigravity_ask (text generation) and antigravity_image_swarm by focusing on single image generation with file saving.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains the tool's behavior (quota usage, file path return) but does not explicitly state when to use this tool versus alternatives like antigravity_image_swarm. It lacks guidance on appropriate prompts or scenarios.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
antigravity_image_swarmGenerate several images in parallelA
Generate several images IN PARALLEL with Antigravity (one worker per prompt).
Like antigravity_image, but runs N image generations concurrently in isolated
workers (capped at max_concurrency). Returns one block listing each image's
final path/format/size (or its error). Extensions are corrected to the real
bytes, exactly like antigravity_image. Same unsandboxed privileges/caveats as
antigravity_swarm.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch | No | If true, open the live dashboard; each finished image shows in its pane, and clicking a row opens that agent's window beside the dashboard. | |
| prompts | Yes | One image description per parallel worker. | |
| timeout_s | No | Per-worker timeout in seconds. Default 240 (images are slower). | |
| workspaces | No | Working directory per worker (same shorthand as antigravity_swarm). | |
| output_paths | No | Where to save each image (aligned to prompts). Omit to write timestamped files in the first workspace (or server cwd). | |
| max_concurrency | No | Max workers running at once (default 4). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description discloses file extension correction, concurrency limits, timeout, return format (path/format/size/error), and unsandboxed privileges. Annotations provide readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, which are consistent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose, uses brief paragraphs, and avoids fluff. However, it repeats 'like antigravity_image' and could be slightly more streamlined.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the output schema exists, the description sufficiently covers behavioral details, parameter defaults, concurrency, and workspace handling. It is complete for a tool with 6 parameters.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% and descriptions are thorough. The tool description adds little extra beyond what the schema already provides, such as the listing of return values but not parameter-specific details.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool generates several images in parallel, differentiating from antigravity_image. It specifies each prompt runs in an isolated worker, and returns a block listing results. This distinguishes it from siblings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains when to use this tool (for parallel image generation) and compares to antigravity_image and antigravity_swarm. However, it does not explicitly state when not to use it or mention alternatives like sequential generation.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
antigravity_statusagy bridge diagnosticsARead-onlyIdempotent
Report diagnostics for the agy bridge setup (spends no AI Pro quota).
Reports the bridge's own version and whether a newer release is available
(best-effort GitHub check; honors AGY_BRIDGE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK), then checks
whether agy is on PATH (and its version/compat), how much AI Pro quota is left
per model family (agy 1.1.11+ answers /usage in print mode for free — a
family at 0% is reported as a problem, since every call against it will fail
until its window resets), whether agy's state directories exist, whether the
newest conversation transcript is readable, and whether the SQLite
conversation store is present. Use this to debug empty or failed responses —
or to see if the bridge itself is out of date, or if you are simply out of
quota — before spending quota.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds significant behavioral context beyond the annotations (readOnly, idempotent): it states it spends no AI Pro quota, is a best-effort GitHub check honoring AGY_BRIDGE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK, details how 0% quota per family is reported as a problem, and lists filesystem checks. No contradiction with annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a dense but well-organized paragraph with the main purpose front-loaded and usage guidance at the end. All details are relevant, though the long clauses and extensive list make it slightly less scannable than optimal.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given that an output schema exists, the description thoroughly covers all checks performed, including version-specific behavior, env-var handling, and edge cases like quota exhaustion. The usage guidance completes the picture, making it comprehensive for a no-parameter diagnostic tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, so the schema fully covers parameter semantics (baseline 4). The description adds no parameter-specific details, but none are needed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'Report diagnostics for the agy bridge setup', which is a specific verb+resource statement. It distinguishes from sibling status tools (codex_status, copilot_status) by explicitly targeting the agy bridge, and then details the specific checks performed.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The final sentence provides explicit when-to-use guidance: 'Use this to debug empty or failed responses — or to see if the bridge itself is out of date, or if you are simply out of quota — before spending quota.' This is clear, but it does not name alternative tools or when-not-to-use, so it falls just short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
codex_askAsk Codex (new session)A
Ask OpenAI Codex (codex exec) a question or task in a NEW session.
Uses your existing Codex login (ChatGPT or API key — see codex login status).
Returns the agent's final message as text, read from codex's
--output-last-message file (no stdout scraping). Codex is a capable coding
agent, so this suits heavier reasoning and real code work, not just cheap
tool-calling. Point workspace at a real project dir for context-aware answers.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model | No | Optional model override (`-m`); omit to use codex's configured default. | |
| watch | No | If true, open a live "watch" view in your browser that streams codex's steps (reasoning, the commands it runs, file changes) from its `--json` event stream. codex still runs headless; the same final text is returned. Best-effort — if the browser can't open, the run completes normally. Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Question or instruction for Codex. | |
| sandbox | No | Filesystem policy — "read-only" (default: reads and answers but writes nothing), "workspace-write" (may edit files under the workspace), or "danger-full-access" (no sandbox — avoid). `codex exec` has no interactive approval gate, so this is the real safety boundary; opt into write access deliberately. WINDOWS CAVEAT (codex 0.149.1): sandboxed runs there currently refuse EVERY command, both policies, down to `pwd` — codex's policy engine cannot classify the `pwsh -Command <...>` wrapper it builds. Shell commands are how codex reads files, so it sees none of the workspace and ANSWERS ANYWAY, from its own knowledge or a web search, with no hint that it read nothing. The bridge appends a visible "[agent-intern] WARNING" to any answer whose run had commands refused: if you see it, treat the answer as unsourced. | read-only |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for codex to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working root for the session (`-C`). Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the annotations (readOnlyHint=false, openWorldHint=true), the description adds meaningful behavioral details: the tool uses an existing Codex login, returns only the final message read from `--output-last-message`, and does not use stdout scraping. It also hints at potentially heavy execution with 'real code work.' No contradiction with annotations; some safety specifics live in parameter descriptions, but the core behavioral traits are disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded: the first sentence states the core action and session type. Every subsequent sentence earns its place—login prerequisite, output mechanism, use-case guidance, and workspace advice. No filler or repetition of schema content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool that launches a coding agent, the description covers the key operational context: new session, login requirement, output retrieval method, suitability for heavy reasoning, and workspace recommendation. An output schema exists, so return-value detail is not required, and the sandbox/window caveats are handled in the parameter descriptions. An agent has enough information to invoke it correctly and set expectations.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, and the schema itself provides rich parameter descriptions (e.g., sandbox policies, watch behavior, timeout). The main description adds a small strategic tip about `workspace` ('Point workspace at a real project dir'), but otherwise does not need to compensate. This matches the baseline for fully documented schemas.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb-resource pair: 'Ask OpenAI Codex a question or task in a NEW session.' It distinguishes this from siblings by emphasizing 'NEW session,' which clearly separates it from codex_continue and other agent ask tools. The additional context that it uses `codex exec` and returns the final message makes the tool's intent unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear context for when to use it: 'suits heavier reasoning and real code work, not just cheap tool-calling.' It also advises pointing `workspace` at a real project directory for context-aware answers. However, it does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, so it falls just short of full exclusionary guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
codex_continueContinue Codex sessionA
Continue the Codex session rooted at this workspace (codex exec resume).
Resumes the exact session id captured from the last codex_ask in this workspace, falling back to the newest on-disk session whose recorded cwd matches (so it still works after a server restart). The resumed session keeps its original sandbox and model — those are chosen when you start it with codex_ask.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch | No | If true, open the live "watch" view streaming codex's steps as it works (same viewer as codex_ask). Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Follow-up message for the existing session. | |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for codex to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working root used by the prior session. Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds valuable behavioral context beyond annotations: it explains session resumption logic, fallback behavior, and that the session keeps its original sandbox and model. No contradictions with annotations (readOnlyHint=false, idempotentHint=false, openWorldHint=true) are present.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise, with two short paragraphs. The first sentence front-loads the primary purpose. Every sentence adds value, with no redundant or irrelevant information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (4 parameters, 1 required), schema coverage (100%), and the presence of an output schema, the description covers all key aspects: session identification, fallback, behavior after restart, and preservation of original settings. It is complete for an agent to correctly invoke the tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description does not add significant extra meaning for parameters beyond what is already in the input schema schema. It provides context around workspace defaults and timeout, but these are already described in the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states that the tool continues an existing Codex session, using a specific command (`codex exec resume`). It distinguishes from sibling tools like codex_ask (which starts a session) and codex_status (status check), and explains the fallback behavior for session identification.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains when to use this tool (after codex_ask, to continue a session) and includes practical details like fallback after server restart. It does not explicitly state when not to use it or mention alternatives, but the context is clear enough for an agent to infer appropriate usage.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
codex_statusCodex bridge diagnosticsARead-onlyIdempotent
Report diagnostics for the Codex bridge setup (spends no quota).
Reports the bridge's own version and whether a newer release is available
(best-effort GitHub check; honors AGY_BRIDGE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK) — the same
update notice antigravity_status shows, so a Codex-only install still surfaces
it — then checks whether codex is on PATH (and its version), whether you're
logged in (codex login status — no model call, no quota), where codex stores
its sessions, and how many workspace sessions are pinned this run. Use this to
debug "codex not found" or auth errors before spending quota.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations provide readOnlyHint and idempotentHint, but the description adds valuable context: confirms no quota spent, describes best-effort GitHub check with environment variable, and details each diagnostic check. No contradictions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single paragraph with a clear flow: purpose, detailed checks, usage note. Slightly long but every sentence adds value; could be more concise but remains efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no parameters, rich annotations, and presence of output schema, the description fully explains what the tool does, its side effects (no quota), and when to use it. It covers all behavioral and contextual aspects.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has zero parameters with 100% coverage, so description does not need to add parameter details. Baseline score of 4 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool reports diagnostics for the Codex bridge setup, listing specific checks (version, update, PATH, login status, session storage, pinned sessions). It distinguishes from sibling status tools by referencing antigravity_status and focusing on Codex-specific debugging.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly tells when to use: 'debug "codex not found" or auth errors before spending quota.' It also implies not to use for other bridges, and notes the tool spends no quota, making it safe to run.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
copilot_askAsk GitHub Copilot (new session)A
Ask the GitHub Copilot CLI (copilot -p) a question or task in a NEW session.
Uses your existing Copilot login (OS credential store, or a
COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN env var — see copilot_status).
Returns the agent's final message, read straight from stdout (the CLI's -s
silent mode; no scraping). Copilot is a capable agentic coder — good for real
code/repo work; point workspace at a project dir for context-aware answers.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model | No | Optional model override (`--model`). Use "auto" to let Copilot pick. Which ids work is ACCOUNT-DEPENDENT and copilot exposes no non-interactive list, so the bridge cannot validate this the way the agy/cursor tools do — an unavailable id errors immediately with copilot's own message, costing a call. Prefer omitting it (your account default) or "auto" unless you know your plan's ids. | |
| watch | No | If true, open a live "watch" view streaming copilot's steps from its `--output-format json` event stream. Same final text is returned. Best-effort. Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Question or instruction for Copilot. | |
| sandbox | No | Permission policy (maps to copilot's tool/path flags): "read-only" (default — best-effort: denies the local write/shell tools; NOT an OS sandbox, so unlike codex it is not a hard boundary), "workspace-write" (may edit files, confined to the workspace), or "danger-full-access" (--allow-all — avoid). | read-only |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for copilot to complete. Default 180. (Copilot's reasoning models can be slow; raise this if needed.) | |
| workspace | No | Working root for the session (`-C`). Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations indicate readOnlyHint false, openWorldHint true, idempotentHint false. Description adds useful behavioral details: uses existing login, returns stdout from CLI in silent mode, best-effort watch option, and notes sandbox is not a hard boundary. No contradiction.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Description is front-loaded with the key action and well-structured, though it could be slightly more concise without losing important details.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity (6 params, output schema, siblings), the description covers purpose, usage, parameters, and output. It lacks explicit error handling but is otherwise sufficiently complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
All 6 parameters have schema descriptions (100% coverage), and the description adds context beyond schema, such as explaining model validation limitations, sandbox distinctions from codex, and workspace usage for context-aware answers.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states 'Ask the GitHub Copilot CLI a question or task in a NEW session,' specifying the verb, resource, and distinguishing from sibling tools like copilot_continue.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description advises using the tool for real code/repo work with workspace context, and mentions alternatives like copilot_status for login. It warns about model validation errors, but could more explicitly say when not to use.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
copilot_continueContinue GitHub Copilot sessionA
Continue the Copilot session rooted at this workspace (resumes its --session-id).
Resumes the exact session id the bridge set on the last copilot_ask in this
workspace, falling back to the newest on-disk session whose recorded cwd
matches (so it still works after a server restart). Unlike codex_continue,
copilot re-applies permission flags on every call, so sandbox takes effect
here too — e.g. analyze read-only with copilot_ask, then continue with
"workspace-write" to apply the fix.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch | No | If true, open the live "watch" view streaming copilot's steps (same viewer as copilot_ask). Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Follow-up message for the existing session. | |
| sandbox | No | Permission policy for THIS turn (default "read-only"). Same values and caveats as copilot_ask. | read-only |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for copilot to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working root used by the prior session. Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description reveals behavioral traits beyond annotations: it resumes the exact session ID, falls back to the newest on-disk session, and re-applies permission flags each call. This adds value over the annotations (readOnlyHint=false, openWorldHint=true) which do not specify these details. No contradiction.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise with two short paragraphs. The first sentence immediately states the core purpose. The second paragraph adds crucial differentiation without redundancy. Every sentence provides value, and the information is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool has an output schema and high schema coverage, the description covers all necessary context: session resumption, workspace fallback, permission behavior, and comparison to codex_continue. It is complete for an AI agent to understand when and how to use the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3. The description adds no extra parameter details beyond the schema, but it does reinforce that 'sandbox' takes effect here, which is already in the schema. The parameter meaning is well-covered by schema descriptions themselves, so no need for more.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool continues a GitHub Copilot session rooted at a workspace, resuming its session ID. It distinguishes itself from siblings like codex_continue by mentioning permission re-application. The title 'Continue GitHub Copilot session' further clarifies the purpose.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains when to use this tool: after a copilot_ask, and when you want sandbox permissions to take effect. It contrasts with codex_continue, but does not explicitly list scenarios where alternatives like antigravity_continue are preferred. The fallback behavior after restart is noted, providing context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
copilot_statusCopilot bridge diagnosticsARead-onlyIdempotent
Report diagnostics for the Copilot bridge setup (spends no quota).
Reports the bridge's own version and whether a newer release is available
(best-effort GitHub check; honors AGY_BRIDGE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK) — the same
update notice antigravity_status shows, so a Copilot-only install still
surfaces it — then checks whether copilot is on PATH (and its version), an auth
hint (copilot has no login status command, so this is best-effort — an env
token is reported when set, otherwise login via the credential store is
assumed and unverified), where copilot stores session state, and how many
workspace sessions are pinned this run. Use this to debug "copilot not found"
or auth errors before a call.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description goes beyond annotations by disclosing the tool's best-effort nature: the GitHub check 'honors AGY_BRIDGE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK' and auth detection is 'best-effort' with specific caveats. It also notes that the update notice is the same as antigravity_status. No contradictions with annotations (readOnlyHint, idempotentHint).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise and well-structured. It opens with a clear summary sentence, then bullet-points the diagnostics items without unnecessary words. Every sentence adds value, and the length is appropriate for the tool's complexity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool has no input parameters and an output schema exists, the description covers all necessary behavioral context: what diagnostics are reported, edge cases (best-effort checks), and the intended debug use case. It is fully complete for the agent to understand and invoke correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has zero parameters and 100% coverage, so the description does not need to explain parameters. The baseline of 4 is appropriate as the description adds no additional parameter information.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: 'Report diagnostics for the Copilot bridge setup.' It details the specific items checked (version, update, PATH, auth, session state) and explicitly says to use it for debugging 'copilot not found' or auth errors. This distinguishes it from sibling status tools like antigravity_status by focusing on Copilot-specific diagnostics.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides explicit usage guidance: 'Use this to debug "copilot not found" or auth errors before a call.' It also explains that the update notice matches antigravity_status, implying when to choose this over that. However, it does not explicitly state when not to use it or name alternative tools for other scenarios.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
cursor_askAsk Cursor (new chat)A
Ask the Cursor CLI (cursor-agent -p) a question or task in a NEW chat.
Uses your existing Cursor login (OS credential store, or a CURSOR_API_KEY env
var — see cursor_status). Returns the agent's final message, read straight
from stdout (no scraping). Cursor is a capable agentic coder with a wide model
menu (GPT / Claude / Grok / Composer); point workspace at a project dir for
context-aware answers.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model | No | Optional model override (`--model`, e.g. "auto", "gpt-5.2", "claude-opus-4-8-high", "composer-2.5"); validated against `cursor-agent models` and rejected on a typo. cursor bakes the effort and speed axes into the id (…-low/-high/-xhigh/-max, each with a -fast twin) and also accepts a bracket form on the family base, e.g. "claude-opus-4-8[context=1m,effort=high]". Omit to use your Cursor default. | |
| watch | No | If true, open a live "watch" view streaming cursor's steps from its `--output-format stream-json` event stream. Same final text is returned. Best-effort. Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Question or instruction for Cursor. | |
| sandbox | No | Permission policy (maps to cursor's mode/force flags): "read-only" (default — `--mode ask`: agent-enforced, no file/shell edits; NOT an OS sandbox, so unlike codex it is not a hard boundary), "workspace-write" (may edit files, rooted at the workspace), or "danger-full-access" (OS sandbox off — avoid). | read-only |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for cursor to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working root for the chat (`--workspace`). Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations indicate mutation and external access, and the description adds context: it uses Cursor CLI, returns stdout, explains sandbox modes (including agent-enforced but not hard boundary), and mentions streaming via watch. This provides valuable behavioral insight beyond the structured annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two concise sentences in the first paragraph, front-loading the core purpose. Every sentence adds necessary context without redundancy. It is well-structured and efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity (6 parameters, output schema exists), the description covers purpose, authentication, return behavior, and basic use. It lacks explicit error handling or timeout details, but the schema covers most parameters. Overall, it provides sufficient context for an AI agent to use the tool effectively.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with detailed parameter descriptions. The description adds value by noting that workspace enables context-aware answers and linking to cursor_status for auth, supplementing the schema. It does not repeat schema information unnecessarily.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states 'Ask the Cursor CLI a question or task in a NEW chat', specifying the verb and resource. It distinguishes from sibling 'cursor_continue' by emphasizing 'new chat' and mentions return value and authentication, making the purpose unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage for new conversations but does not explicitly state when not to use it or provide alternatives. It references 'cursor_status' for auth but lacks direct comparison with 'cursor_continue'. The guidance is implied but not explicit, warranting a mid-range score.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
cursor_continueContinue Cursor chatA
Continue the Cursor chat rooted at this workspace (resumes its chat id).
Resumes the exact chat id the bridge minted on the last cursor_ask in this
workspace, falling back to the newest on-disk chat whose recorded cwd matches
(so it still works after a server restart). cursor applies permission flags per
invocation, so sandbox takes effect here too — e.g. analyze read-only with
cursor_ask, then continue with "workspace-write" to apply the fix.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch | No | If true, open the live "watch" view streaming cursor's steps (same viewer as cursor_ask). Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Follow-up message for the existing chat. | |
| sandbox | No | Permission policy for THIS turn (default "read-only"). Same values and caveats as cursor_ask. | read-only |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for cursor to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working root used by the prior chat. Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds significant behavioral context beyond annotations: it explains the resumption logic (exact chat id from last cursor_ask, fallback to newest chat with matching cwd), how permission flags apply per invocation, and that it works after server restart. No contradictions with annotations (readOnlyHint false, openWorldHint true, idempotentHint false).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise with two short paragraphs. The first sentence immediately states the core action. The second paragraph adds necessary detail without fluff. Every sentence adds value.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity (5 parameters, output schema exists), the description covers all essential behavioral aspects: resumption logic, fallback, permission per invocation, and restart resilience. It does not need to explain output schema since it exists separately.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With 100% schema coverage, the baseline is 3. The description does not add new parameter-level semantics beyond what is already in the schema. It reiterates that sandbox takes effect, but does not provide additional details or context that enhance parameter understanding.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly identifies the tool's action: 'continue the Cursor chat.' It uses specific verb ('continue') and resource ('Cursor chat'), and distinguishes from sibling tools like cursor_ask (which starts a new chat) and cursor_status (which shows status).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly states when to use this tool: after a cursor_ask to continue that chat. It also provides context on fallback behavior and permission handling, with an example usage scenario ('analyze read-only with cursor_ask, then continue with workspace-write'), guiding the agent on when and why to invoke this tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
cursor_statusCursor bridge diagnosticsARead-onlyIdempotent
Report diagnostics for the Cursor bridge setup (spends no quota).
Reports the bridge's own version and whether a newer release is available
(best-effort GitHub check; honors AGY_BRIDGE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK) — the same
update notice antigravity_status shows, so a Cursor-only install still surfaces
it — then checks whether cursor-agent is found (and its version), whether
you're logged in (cursor-agent status), and where cursor stores its chats.
Use this to debug "cursor not found" or auth errors before spending quota.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and idempotentHint=true, so no contradiction. The description adds value by detailing the best-effort GitHub update check and the AGY_BRIDGE_NO_UPDATE_CHECK environment variable, providing useful behavioral context beyond annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is composed of four efficient sentences, front-loading the purpose and quota-free nature. Every sentence earns its place, with no redundancy or unnecessary detail.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given zero parameters, existing output schema, and thorough description of diagnostics reported, the description is fully complete for an agent to understand what the tool does and what it will return.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With zero parameters, schema coverage is 100% and baseline is 4. No additional parameter description needed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states 'Report diagnostics for the Cursor bridge setup' with specific resources (bridge version, cursor-agent, login status, chat storage). It distinguishes from sibling antigravity_status by noting the same update notice is shown, clarifying overlap.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly says 'Use this to debug cursor not found or auth errors before spending quota,' providing clear usage context. It lacks explicit when-not-to-use but is sufficient for a diagnostic tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
grok_askAsk Grok Build (new session) [experimental]A
Ask Grok Build (grok -p) a question or task in a NEW session. EXPERIMENTAL.
⚠️ Community-verified only: this bridge has never completed an authenticated round-trip, because the author has no Grok subscription. Its flags are verified against grok 1.0.3, but the answer path is not. If it misbehaves, say so rather than working around it — and please report it.
Needs a SuperGrok / X Premium+ login (grok login) or an XAI_API_KEY env var;
run grok_status first to check. Returns the agent's final message, read from
grok's --output-format json result. Point workspace at a project dir for
context-aware answers.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model | No | Optional model override (`-m`, e.g. "grok-4.5"); validated against `grok models` and rejected on a typo. Omit to use grok's default. | |
| watch | No | If true, open a live "watch" view streaming grok's steps from its `--output-format streaming-json` event stream. Same final text is returned. Best-effort. Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Question or instruction for Grok. | |
| sandbox | No | Permission policy (maps to grok's `--sandbox` profile plus a tool allowlist): "read-only" (default — the `read-only` profile, no write/shell tools, no subagents), "workspace-write" (the `workspace` profile: writes land in the workspace, ~/.grok and temp), or "danger-full-access" (profile `off` — avoid). ⚠️ grok's OS sandbox is LINUX/macOS ONLY (Landlock/Seatbelt); on Windows it is silently NOT enforced, so read-only there rests on the agent-enforced tool allowlist alone. For a hard boundary on every platform, use codex. | read-only |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for grok to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working root (`--cwd`). Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond annotations, the description discloses the experimental status ('has never completed an authenticated round-trip'), warns that it may misbehave and asks to report issues, and states it returns the agent's final message from `--output-format json`. This adds meaningful risk and behavior context not present in structured hints.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose and experimental warning in the first paragraph; the second paragraph covers auth, output, and workspace usage. Each sentence is substantive, though slightly verbose.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity, the rich schema/annotations/output schema, and the experimental nature, the description covers the essential risk factors, auth, output, and workspace guidance. It is complete enough for an agent to decide and invoke it safely.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema descriptions cover 100% of parameters with detailed explanations (e.g., sandbox profiles, watch streaming). The description adds no extra parameter meaning beyond a passing mention of workspace location, so baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb+resource: 'Ask Grok Build (`grok -p`) a question or task in a NEW session.' This clearly distinguishes it from grok_continue (explicit 'NEW session') and grok_status.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It states prerequisites ('Needs a SuperGrok / X Premium+ login... or an XAI_API_KEY env var'), directs the agent to 'run `grok_status` first,' and suggests pointing workspace at project dir for context-aware answers. It doesn't explicitly name the alternative for continuing sessions, but the 'NEW session' wording implies the boundary.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
grok_continueContinue Grok Build session [experimental]A
Continue the Grok session rooted at this workspace. EXPERIMENTAL.
Resumes the exact session id grok returned on the last grok_ask in this
workspace (-r <id>), falling back to grok's own "most recent session for this
cwd" (-c) when that in-memory pin is gone — so it still works after a server
restart. grok applies permission flags per invocation, so sandbox takes effect
here too: analyze read-only with grok_ask, then continue with "workspace-write"
to apply the fix. Same experimental caveat and auth requirement as grok_ask.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| watch | No | If true, open the live "watch" view streaming grok's steps (same viewer as grok_ask). Default false. | |
| prompt | Yes | Follow-up message for the existing session. | |
| sandbox | No | Permission policy for THIS turn (default "read-only"). Same values and platform caveats as grok_ask. | read-only |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for grok to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working root used by the prior session. Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond annotations, the description discloses important behaviors: session pinning via grok_ask's id, fallback to cwd, persistence across server restarts, per-invocation permission flags, and the sandbox's effect. It also notes the experimental caveat and auth requirement, adding value over the structured annotations which only indicate openWorld and read-only state.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a compact paragraph that front-loads the purpose and then provides necessary technical details. Each sentence contributes useful information — purpose, session mechanism, permission behavior, and experimental caveat — without redundancy or fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the presence of a detailed input schema, annotations, and an output schema, the description is complete enough. It covers the core behavior, session continuity, permission handling, and caveats. It doesn't discuss edge cases like missing prior sessions, but the fallback mechanism partially addresses that, and the experimental tag signals volatility.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
All 5 parameters are fully described in the schema (100% coverage), so the description has little additional semantic burden. It adds one clarifying note that 'sandbox takes effect here too' and ties it to a workflow, but this is marginal relative to the schema's already explicit parameter descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'Continue the Grok session rooted at this workspace', which clearly specifies the verb (continue), the resource (Grok session), and the scope (rooted at this workspace). It further explains the mechanics (resuming via session id or fallback to cwd), distinguishing it from sibling tools like grok_ask and grok_status.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context: it is for continuing an existing session, references the companion grok_ask for read-only analysis, and explicitly recommends using 'workspace-write' to apply fixes. It lacks explicit 'when not to use' or named alternatives beyond grok_ask, but the workflow guidance is strong.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
grok_statusGrok bridge diagnosticsARead-onlyIdempotent
Report diagnostics for the Grok Build bridge setup (spends no quota).
Reports the bridge's own version and any newer release (the same update notice
antigravity_status shows), then whether grok is found (and its version),
whether you're authenticated, which models it offers, and where grok keeps its
data. Auth and the model list both come from grok models, which answers even
when logged out — so this is cheap and safe to call first.
Use this to debug "grok not found" or auth errors before spending quota. This backend is EXPERIMENTAL and unverified end-to-end, so a green status here means the setup looks right, not that a live answer has ever been confirmed.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond the readOnlyHint and idempotentHint annotations, the description reveals that no quota is consumed, that auth/model data come from `grok models` which answers even when logged out, and importantly warns that the backend is EXPERIMENTAL with unverified end-to-end behavior. These are valuable behavioral insights.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the key fact ('spends no quota'), structured into a clear overview, detailed output list, and usage guidance. Every sentence carries unique value and there is no repetition or filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a zero-parameter diagnostic tool, the description fully covers its purpose, output scope, safety characteristics, usage context, and a crucial caveat about experimental status. The presence of an output schema makes the lack of explicit return-format details acceptable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema requires no parameters, so the baseline is 4. The description compensates by explaining what the tool reports, which is more relevant to output than parameter semantics. No parameter information is needed.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states the tool's specific action ('Report diagnostics') and resource ('Grok Build bridge setup'), and immediately clarifies it spends no quota. It distinguishes itself from sibling tools like grok_ask/grok_continue by being a status/diagnostic tool, and even references antigravity_status for the update notice.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states when to use: 'Use this to debug "grok not found" or auth errors before spending quota.' It also positions itself as cheap, safe, and first to call, giving clear decision guidance relative to other tools that spend quota.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
kimi_askAsk Kimi (new session) [experimental]A
Ask Kimi Code (kimi -p) a question or task in a NEW session. EXPERIMENTAL.
⚠️ Community-verified only — built without a Kimi account, so no authenticated
round-trip has ever run and the author cannot verify it. It won't answer until
you authenticate: run kimi login (device-code) or put an API key in
~/.kimi-code/config.toml, then check kimi_status. Returns the agent's final
message, read straight from stdout. Kimi Code is Moonshot's terminal coding
agent (Kimi K2 family); point workspace at a project dir for context-aware
answers.
Kimi print mode has NO sandbox and auto-executes every tool call (like antigravity), so run it only with trusted prompts on trusted content.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model | No | Optional model alias (`-m`, from ~/.kimi-code/config.toml); omit to use config's default_model. Not validated up front (Kimi has no `models` list), so a bad alias surfaces as Kimi's own run-time error. | |
| prompt | Yes | Question or instruction for Kimi. | |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for kimi to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working root (kimi's cwd). Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already flag readOnlyHint=false, openWorldHint=true, idempotentHint=false, but the description adds substantial behavioral context: the tool is experimental and community-verified only, no authenticated round-trip has ever been run, it requires authentication, reads output from stdout, and — critically — 'has NO sandbox and auto-executes every tool call (like antigravity).' This goes well beyond the annotations and fully warns the agent of the tool's dangerous side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is longer than average but every sentence contributes meaningful information: purpose, experimental status, auth steps, return format, what Kimi Code is, workspace tip, and a critical safety warning. It is front-loaded with the primary action and uses line breaks to separate warnings. Slightly verbose but justified by the tool's complexity and risk.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's experimental, unauthenticated, and dangerous nature, the description is remarkably complete. It explains the output (agent's final message from stdout), prerequisites, the safety model (no sandbox, auto-execution), and how to get better results (workspace). The presence of an output schema reduces the need to describe return values, and the description covers the rest comprehensively.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so all four parameters (model, prompt, timeout_s, workspace) are already documented. The description adds one useful hint for the workspace parameter ('point workspace at a project dir for context-aware answers'), but adds nothing new for prompt, model, or timeout_s. With high schema coverage, this marginal extra keeps it at baseline 3.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb-resource pairing: 'Ask Kimi Code... a question or task in a NEW session.' This clearly distinguishes the tool from the sibling kimi_continue (which presumably continues a session) and kimi_status. It also names the underlying command (`kimi -p`) and states what it returns, making the tool's function unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'in a NEW session' provides clear context for when to use this tool versus continuation alternatives, even though no alternative is explicitly named. It also gives prerequisites (authentication via `kimi login` or API key, then checking `kimi_status`) and a safety restriction ('run it only with trusted prompts on trusted content'). Missing an explicit 'use kimi_continue instead' but otherwise strong.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
kimi_continueContinue Kimi session [experimental]A
Continue the Kimi session rooted at this workspace (kimi -c). EXPERIMENTAL.
Resumes the previous Kimi session for this workspace via -c/--continue — Kimi
scopes sessions per working directory, so there's no id to track. Errors if no
prior kimi_ask ran in this workspace. Same experimental caveat and auth
requirement as kimi_ask.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| prompt | Yes | Follow-up message for the existing session. | |
| timeout_s | No | Max seconds to wait for kimi to complete. Default 180. | |
| workspace | No | Working root used by the prior session. Defaults to the server cwd. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare the tool as non-read-only, open-world, and non-idempotent. The description adds meaningful behavioral context: session scoping per working directory (no ID needed), error condition when no prior session exists, and experimental/auth caveats. This goes beyond basic annotations and helps an agent understand prerequisites and side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is three sentences, front-loads the main purpose in the first sentence, and includes only essential details. No extraneous information or redundant restatement of the title.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity (experimental, has prerequisites, multiple parameters) and the presence of an output schema and annotations, the description covers the critical context: how to use it, what will happen if misused, and the experimental nature. It's sufficient for an agent to invoke correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema covers all three parameters with clear descriptions (100% coverage). The description adds meaning by explaining the session scoping mechanism, which clarifies the 'workspace' parameter's purpose and why no session ID is required. This enriches the schema without radically changing it.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool resumes a prior Kimi session for the workspace via `kimi -c`. It distinguishes from siblings like kimi_ask (starting a new session) and kimi_status (checking status) by specifying the action and workspace scoping. The verb 'continue' is specific and unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides explicit guidance by stating it errors if no prior kimi_ask was run, indicating when the tool is applicable. It also references the same experimental caveat and auth requirement as kimi_ask, framing the appropriate context. However, it doesn't explicitly contrast with alternatives like kimi_ask or kimi_status, so it falls just short of fully explicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
kimi_statusKimi bridge diagnosticsARead-onlyIdempotent
Report diagnostics for the Kimi bridge setup (spends no quota). EXPERIMENTAL.
Reports the bridge's own version and any newer release (same update notice
antigravity_status shows), then checks whether kimi is found (and its
version), whether a provider is configured (kimi provider list — the auth
proxy, since Kimi needs kimi login or an API key in config.toml), and where
Kimi stores its data. This backend is unverified, so expect the auth row to say
"no providers configured" until you log in.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Adds substantial context beyond annotations: 'spends no quota,' 'EXPERIMENTAL,' expected auth row prior to login, and backend unverified. These are behavioral traits not captured by readOnlyHint/idempotentHint.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with a clear one-line summary. The subsequent paragraph is detailed but each sentence adds necessary caveats or specifics. Slightly verbose with backticks and examples, but overall efficient.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present and annotations, the description provides complete context: purpose, cost (no quota), experimental status, expected caveats, and specific checks performed. No significant gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Tool has zero parameters and schema coverage is 100% trivially. The description doesn't add parameter semantics, but none are needed; baseline 4 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Report diagnostics for the Kimi bridge setup'. It enumerates concrete checks (version, newer release, kimi binary, provider, data location) and distinguishes it from sibling status tools by referencing antigravity_status's update notice.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies use when checking bridge setup, notes 'spends no quota' as a benefit, and warns the backend is unverified. However, it does not explicitly state when to use this instead of kimi_ask/kimi_continue or when not to use it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
1 tool update
v0.29.1- Changed
antigravity_ask1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / model / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional model slug to run this conversation on (agy's --model),\n e.g. \"gemini-3.1-pro-high\" or \"claude-sonnet-4-6\". Omit to use the\n model set in agy's settings.json (gemini-3.7-flash-high by\n default). Must be one of `agy models` — an unknown slug is\n rejected up front (agy would otherwise silently ignore it and fall\n back to the default). agy 1.1.5 replaced the old human labels\n (\"Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)\") with these slugs, and the default has\n since moved to the gemini-3.7-flash family; the old form is no\n longer accepted. See antigravity_status / `agy models` for the\n valid slugs."New value: +"Optional model slug to run this conversation on (agy's --model),\n e.g. \"gemini-3.1-pro-high\" or \"claude-sonnet-4-6\". Omit to use the\n model set in agy's settings.json (gemini-3.8-flash-high as of agy\n 1.1.25). Must be one of `agy models` — an unknown slug is\n rejected up front (agy would otherwise silently ignore it and fall\n back to the default). agy 1.1.5 replaced the old human labels\n (\"Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)\") with these slugs, and the default has\n since moved to the gemini-3.8-flash family; the old form is no\n longer accepted. Note 1.1.25 also DROPPED the gemini-3.5-flash\n family with no changelog entry, so a 3.5 slug you saw in older\n docs is now rejected. See antigravity_status / `agy models` for\n the valid slugs."
4 tool updates
v0.28.0- Changed
agent_swarm1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / tasks / descriptionPrevious value: -"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\"), \"codex\",\n \"copilot\" (alias \"gh\"/\"github\"), \"cursor\", or \"grok\"\n (alias \"xai\"; EXPERIMENTAL — see grok_ask) (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: Codex/Copilot/Cursor/Grok only — \"read-only\" (default),\n \"workspace-write\", or \"danger-full-access\". Ignored for\n Antigravity. (Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox\n everywhere; Grok's is enforced on Linux/macOS only;\n Copilot's and Cursor's are agent/tool-level, not OS\n boundaries — see copilot_ask / cursor_ask / grok_ask.)\n - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`,\n Copilot's/Cursor's `--model`, Grok's `-m`, or\n Antigravity's `--model` (an agy slug like\n \"claude-sonnet-4-6\"; validated against each backend's\n model list). Omit for each backend's default."New value: +"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\"), \"codex\",\n \"copilot\" (alias \"gh\"/\"github\"), \"cursor\", or \"grok\"\n (alias \"xai\"; EXPERIMENTAL — see grok_ask) (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: \"read-only\" (default), \"workspace-write\", or\n \"danger-full-access\". Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox\n everywhere; Grok's is enforced on Linux/macOS only;\n Copilot's and Cursor's are agent/tool-level, not OS\n boundaries — see copilot_ask / cursor_ask / grok_ask.\n ANTIGRAVITY is the odd one: \"read-only\" maps to agy's\n plan mode (it investigates and writes a plan instead of\n editing files or running commands — see antigravity_ask's\n `plan`, and note it is agent-enforced, and needs agy\n 1.1.12+), \"danger-full-access\" states plainly that the\n worker is unrestricted, and \"workspace-write\" is REFUSED\n because agy has no write scoping to offer. Omitting it\n leaves an Antigravity worker unrestricted — that is the\n long-standing default, unlike every other backend here,\n so fence it explicitly if you want it fenced.\n - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`,\n Copilot's/Cursor's `--model`, Grok's `-m`, or\n Antigravity's `--model` (an agy slug like\n \"claude-sonnet-4-6\"; validated against each backend's\n model list). Omit for each backend's default."
- Changed
antigravity_ask3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / model / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional model slug to run this conversation on (agy's --model),\n e.g. \"gemini-3.1-pro-high\" or \"claude-sonnet-4-6\". Omit to use the\n model set in agy's settings.json (gemini-3.6-flash-high by\n default). Must be one of `agy models` — an unknown slug is\n rejected up front (agy would otherwise silently ignore it and fall\n back to the default). agy 1.1.5 replaced the old human labels\n (\"Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)\") with these slugs and 1.1.6 added the\n gemini-3.6-flash family; the old form is no longer accepted. See\n antigravity_status / `agy models` for the valid slugs."New value: +"Optional model slug to run this conversation on (agy's --model),\n e.g. \"gemini-3.1-pro-high\" or \"claude-sonnet-4-6\". Omit to use the\n model set in agy's settings.json (gemini-3.7-flash-high by\n default). Must be one of `agy models` — an unknown slug is\n rejected up front (agy would otherwise silently ignore it and fall\n back to the default). agy 1.1.5 replaced the old human labels\n (\"Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)\") with these slugs, and the default has\n since moved to the gemini-3.7-flash family; the old form is no\n longer accepted. See antigravity_status / `agy models` for the\n valid slugs." - added
Input schema / properties / planAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "If true, run agy in PLAN mode (agy 1.1.12+): it investigates and\n writes an implementation plan instead of touching anything. Verified\n on 1.1.20 that a file write and a shell command are both refused and\n diverted into a plan document under agy's own directory — even when\n the prompt insists, and even though the bridge still passes\n --dangerously-skip-permissions — while file READS answer normally.\n Use it to point Antigravity at a repo you don't want it editing.\n Two caveats. It is agent-enforced, not an OS sandbox: it constrains\n agy's agent loop, so treat it as a strong default rather than a\n boundary you'd rely on against a hostile prompt (Codex has the real\n one — see codex_ask's sandbox, and its Windows caveat: as of codex\n 0.149.1 a sandboxed run there refuses every command and answers\n anyway). And it is exclusive with the bridge's\n slash-command shield, because agy silently disables plan mode when\n that shield is on; a prompt whose first token is a slash command is\n therefore rejected up front rather than run. Raises on agy older than\n 1.1.12, which ignores --mode in print mode, rather than silently\n running your prompt unrestricted. Default false.", + "type": "boolean" +} - added
Input schema / properties / schemaAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": true, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "Optional JSON Schema (an object, or its JSON text). When given, agy\n is asked to produce output matching it (agy 1.1.8's --json-schema)\n and this tool returns the VALIDATED OBJECT as JSON text instead of\n prose — json.loads it. What comes back is agy's own\n `structured_output`, which carries exactly the declared fields;\n agy's prose `response` on the same run also picks up its internal\n toolAction/toolSummary keys and can be prefixed with a sentence, so\n the two are NOT interchangeable. If agy produces no structured\n output the call RAISES rather than handing back prose you would\n have to parse anyway. Needs agy 1.1.8+.\n\n IMPORTANT — write the prompt so the ANSWER is in the turn, and let\n the schema only shape it. agy fills the schema in a finishing pass\n that does not re-reason about the content, so a field the turn never\n established gets guessed from the schema itself. Measured on 1.1.20\n with \"this broke my build and wasted my whole afternoon\": with\n enum [\"positive\",\"negative\"] it answered \"positive\" 3 times out of 4,\n and simply REVERSING the enum to [\"negative\",\"positive\"] flipped it\n to \"negative\" 2 out of 2 — it was following field order, not the\n sentence. Adding a `reason` field did not help; the reason came back\n \"Completed sentiment classification task.\" Asking the prompt to state\n the verdict and why, and keeping the same biased enum, was correct\n 3 out of 3. So: extraction of what the model has already worked out\n is reliable; a judgment delegated to the schema is not." +}
- Changed
antigravity_continue2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / planAdded value: +{ + "default": false, + "description": "If true, run this turn in agy's PLAN mode (1.1.12+) — it investigates\n and writes an implementation plan instead of editing files or running\n commands, while reads still work. Per-invocation like `model`, so a\n follow-up can plan even if the original ask was unrestricted. See\n antigravity_ask's `plan` for what it does and does not guarantee.\n Default false.", + "type": "boolean" +} - added
Input schema / properties / schemaAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "additionalProperties": true, + "type": "object" + }, + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "Optional JSON Schema for this turn — returns the validated object as\n JSON text instead of prose. Per-invocation like `model` and `plan`.\n See antigravity_ask's `schema`. Needs agy 1.1.8+." +}
- Changed
codex_ask1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / sandbox / descriptionPrevious value: -"Filesystem policy — \"read-only\" (default: reads and answers but\n writes nothing), \"workspace-write\" (may edit files under the\n workspace), or \"danger-full-access\" (no sandbox — avoid). `codex\n exec` has no interactive approval gate, so this is the real safety\n boundary; opt into write access deliberately."New value: +"Filesystem policy — \"read-only\" (default: reads and answers but\n writes nothing), \"workspace-write\" (may edit files under the\n workspace), or \"danger-full-access\" (no sandbox — avoid). `codex\n exec` has no interactive approval gate, so this is the real safety\n boundary; opt into write access deliberately.\n\n WINDOWS CAVEAT (codex 0.149.1): sandboxed runs there currently\n refuse EVERY command, both policies, down to `pwd` — codex's\n policy engine cannot classify the `pwsh -Command <...>` wrapper it\n builds. Shell commands are how codex reads files, so it sees none\n of the workspace and ANSWERS ANYWAY, from its own knowledge or a\n web search, with no hint that it read nothing. The bridge appends\n a visible \"[agent-intern] WARNING\" to any answer whose run had\n commands refused: if you see it, treat the answer as unsourced."
7 tool updates
v0.26.0- Changed
agent_swarm1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / tasks / descriptionPrevious value: -"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\"), \"codex\",\n \"copilot\" (alias \"gh\"/\"github\"), or \"cursor\" (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: Codex/Copilot/Cursor only — \"read-only\" (default),\n \"workspace-write\", or \"danger-full-access\". Ignored for\n Antigravity. (Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox; Copilot's\n and Cursor's are agent/tool-level, not OS boundaries — see\n copilot_ask / cursor_ask.)\n - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`,\n Copilot's/Cursor's `--model`, or Antigravity's `--model`\n (an agy slug like \"claude-sonnet-4-6\"; validated\n against each backend's model list). Omit for each\n backend's default."New value: +"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\"), \"codex\",\n \"copilot\" (alias \"gh\"/\"github\"), \"cursor\", or \"grok\"\n (alias \"xai\"; EXPERIMENTAL — see grok_ask) (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: Codex/Copilot/Cursor/Grok only — \"read-only\" (default),\n \"workspace-write\", or \"danger-full-access\". Ignored for\n Antigravity. (Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox\n everywhere; Grok's is enforced on Linux/macOS only;\n Copilot's and Cursor's are agent/tool-level, not OS\n boundaries — see copilot_ask / cursor_ask / grok_ask.)\n - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`,\n Copilot's/Cursor's `--model`, Grok's `-m`, or\n Antigravity's `--model` (an agy slug like\n \"claude-sonnet-4-6\"; validated against each backend's\n model list). Omit for each backend's default."
- Added
grok_ask - Added
grok_continue - Added
grok_status - Added
kimi_ask - Added
kimi_continue - Added
kimi_status
2 tool updates
v0.22.1- Changed
copilot_ask1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / model / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional model override (`--model`, e.g. \"gpt-5.3-codex\"); omit to\n use your account's default. An unavailable model errors immediately."New value: +"Optional model override (`--model`). Use \"auto\" to let Copilot pick.\n Which ids work is ACCOUNT-DEPENDENT and copilot exposes no\n non-interactive list, so the bridge cannot validate this the way the\n agy/cursor tools do — an unavailable id errors immediately with\n copilot's own message, costing a call. Prefer omitting it (your\n account default) or \"auto\" unless you know your plan's ids."
- Changed
cursor_ask1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / model / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional model override (`--model`, e.g. \"gpt-5.2\", \"sonnet-4-thinking\",\n \"auto\"); validated against `cursor-agent models` and rejected on a\n typo. Omit to use your Cursor default."New value: +"Optional model override (`--model`, e.g. \"auto\", \"gpt-5.2\",\n \"claude-opus-4-8-high\", \"composer-2.5\"); validated against\n `cursor-agent models` and rejected on a typo. cursor bakes the effort\n and speed axes into the id (…-low/-high/-xhigh/-max, each with a\n -fast twin) and also accepts a bracket form on the family base, e.g.\n \"claude-opus-4-8[context=1m,effort=high]\". Omit to use your Cursor\n default."
3 tool updates
v0.21.4- Changed
agent_swarm1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / tasks / descriptionPrevious value: -"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\"), \"codex\",\n \"copilot\" (alias \"gh\"/\"github\"), or \"cursor\" (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: Codex/Copilot/Cursor only — \"read-only\" (default),\n \"workspace-write\", or \"danger-full-access\". Ignored for\n Antigravity. (Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox; Copilot's\n and Cursor's are agent/tool-level, not OS boundaries — see\n copilot_ask / cursor_ask.)\n - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`,\n Copilot's/Cursor's `--model`, or Antigravity's `--model`\n (an agy label like \"Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Thinking)\";\n validated against each backend's model list). Omit for\n each backend's default."New value: +"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\"), \"codex\",\n \"copilot\" (alias \"gh\"/\"github\"), or \"cursor\" (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: Codex/Copilot/Cursor only — \"read-only\" (default),\n \"workspace-write\", or \"danger-full-access\". Ignored for\n Antigravity. (Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox; Copilot's\n and Cursor's are agent/tool-level, not OS boundaries — see\n copilot_ask / cursor_ask.)\n - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`,\n Copilot's/Cursor's `--model`, or Antigravity's `--model`\n (an agy slug like \"claude-sonnet-4-6\"; validated\n against each backend's model list). Omit for each\n backend's default."
- Changed
antigravity_ask1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / model / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional model label to run this conversation on (agy's --model),\n e.g. \"Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)\" or \"Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Thinking)\".\n Omit to use the model set in agy's settings.json (Gemini 3.5 Flash\n (High) by default). Must be one of `agy models` — an unknown label\n is rejected up front (agy would otherwise silently ignore it and\n fall back to the default). See antigravity_status / `agy models`\n for the valid labels."New value: +"Optional model slug to run this conversation on (agy's --model),\n e.g. \"gemini-3.1-pro-high\" or \"claude-sonnet-4-6\". Omit to use the\n model set in agy's settings.json (gemini-3.6-flash-high by\n default). Must be one of `agy models` — an unknown slug is\n rejected up front (agy would otherwise silently ignore it and fall\n back to the default). agy 1.1.5 replaced the old human labels\n (\"Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)\") with these slugs and 1.1.6 added the\n gemini-3.6-flash family; the old form is no longer accepted. See\n antigravity_status / `agy models` for the valid slugs."
- Changed
antigravity_continue1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / model / descriptionPrevious value: -"Optional model label for this turn (agy's --model). agy's model is\n per-invocation, not baked into the conversation, so a follow-up can\n run on a different model than the original ask — omit to use agy's\n settings.json default. Validated against `agy models`; an unknown\n label is rejected (agy would silently ignore it)."New value: +"Optional model slug for this turn (agy's --model), e.g.\n \"claude-sonnet-4-6\". agy's model is per-invocation, not baked into\n the conversation, so a follow-up can run on a different model than\n the original ask — omit to use agy's settings.json default.\n Validated against `agy models`; an unknown slug is rejected (agy\n would silently ignore it)."
4 tool updates
v0.21.0- Changed
agent_swarm1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / tasks / descriptionPrevious value: -"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\"), \"codex\", or\n \"copilot\" (alias \"gh\"/\"github\") (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: Codex/Copilot only — \"read-only\" (default),\n \"workspace-write\", or \"danger-full-access\". Ignored for\n Antigravity. (Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox; Copilot's\n is best-effort tool/path permissions — see copilot_ask.)\n - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`,\n Copilot's `--model`, or Antigravity's `--model` (an agy\n label like \"Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Thinking)\"; validated\n against `agy models`). Omit for each backend's default."New value: +"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\"), \"codex\",\n \"copilot\" (alias \"gh\"/\"github\"), or \"cursor\" (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: Codex/Copilot/Cursor only — \"read-only\" (default),\n \"workspace-write\", or \"danger-full-access\". Ignored for\n Antigravity. (Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox; Copilot's\n and Cursor's are agent/tool-level, not OS boundaries — see\n copilot_ask / cursor_ask.)\n - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`,\n Copilot's/Cursor's `--model`, or Antigravity's `--model`\n (an agy label like \"Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Thinking)\";\n validated against each backend's model list). Omit for\n each backend's default."
- Added
cursor_ask - Added
cursor_continue - Added
cursor_status
6 tool updates
v0.15.4- Changed
agent_swarm1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / tasks / descriptionPrevious value: -"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\") or \"codex\" (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: Codex only — \"read-only\" (default), \"workspace-write\",\n or \"danger-full-access\". Ignored for Antigravity.\n - model: Codex only — model override (`-m`). Ignored for Antigravity."New value: +"One object per parallel worker:\n - backend: \"antigravity\" (alias \"agy\"/\"gemini\"), \"codex\", or\n \"copilot\" (alias \"gh\"/\"github\") (required)\n - prompt: the question or instruction (required)\n - workspace: working dir for that worker (default: server cwd)\n - sandbox: Codex/Copilot only — \"read-only\" (default),\n \"workspace-write\", or \"danger-full-access\". Ignored for\n Antigravity. (Codex's is an enforced OS sandbox; Copilot's\n is best-effort tool/path permissions — see copilot_ask.)\n - model: optional model override for ANY backend — Codex's `-m`,\n Copilot's `--model`, or Antigravity's `--model` (an agy\n label like \"Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Thinking)\"; validated\n against `agy models`). Omit for each backend's default."
- Changed
antigravity_ask1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / modelAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "Optional model label to run this conversation on (agy's --model),\n e.g. \"Gemini 3.1 Pro (High)\" or \"Claude Sonnet 4.6 (Thinking)\".\n Omit to use the model set in agy's settings.json (Gemini 3.5 Flash\n (High) by default). Must be one of `agy models` — an unknown label\n is rejected up front (agy would otherwise silently ignore it and\n fall back to the default). See antigravity_status / `agy models`\n for the valid labels." +}
- Changed
antigravity_continue1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / modelAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "description": "Optional model label for this turn (agy's --model). agy's model is\n per-invocation, not baked into the conversation, so a follow-up can\n run on a different model than the original ask — omit to use agy's\n settings.json default. Validated against `agy models`; an unknown\n label is rejected (agy would silently ignore it)." +}
- Added
copilot_ask - Added
copilot_continue - Added
copilot_status
5 tool updates
v0.12.2- Added
agent_swarm - Removed
antigravity_swarm - Added
codex_ask - Added
codex_continue - Added
codex_status
6 tool updates
v0.11.0- First observed
antigravity_ask - First observed
antigravity_continue - First observed
antigravity_image - First observed
antigravity_image_swarm - First observed
antigravity_status - First observed
antigravity_swarm
TDQS
Each tool is clearly distinguished by backend and action: ask starts a new session, continue resumes the workspace-rooted session, and status reports diagnostics. The parallel swarm tools are also clearly separated by whether they handle tasks or images.
The dominant pattern <backend>_ask / _continue / _status is applied consistently across all six backends. A few outliers (antigravity_image, antigravity_image_swarm, agent_swarm) deviate from the verb-action convention, but they remain readable and internally patterned.
21 tools is above the typical 3–15 range, but the server intentionally spans six backends, each needing ask/continue/status plus image and swarm operations. The count is heavy yet justified, with little redundancy.
Each backend has a complete new-session/resume/diagnose lifecycle, plus additional image and parallel-swarm capabilities. Minor gaps exist, such as no direct way to list or inspect past conversation history, but normal workflows have no dead ends.
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