proofrelay
A read-only MCP verifier that helps agents and operators manage action checkpoints, inspect evidence bundle metadata, and flag risk signals before relying on external tools or services.
Get Verifier Status (
proofrelay.get_verifier_status): Retrieve public ProofRelay discovery metadata (hosted MCP endpoint URL, server-card URL, product URL, available tool count, trust boundary notes) — no authentication required.Recommend Checkpoint (
proofrelay.recommend_checkpoint): Determine whether an agent action class (e.g.,paid_tool_call,revenue_action,financial_transaction,external_reliance) requires a checkpoint before proceeding. Returnspass,skipped, orneeds_reviewwith a reason.Verify Bundle (
proofrelay.verify_bundle): Check the shape and consistency of synthetic or non-confidential evidence bundle metadata for local pass/fail boundary checks. Does not certify real-world facts and must not receive secrets or sensitive data.Scan MCP Risk (
proofrelay.scan_mcp_risk): Inspect caller-supplied public MCP descriptor metadata for advisory risk signals (e.g., mutating tools, payment/wallet language, credential indicators, missing public metadata) — without fetching the server URL or acting as a security certification.Describe CLI/SDK Helper (
proofrelay.describe_cli_sdk_helper): Get a read-only integration guide explaining how to wrap agent or CLI actions with ProofRelay-style pass/fail/review checkpoint patterns.
GENESIS ProofRelay MCP
ARCHIVED NON-CANONICAL SNAPSHOT. This repository is retained for public history and marketplace-link continuity. It is not the canonical ProofRelay implementation, is not a source mirror, and is not suitable for production reliance. The executable local wrapper formerly stored here intentionally implemented only shallow discovery checks and has been removed to prevent it from being confused with the hosted verifier.
Documentation-only discovery snapshot for the GENESIS ProofRelay MCP verifier. The canonical public machine-readable contract is the live server card.
ProofRelay's hosted public surface is a read-only MCP verifier for synthetic or
non-confidential evidence bundle metadata. This repository does not implement
or reproduce that verifier.
ProofRelay is not an oracle, escrow service, DeFi risk engine, legal opinion, or endorsement system. It does not certify real-world truth, prove title, approve payments, custody funds, or make a third-party tool safe.
Why This Exists
Agents increasingly take actions that cross from "answer a question" into "rely on something external": paid tool calls, revenue actions, financial transactions, closing workflows, marketplace listings, and MCP integrations. Those actions need simple controls that work before private data or production systems are exposed.
ProofRelay gives agents a small decision layer:
decide whether a checkpoint is needed
check whether public-safe evidence metadata is shaped consistently
surface mismatch or missing-authority signals
keep secret-bearing material out of public verification paths
record pass/fail/review outcomes without claiming real-world certification
Related MCP server: memory-bank-mcp
Snapshot status
Archived from public repository commit
feeca01f31fead61a77cb1be9691dd65eec596a0on 2026-08-27.Hosted surface observed on 2026-08-27: 26 tools, 18 resources, 13 prompts.
Those counts are observations, not a frozen API guarantee. Read the live server card before every integration or reliance decision.
Security review of the prior 17-commit history found no secret with Gitleaks; this is not a guarantee that prior clones or third-party mirrors are current.
Reopening requires the controls in
export-policy.json, protected review, and an explicitly assigned maintenance owner.
Decision Vocabulary
The hosted service uses these high-level statuses:
Status | Meaning | Typical next step |
| The public-safe metadata satisfies the local check. | Continue, while preserving the evidence reference. |
| The action or bundle has missing, ambiguous, or higher-reliance signals. | Pause for operator, policy, or stronger evidence review. |
| The action class is low-reliance or no checkpoint applies. | Continue without treating the result as verified. |
| The bundle shape or required metadata is inconsistent. | Do not rely on the bundle until corrected. |
Public Tool Surface
Tool names, schemas, counts, and descriptions change independently of this archived snapshot. Discover them only from the live server card and MCP protocol. Do not infer hosted behavior from this repository's Git history.
ProofRelay vs DeFi Safety
ProofRelay is about evidence and action-control metadata. DeFi safety tooling is about smart-contract, protocol, wallet, liquidity, oracle, bridge, and token risk. Those are different domains.
ProofRelay may help an agent notice that a financial or wallet-related action needs review, or that a bundle lacks a required authority envelope. It does not audit contracts, verify liquidity, price assets, validate token economics, score protocol risk, or make custody decisions.
Public Links
Glama listing: https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/GENESISRE/proofrelay
Smithery listing: https://smithery.ai/servers/genesis/proof-relay
Product page: https://genesisre.io/proofrelay
MCP endpoint: https://mcp.genesisre.io/mcp
MCP health: https://mcp.genesisre.io/health
MCP server card: https://mcp.genesisre.io/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json
Agent service descriptor: https://genesisre.io/.well-known/proofrelay-agent-service.json
Install From Smithery
npx -y smithery mcp add genesis/proof-relay
npx -y smithery mcp get proof-relay
npx -y smithery tool list proof-relay
npx -y smithery tool call proof-relay proofrelay.get_verifier_status '{}'Generic MCP Client
{
"mcpServers": {
"genesis-proofrelay": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.genesisre.io/mcp"
}
}
}Trust Boundary
ProofRelay verifies submitted synthetic or non-confidential evidence bundle shape and integrity signals. It does not process payments, custody funds, escrow assets, certify legal/title/compliance status, certify real-world facts, provide legal advice, review private source code, or require source-code disclosure.
Do not submit secrets, private prompts, raw logs, source code, customer files, wallet keys, payment credentials, or tenant traces to the public MCP endpoint.
Public Repository Boundary
This archived repository is intentionally limited to public ProofRelay MCP
discovery, setup, and trust-boundary documentation. The hosted MCP service is
operated separately by GENESIS at mcp.genesisre.io.
This repository does not include:
internal GENESIS monorepo code
production deployment automation
private credentials or environment files
paid settlement adapters
Skyfire, Coinbase, Stripe, AWS, or internal operator secrets
customer data, raw logs, prompts, traces, or evidence bundles
a local MCP server, SDK, verifier, container, or deployable package
See PUBLICATION_BOUNDARY.md for the publication allowlist and exclusion policy.
License
MIT. See LICENSE.
Available Tools
5 toolsproofrelay.describe_cli_sdk_helperARead-onlyIdempotent
Read-only integration guide for the invisible pass/fail/review helper pattern. Use when an agent or developer needs to understand how to wrap actions with ProofRelay-style checkpoint statuses; use recommend_checkpoint for a specific action decision. Requires no authentication, mutates nothing, and returns JSON text describing statuses, hosted endpoint, and the action-to-audit flow.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| helper | Yes | |
| statuses | Yes | |
| hosted_mcp_endpoint | Yes | |
| example_flow | Yes | |
| boundary | Yes | Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, idempotentHint. Description adds that it requires no authentication, mutates nothing, and returns JSON text. No contradiction, and extra context is provided.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise, front-loading the main purpose and using multiple short sentences. It avoids unnecessary details, though slightly more structure could improve scannability.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no parameters and an output schema present, the description is complete. It covers the tool's role, usage context, and return content (statuses, endpoint, flow). No gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
No parameters exist; schema coverage is 100%. The description correctly omits parameter details and focuses on the tool's purpose and output. Baseline for 0 parameters is 4.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool as an integration guide for the ProofRelay helper pattern, specifying it is read-only and returns JSON text. It distinguishes from sibling recommend_checkpoint by naming it explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives clear context for when to use (understanding how to wrap actions) and suggests an alternative (recommend_checkpoint). However, it does not discuss exclusions or differentiate from all siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofrelay.get_verifier_statusARead-onlyIdempotent
Read-only status lookup for public ProofRelay discovery metadata. Use first to confirm the hosted MCP endpoint, server-card URL, product URL, public tool count, and trust boundary. Requires no authentication, performs no network call from this local wrapper, mutates nothing, and returns JSON text with status, URLs, counts, and non-confidential boundary notes.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| status | Yes | |
| server_name | Yes | |
| hosted_mcp_endpoint | Yes | |
| server_card | Yes | |
| product_page | Yes | |
| public_tool_count | Yes | |
| local_glama_tool_count | Yes | |
| boundary | Yes | Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Description adds beyond annotations: 'performs no network call from this local wrapper' and 'returns JSON text'. Annotations already cover readOnly, destructive, idempotent hints, so description enriches with important behavioral details.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three sentences, front-loaded with purpose, no unnecessary words. Every sentence adds value, efficient and clear.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no parameters and existing output schema, description covers all needed context: purpose, usage order, side effects, authentication, and return type. Complete for this simple tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Tool has zero parameters, so description does not need to add parameter info. Baseline 4 for 0 parameters is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description clearly states it is a read-only status lookup for public ProofRelay discovery metadata, specifying exactly what it retrieves (endpoint, URLs, counts, trust boundary). It is distinct from sibling tools which focus on helper, recommendation, risk scanning, or verification.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly says 'Use first to confirm' indicating it should be used before other tools. However, it does not explicitly state when not to use or name alternative tools, but the context of siblings provides implicit guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofrelay.recommend_checkpointARead-onlyIdempotent
Read-only checkpoint recommendation for a high-level agent action class. Use before relied-upon actions such as paid_tool_call, revenue_action, external_reliance, or financial_transaction; use get_verifier_status for discovery only and verify_bundle after evidence metadata exists. Requires no authentication, mutates nothing, and returns JSON text with status pass, skipped, or needs_review plus checkpoint and reason fields.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_class | Yes | High-level action class. Typical values are paid_tool_call, revenue_action, external_reliance, financial_transaction, local_dev, draft, or read_only_research. High-reliance classes need an authority envelope. | |
| has_authority_envelope | No | Set true when the caller already has a bounded authority envelope for the action. Defaults to false when omitted. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| status | Yes | |
| checkpoint | Yes | |
| reason | Yes | |
| action_class | No | |
| boundary | Yes | Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false, idempotentHint=true. The description adds value by stating it requires no authentication, mutates nothing, and returns JSON with status, checkpoint, and reason fields. No contradictions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, front-loaded with purpose and usage guidelines. Every sentence earns its place with no wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the output schema exists, the description covers purpose, usage, safety, and parameters completely. No additional information needed for this 2-param tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3. The description mentions typical values for action_class and explains the has_authority_envelope parameter, but the schema already provides adequate descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly defines the tool as a read-only checkpoint recommendation for high-level agent actions, specifying the verb 'recommend' and resource 'checkpoint'. It distinguishes from siblings by referencing use cases like 'get_verifier_status' for discovery and 'verify_bundle' after evidence exists.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states when to use (before relied-upon actions like paid_tool_call) and when to use alternative tools (get_verifier_status for discovery, verify_bundle after evidence). Provides clear context and exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofrelay.scan_mcp_riskARead-onlyIdempotent
Read-only advisory scan of caller-supplied public MCP descriptor metadata. Use before registering or trusting an MCP server to flag mutating tools, payment or wallet language, credential signals, or missing public metadata; use verify_bundle for evidence bundles instead. Requires no authentication, does not fetch server_url, mutates nothing, is not a security certification, and returns JSON text with status, findings, recommended_control, non_claims, and boundary fields.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server_url | No | Optional public MCP server URL used only as supplied metadata. This local wrapper does not fetch it. | |
| descriptor | No | Optional public MCP descriptor or listing metadata to inspect for advisory risk signals. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| status | Yes | |
| findings | Yes | |
| recommended_control | Yes | |
| non_claims | Yes | |
| boundary | Yes | Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Beyond annotations (readOnlyHint, idempotentHint), description adds 'does not fetch server_url', 'mutates nothing', 'is not a security certification', and details return fields. No contradiction with annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Four sentences, each serving a distinct purpose: purpose, usage, constraints, output. No redundant or missing information. Efficient and well-structured.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given zero required parameters, simple input, and presence of output schema, description is thorough: covers behavior, constraints, alternatives, and output structure. No gaps identified.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with baseline 3. Description adds nuance for 'server_url' parameter (clarifying it is not fetched), but does not add new info for 'descriptor' parameter. Overall, good supplementary context.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Description clearly states 'Read-only advisory scan of caller-supplied public MCP descriptor metadata', specifying verb, resource, and scope. It distinguishes from sibling 'verify_bundle' by explicitly mentioning it as an alternative.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides explicit usage context: 'Use before registering or trusting an MCP server' and lists specific flags (mutating tools, payment language, etc.). Also names alternative tool 'verify_bundle' and states that no authentication is required.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
proofrelay.verify_bundleARead-onlyIdempotent
Read-only public-safe bundle shape check for synthetic or non-confidential evidence metadata. Use when you already have a bundle fixture and need a local pass/fail boundary check before sharing or routing to hosted verification; use recommend_checkpoint when deciding whether a checkpoint is needed. Requires no authentication, mutates nothing, does not certify real-world facts, and returns JSON text with status, checks, problems, verifier, and hosted endpoint fields.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| bundle | Yes | Synthetic or non-confidential evidence bundle metadata. Do not include secrets, prompts, raw logs, source code, customer files, wallet keys, payment credentials, or tenant traces. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| status | Yes | |
| verifier | Yes | |
| checks | Yes | |
| problems | Yes | |
| note | Yes | |
| hosted_mcp_endpoint | Yes | |
| boundary | Yes | Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already mark readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false, idempotentHint=true. The description adds beyond that: 'does not certify real-world facts' and 'returns JSON text with status, checks, problems, verifier, and hosted endpoint fields,' which neither contradicts annotations nor repeats them. It gives the agent concrete behavioral expectations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no fluff. First sentence delivers purpose and usage; second adds behavioral constraints and output format. Every phrase earns its place, and critical info (safety, authentication, alternative) is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool has one parameter (nested object), output schema exists, and annotations are rich, the description still adds value: it explains what the tool does not certify, gives output field names, and distinguishes from siblings. No gaps remain for an agent to make incorrect assumptions.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The only parameter 'bundle' has schema coverage 100% with a description that lists what to include ('Synthetic or non-confidential evidence bundle metadata') and explicitly warns what NOT to include ('Do not include secrets, prompts, raw logs, source code, customer files, wallet keys, payment credentials, or tenant traces'). The tool description reinforces this, adding no redundancy.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description starts with 'Read-only public-safe bundle shape check for synthetic or non-confidential evidence metadata,' clearly stating the verb (check), resource (bundle), and scope (synthetic or non-confidential). It also distinguishes from sibling 'recommend_checkpoint' by name, ensuring no ambiguity.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly states when to use this tool: 'when you already have a bundle fixture and need a local pass/fail boundary check before sharing or routing to hosted verification' and provides a clear alternative: 'use recommend_checkpoint when deciding whether a checkpoint is needed.' It also notes 'Requires no authentication, mutates nothing,' guiding safe usage.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
5 tool updates
v0.1.7- Changed
proofrelay.describe_cli_sdk_helper1 field changed- changed
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{ + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "boundary": { + "description": "Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims.", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "example_flow": { + "type": "string" + }, + "helper": { + "type": "string" + }, + "hosted_mcp_endpoint": { + "type": "string" + }, + "statuses": { + "items": { + "enum": [ + "pass", + "fail", + "needs_review", + "skipped" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + } + }, + "required": [ + "helper", + "statuses", + "hosted_mcp_endpoint", + "example_flow", + "boundary" + ], + "type": "object" +}
- Changed
proofrelay.get_verifier_status1 field changed- changed
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{ + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "boundary": { + "description": "Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims.", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "hosted_mcp_endpoint": { + "type": "string" + }, + "local_glama_tool_count": { + "type": "number" + }, + "product_page": { + "type": "string" + }, + "public_tool_count": { + "type": "number" + }, + "server_card": { + "type": "string" + }, + "server_name": { + "type": "string" + }, + "status": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "status", + "server_name", + "hosted_mcp_endpoint", + "server_card", + "product_page", + "public_tool_count", + "local_glama_tool_count", + "boundary" + ], + "type": "object" +}
- Changed
proofrelay.recommend_checkpoint1 field changed- changed
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{ + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "action_class": { + "type": "string" + }, + "boundary": { + "description": "Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims.", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "checkpoint": { + "type": "string" + }, + "reason": { + "type": "string" + }, + "status": { + "enum": [ + "pass", + "fail", + "needs_review", + "skipped" + ], + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "status", + "checkpoint", + "reason", + "boundary" + ], + "type": "object" +}
- Changed
proofrelay.scan_mcp_risk1 field changed- changed
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{ + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "boundary": { + "description": "Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims.", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "findings": { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "non_claims": { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "recommended_control": { + "type": "string" + }, + "status": { + "enum": [ + "pass", + "needs_review" + ], + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "status", + "findings", + "recommended_control", + "non_claims", + "boundary" + ], + "type": "object" +}
- Changed
proofrelay.verify_bundle1 field changed- changed
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{ + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "boundary": { + "description": "Public-safe operating boundary and non-claims.", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "checks": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "properties": { + "bundle_is_object": { + "type": "boolean" + }, + "confidential_marker_scan": { + "type": "boolean" + } + }, + "required": [ + "bundle_is_object", + "confidential_marker_scan" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "hosted_mcp_endpoint": { + "type": "string" + }, + "note": { + "type": "string" + }, + "problems": { + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "status": { + "enum": [ + "pass", + "fail" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "verifier": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "status", + "verifier", + "checks", + "problems", + "note", + "hosted_mcp_endpoint", + "boundary" + ], + "type": "object" +}
3 tool updates
v0.1.6- Changed
proofrelay.recommend_checkpoint2 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / action_class / descriptionPrevious value: -"High-level action class such as paid_tool_call, revenue_action, external_reliance, or local_dev."New value: +"High-level action class. Typical values are paid_tool_call, revenue_action, external_reliance, financial_transaction, local_dev, draft, or read_only_research. High-reliance classes need an authority envelope." - changed
Input schema / properties / has_authority_envelope / descriptionPrevious value: -"Whether a bounded authority envelope is already present."New value: +"Set true when the caller already has a bounded authority envelope for the action. Defaults to false when omitted."
- Changed
proofrelay.scan_mcp_risk2 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / descriptor / descriptionAdded value: +"Optional public MCP descriptor or listing metadata to inspect for advisory risk signals." - added
Input schema / properties / server_url / descriptionAdded value: +"Optional public MCP server URL used only as supplied metadata. This local wrapper does not fetch it."
- Changed
proofrelay.verify_bundle1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / bundle / descriptionPrevious value: -"Synthetic or non-confidential evidence bundle metadata."New value: +"Synthetic or non-confidential evidence bundle metadata. Do not include secrets, prompts, raw logs, source code, customer files, wallet keys, payment credentials, or tenant traces."
5 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
proofrelay.describe_cli_sdk_helper - First observed
proofrelay.get_verifier_status - First observed
proofrelay.recommend_checkpoint - First observed
proofrelay.scan_mcp_risk - First observed
proofrelay.verify_bundle
TDQS
Each tool addresses a distinct aspect: onboarding, status discovery, checkpoint recommendation, risk scanning, and bundle verification. No two tools have overlapping purposes, so an agent can reliably select the correct one.
All tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern using snake_case (e.g., describe_cli_sdk_helper, get_verifier_status). There is no mixing of conventions or unpredictable naming.
Five tools is an ideal number for this focused server. Each tool is meaningful and contributes to the ProofRelay workflow without being excessive or insufficient.
The tool set covers the full lifecycle: onboarding guidance, status discovery, checkpoint recommendation, risk scanning, and bundle verification. No obvious gaps are present for the stated domain.
Maintenance
Resources
Unclaimed servers have limited discoverability.
Looking for Admin?
If you are the server author, to access and configure the admin panel.
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