aegis
The Aegis server provides real-time governance policy enforcement for AI agent actions, with dynamic policy management and risk assessment.
evaluate_action: Submit an AI agent action (type, target, parameters, description, agent ID) to receive a governance decision —auto(allow),approve(needs human review), orblock(deny).evaluate_batch: Evaluate multiple actions simultaneously, receiving a decision for each.get_policy: Retrieve the currently active governance policy, including action patterns, targets, risk levels, and approval requirements.update_policy: Hot-reload the governance policy from a YAML string, with changes taking effect immediately — no restart required.check_risk: Perform a lightweight risk assessment for a given action type and target, returning just the risk level and approval requirement.
Offers governance and human-in-the-loop approval gates for multi-agent workflows built using the CrewAI framework.
Enables human approval workflows by sending rich embed messages to Discord for reviewing and gating agent actions.
Integrates with LangChain to wrap agent actions with governance rules, providing a runtime engine for policy evaluation and audit logging.
Provides a middleware layer to monitor, control, and gate actions taken by OpenAI-based agents through policy checks and approval workflows.
Allows the server to govern and audit AI agent actions targeting Salesforce, such as managing CRM contacts or performing data updates.
Facilitates human-in-the-loop approvals by posting action requests to Slack, allowing users to authorize or block agent actions directly from a workspace.
Connects with Telegram to provide an approval interface where humans can approve or reject pending AI agent actions using inline keyboards.
What is Aegis
Every AI agent framework reinvents the same governance primitives — and each one does it slightly differently. Aegis is the abstraction layer that unifies them.
Layer | What it does | Examples |
1. Primitives | A universal contract for every tool call |
|
2. Adapters | Auto-instrument any framework through its own hooks | LangChain callbacks, CrewAI |
3. Governance | Declarative primitives you compose into policy | Prompt injection / PII / leak / toxicity guardrails, RBAC, rate limit, cost budget, drift detection, anomaly scoring, trust delegation, justification gap, selection audit, Merkle audit chain |
4. Lifecycle | One runtime, every stage of agent ops | Scan → Instrument → Policy CI/CD → Runtime → Proxy → Audit |
import aegis
aegis.auto_instrument() # 12 frameworks governed. No other code changes.You don't write a LangChain guardrail and a CrewAI guardrail and an OpenAI guardrail — you write one Policy and every framework inherits it.
How this differs from the guardrail libraries
They solve a different problem, and mostly a text-shaped one. Guardrails AI validates model output against a hub of validators; NeMo Guardrails scripts conversational and tool policy in the Colang DSL; Snyk Agent Scan — Invariant Labs' mcp-scan, since the Snyk acquisition — scans MCP servers and agent skills for known risk patterns and can proxy them at runtime; LLM Guard chained input/output scanners until it was archived in July 2026. Each one you wire in yourself, at a call site you choose. Aegis starts from the other end: auto_instrument() finds the frameworks already installed and instruments them in place, so one Policy covers all of them without a line of agent code changing. What it enforces is agent-shaped rather than prompt-shaped — delegation chains under a monotone trust constraint, audits of what an agent excluded rather than what it picked, the distance between an agent's declared intent and its measured impact, and a tamper-evident audit chain. All of it is deterministic, so there is no second model sitting in the request path. These are not exclusive choices: a semantic or model-based detector drops into GuardrailEngine.add() alongside the built-ins.
Related MCP server: hejdar-mcp
Primitives
The contract every adapter maps into. Framework-agnostic by design.
Primitive | Purpose | Module |
| Unified representation of any tool / LLM / HTTP / MCP call across all frameworks |
|
| Tripartite structure — Declared (agent-authored) / Assessed (Aegis-computed) / Chain (delegation) |
|
| Declarative YAML rules: match → risk → approval ( |
|
| Policy layer that evaluates 6-dimensional impact vectors, not just tool names |
|
| Deterministic regex checks for injection, PII, prompt leak, toxicity — 2.65ms cold / <1µs warm |
|
| Multi-agent hand-off tracking with monotone trust constraint (non-increasing) |
|
| Tamper-evident append-only log, Merkle-chained, SQLite + JSONL + webhook sinks |
|
| Audits what an agent excludes, not just what it picks — detects cosmetic alignment |
|
| 6D asymmetric scoring: agents declare impact, Aegis independently assesses, gap triggers escalation |
|
| Ed25519-signed chain for long-term compliance evidence |
|
Every governance feature in Aegis — anomaly detection, cost budgets, drift, cascade guards, kill switches — is a composition of these primitives. Read the Concepts guide to see how they fit together.
Frameworks
One API. 12 agent frameworks + 3 protocol-level adapters.
Framework | Hook | Integration |
Google ADK |
| Native — the patch only installs the plugin |
CrewAI | global | Hybrid — native hook for tool calls, patch for crew entry |
Pydantic AI |
| Native (opt-in) · Patch (auto) |
OpenAI Agents SDK |
| Native (opt-in) · Patch (auto) |
LangChain |
| Patch |
OpenAI API |
| Patch |
Anthropic API |
| Patch |
LiteLLM |
| Patch |
Google GenAI |
| Patch |
LlamaIndex |
| Patch |
Instructor |
| Patch |
DSPy |
| Patch |
MCP | Transport-layer proxy for any MCP server (stdio / HTTP) | Proxy — no patching |
httpx |
| Wrapper — no patching |
Playwright |
| Wrapper — no patching |
auto_instrument() detects what's installed and patches only those — no hard dependencies. Custom adapters use the same BaseAdapter interface. Every adapter above is exercised against the current upstream release daily by the integration workflow, which drives each framework's real entrypoint and asserts a guardrail fires — the unit suite fakes these frameworks, so it cannot see upstream drift on its own.
Integration policy. Native extension points win wherever one exists that can actually block — Google ADK's BasePlugin and CrewAI's BeforeToolCallHook both do, and there auto_instrument() patches only enough to install the native object. Pydantic AI and the OpenAI Agents SDK ship native implementations you opt into (AbstractCapability, tool_input_guardrail) alongside a patch-based path for the zero-code case. Everything else is patched because no blocking hook exists: the raw OpenAI/Anthropic SDKs and DSPy expose none, and LlamaIndex's instrumentation dispatcher emits events but swallows handler exceptions, so it can observe and not enforce.
The Pydantic AI integration is the reason this policy is written down. It was monkey-patched until core maintainer DouweM reviewed it — "It doesn't look like those features are actually exposed as Pydantic AI capabilities?" — and was rebuilt on the native extension API in response (src/aegis/contrib/pydantic_ai.py; the review is pydantic-ai#4888).
Patching is the fallback, not the preference — it is the part most exposed to upstream change, which is why the integration workflow exists.
Default Guardrails
Guardrail | Default | What it catches |
Prompt injection | Block | 13 attack categories, 109 patterns, 9 languages (EN/KO/ZH/JA/ES/DE/FR/TH/VI) |
PII detection | Warn | 13 categories (email, credit card, SSN, IBAN, API keys, etc.) |
Prompt leak | Warn | System prompt extraction attempts |
Toxicity | Warn | Harmful, violent, or abusive content |
MCP STDIO injection | Block | JSON-RPC injection, frame concatenation, unicode escape bypass (OX Security advisory) |
Deterministic regex — no LLM calls, no network. 2.65ms cold / <1µs warm per check.
Use Cases
The same primitives, five different entry points. Pick whichever matches your workflow.
1. Runtime protection (most common)
One line. Any framework.
import aegis
aegis.auto_instrument()Or zero code changes — AEGIS_INSTRUMENT=1 python my_agent.py. Injection blocking, PII masking, prompt-leak warnings, audit trail, and policy enforcement become active for every LangChain / CrewAI / OpenAI / Anthropic / LiteLLM / ADK / DSPy / LlamaIndex / Pydantic AI call.
Pydantic AI native capability — no monkey-patching, explicit per-agent control:
from pydantic_ai import Agent
from aegis.contrib.pydantic_ai import AegisCapability
agent = Agent(
"openai:gpt-4o-mini",
capabilities=[AegisCapability.default()], # injection, PII, toxicity, prompt-leak, hallucination
)
result = await agent.run("What is AI governance?")Full Pydantic AI integration guide →
2. Pre-production scanning
Find ungoverned AI calls before they ship.
pip install agent-aegis
aegis scan .Aegis Governance Scan
=====================
Scanned: 47 files in ./src
Found 5 ungoverned tool call(s):
agent.py:12 OpenAI function call with tools= — no governance wrapper [ASI02]
tools.py:8 LangChain @tool "search_db" — no policy check [ASI02]
llm.py:21 LiteLLM litellm.completion() — no governance wrapper [ASI02]
run.py:5 subprocess subprocess.run — direct shell execution [ASI08]
api.py:14 HTTP requests.post — raw HTTP in agent code [ASI07]
Governance Score: D (5 ungoverned call(s))Supports --format json|sarif|suggest, --threshold A-F, .aegisscanignore, and inline # aegis: ignore pragmas. Auto-fix with aegis scan --fix.
3. Policy CI/CD
Security tools protect at runtime. Aegis also manages the policy lifecycle — the same way you test and ship code.
aegis plan current.yaml proposed.yaml --audit-db aegis_audit.db
# Policy Impact Analysis
# Rules: 2 added, 1 removed, 3 modified
# Impact (replayed 1,247 actions):
# 23 actions would change from AUTO → BLOCKaegis test policy.yaml tests.yaml # Run in CI
aegis test policy.yaml --generate # Auto-generate test suite
aegis test new.yaml tests.yaml --regression old.yaml # Regression check# .github/workflows/policy-check.yml
- uses: Acacian/aegis@main
with:
policy: aegis.yaml
tests: tests.yaml
fail-on-regression: trueOr block ungoverned calls at PR time:
- uses: Acacian/aegis@v1.0.0
with:
command: scan
fail-on-ungoverned: true4. Audit & compliance
Every call is logged to a tamper-evident Merkle chain, with mappings to EU AI Act / NIST AI RMF / SOC2 built in.
aegis audit ID Session Action Target Risk Decision Result
1 a1b2c3d4... read crm LOW auto success
2 a1b2c3d4... bulk_update crm HIGH approved success
3 a1b2c3d4... delete crm CRITICAL block blockedSQLite + JSONL + webhook sinks. Ed25519 signing for long-term evidence. See the Compliance guide.
5. Governance server (multi-agent)
Centralized governance for multiple agents. Each agent connects via SDK, server handles policy, guardrails, audit, and compliance.
pip install 'agent-aegis[server]'
aegis-server37 REST endpoints + WebSocket audit streaming + web dashboard. Agents auto-register, send heartbeats, and query policy over HTTP. See Governance Framework Server.
30-Second Start
pip install agent-aegisimport aegis
aegis.auto_instrument()
# All 12 frameworks now governed with default guardrails.Or use a YAML policy for full control:
aegis init # Creates aegis.yaml# aegis.yaml
guardrails:
pii: { enabled: true, action: mask }
injection: { enabled: true, action: block, sensitivity: medium }
policy:
version: "1"
defaults:
risk_level: medium
approval: approve
rules:
- name: read_safe
match: { type: "read*" }
risk_level: low
approval: auto
- name: no_deletes
match: { type: "delete*" }
risk_level: critical
approval: blockInstall Options
pip install agent-aegis # Core (includes auto_instrument for all frameworks)
pip install langchain-aegis # LangChain standalone integration
pip install 'agent-aegis[mcp]' # MCP server + proxy
pip install 'agent-aegis[server]' # REST API + dashboard
pip install 'agent-aegis[all]' # EverythingMCP Proxy — govern any MCP server with zero code changes
{
"mcpServers": {
"filesystem": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["--from", "agent-aegis[mcp]", "aegis-mcp-proxy",
"--wrap", "npx", "-y",
"@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/home"]
}
}
}Works with Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf. STDIO injection protection, tool poisoning detection, rug-pull detection, argument sanitization, policy evaluation, full audit trail.
Governance Framework Server
Run Aegis as a dedicated governance server with REST API, WebSocket streaming, and web dashboard.
pip install 'agent-aegis[server]'
aegis-server --init # Generate aegis-server.yaml
aegis-server # Start server on :800037 REST endpoints covering the full governance lifecycle:
API Group | Endpoints | Purpose |
Core | evaluate, execute, audit, policy | Policy evaluation + execution pipeline |
Agents | register, heartbeat, list, status | Agent lifecycle management |
Guardrails | check, list | Content safety checks |
Policy Versioning | commit, diff, rollback, tag | Git-like policy change management |
Crypto Audit | verify, entries, evidence | Tamper-proof audit chain verification |
Trust & Drift | trust score, drift detection | Per-agent behavioral analysis |
Cost | budget check, reports | LLM cost governance |
Compliance | reports, regulatory gaps | SOC2 / GDPR / EU AI Act reports |
Sessions | list, replay | Session recording + forensic replay |
Connect with the Python SDK (sync or async):
from aegis import AegisClient
with AegisClient("http://localhost:8000", agent_id="my-agent") as client:
result = client.evaluate("delete", "user_data")
# result["risk_level"] == "CRITICAL", result["is_allowed"] == Falsefrom aegis import AsyncAegisClient
async with AsyncAegisClient("http://localhost:8000", agent_id="my-agent") as client:
result = await client.evaluate("read", "reports")Config-driven via aegis-server.yaml — guardrails, webhooks (Slack/PagerDuty), rate limiting, cost budgets, and auth all declarative. See aegis-server.example.yaml.
Why Aegis?
Writing your own | Platform guardrails | Enterprise platforms | Aegis | |
Abstraction level | Per-framework if/else | Single-vendor SDK | Proprietary gateway | Universal primitives across 12 frameworks |
Setup | Days of if/else | Vendor-specific config | Kubernetes + procurement |
|
Code changes | Wrap every call | SDK-specific | Months of integration | Zero — auto-instruments |
Policy portability | Rewrite per framework | Locked to ecosystem | Usually single-vendor | One YAML policy, every framework |
Governance primitives | Build from scratch | Subset, vendor-defined | Proprietary | 10+ composable primitives |
Policy CI/CD | None | None | None |
|
Audit trail | printf debugging | Platform logs only | Cloud dashboard | SQLite + JSONL + webhooks + Merkle chain |
Compliance | Manual docs | None | Enterprise sales cycle | EU AI Act, NIST, SOC2 built-in |
Cost | Engineering time | Free-to-$$$ | $$$$ + infra | Free (MIT). Forever. |
What Only Aegis Does
Other tools check inputs and outputs. Aegis governs the decision itself — with primitives no other governance runtime exposes.
Capability | What it means | Based on |
Tripartite ActionClaim | Every tool call splits into Declared (agent-authored, untrusted), Assessed (Aegis-computed), and Chain (delegation) fields. The structural separation is what makes cosmetic alignment detectable. | |
Justification Gap | 6-dimensional asymmetric scoring: agents declare impact, Aegis independently assesses it, and | Name "ActionClaim" from COA-MAS (Carvalho); 6D metric + runtime form original |
Selection Governance | Audits what agents exclude, not just what they choose. A model that "helpfully" omits risky options is exerting selection power — Aegis detects this. | |
Monotone Trust Constraint | Delegated agents cannot escalate their own authority. Trust levels must be non-increasing along the chain — violations auto-block. | Lattice-based access control |
Full Lifecycle | Scan (detect) → Instrument (protect) → Policy CI/CD (test) → Runtime (govern) → Proxy (gateway) → Audit (trace). One library, one | — |
CLI
aegis scan ./src/ # Detect ungoverned AI calls
aegis score ./src/ --policy policy.yaml # Governance score (0-100)
aegis init # Generate starter policy
aegis validate policy.yaml # Validate syntax
aegis plan current.yaml proposed.yaml # Preview policy changes
aegis test policy.yaml tests.yaml # Policy regression testing
aegis check policy policy.yaml read:crm # Policy decision per action (CI gate)
aegis audit # View audit log
aegis serve policy.yaml # REST API + dashboard
aegis probe policy.yaml # Adversarial policy testing
aegis autopolicy "block deletes" # Natural language → YAMLResearch
Original measurements on public agent trace datasets. Stdlib-only, reproducible in 30 seconds.
The Justification Gap in 14,285 Tau-Bench Tool Calls — Formal definition of the Tripartite ActionClaim with a silent-baseline empirical study. 90.3% approve / 9.7% escalate / 0% block across four model:domain groups. Airline domain exposes ~2× the mean gap of retail. Includes soundness sketches for the three structural invariants and an honest note on the
max-only override limitation discovered during the study.Tool Distribution Drift in 1,960 Tau-Bench Trajectories — Shannon entropy on tool name sequences across GPT-4o and Sonnet 3.5 New. 39.8% of scored trajectories collapse onto one or two tools by the end. Bimodal distribution, 1.7× cross-model gap. All scripts and raw data included.
Run the same signal on your own trace:
aegis check drift --trace path/to/trace.jsonlThe CLI reads only the tool_name field — never args, CoT, or prompts — so enterprise users can score prod traces without exfiltrating PII.
We also ran aegis scan across 39 public agent repositories and graded their governance posture: 92% scored an F. That is a finding about the ecosystem, not about any one project — most agent code has no tool-call policy at all.
Documentation
Full documentation at acacian.github.io/aegis:
Integration guides — LangChain, CrewAI, OpenAI, MCP, and more
Policy reference — conditions, templates, best practices
Security features — guardrails, anomaly detection, compliance
API stability — what 1.x guarantees, and what counts as a breaking change
Architecture — how the codebase is structured
Interactive playground — try in browser, no install
Contributing
git clone https://github.com/Acacian/aegis.git && cd aegis
make dev # Install deps + hooks
make test # Run tests
make lint # Lint + format checkContributing Guide • Good First Issues •
License
MIT -- see LICENSE for details.
Copyright (c) 2026 구동하 (Dongha Koo, @Acacian). Created March 21, 2026.
Available Tools
5 toolscheck_riskA
Quick risk check for an action type + target combination.
Returns just the risk level and approval requirement — lighter than evaluate_action.
Args:
action_type: The kind of operation.
target: The system being acted upon.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_type | Yes | ||
| target | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description discloses that the tool returns risk level and approval requirement and is lighter than evaluate_action. With no annotations provided, it moderately compensates by indicating the tool is read-like and partial, but lacks details on authentication needs, rate limits, or side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely concise, consisting of two sentences and a bulleted list of arguments. The first sentence clearly states the purpose, and every subsequent sentence adds value without redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's simplicity (2 parameters, no enums) and the presence of an output schema (though not shown), the description adequately explains what it does and what it returns. It lacks only minor details about parameter constraints or advanced behavior, but is complete enough for correct usage.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 0% description coverage, but the tool's description elaborates on the parameters: action_type is 'the kind of operation' and target is 'the system being acted upon.' This adds meaningful context beyond the schema titles, though it could be more precise with examples or constraints.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool performs a 'Quick risk check for an action type + target combination' and explicitly differentiates itself from the sibling evaluate_action by noting it is 'lighter'. This provides a specific verb and resource, making its purpose unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description indicates this tool is 'lighter than evaluate_action' and returns only risk level and approval requirement, implying it should be used for quick checks. However, it does not explicitly state when not to use it or mention any prerequisites or alternatives beyond evaluate_action.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
evaluate_actionA
Evaluate an AI agent action against the current governance policy.
Returns a decision: auto (allow), approve (needs human review), or block (deny).
Args:
action_type: The kind of operation (e.g. "read_file", "send_email", "delete").
target: The system being acted upon (e.g. "filesystem", "stripe", "database").
params: Arbitrary parameters for the operation.
description: Optional human-readable description.
agent_id: Optional identifier for the agent performing the action.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| action_type | Yes | ||
| target | Yes | ||
| params | No | ||
| description | No | ||
| agent_id | No |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations provided, so description carries burden. It discloses return decisions and parameter roles but lacks details on side effects, authentication, rate limits, or error handling. The description adds moderate transparency beyond the schema.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the main purpose, followed by parameter explanations. It is reasonably concise without wasting words, though the bullet-style list could be more compact.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema existing, return values are not fully described, but the description mentions three decisions. It lacks examples or constraints on parameter values. For a tool with 5 params and 0% schema coverage, the description is adequate but not deeply complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, but the description compensates by explaining each parameter's meaning (action_type, target, params, description, agent_id). While not exhaustive, it provides sufficient context for an agent to understand required inputs.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool evaluates an AI agent action against governance policy and returns a decision (auto, approve, block). It uses a specific verb-resource combination and distinguishes itself from siblings by focusing on individual action evaluation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance on when to use this tool versus siblings like check_risk or evaluate_batch. No explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use conditions are provided, leaving the agent to infer context independently.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
evaluate_batchA
Evaluate multiple actions at once against the governance policy.
Each action dict should have: action_type, target,
and optionally params, description, agent_id.
Args:
actions: List of action dicts to evaluate.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| actions | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| result | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description bears full responsibility for behavioral disclosure. It mentions 'evaluate' which suggests a read operation, but does not explicitly state whether it is read-only, whether it modifies state, or any side effects. Missing details on permissions, rate limits, or error handling.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise and includes a one-line summary followed by a bullet-like list of required fields. It could be more structured (e.g., using proper Args format), but it avoids unnecessary verbosity and is easy to scan.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
While the output schema exists and may cover return values, the description does not mention what the tool returns (e.g., per-action results) or error handling. For a tool with one parameter, it covers input adequately but not output or edge cases. Some completeness is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema provides no parameter descriptions (0% coverage), so the description adds value by specifying that each action dict should contain 'action_type', 'target', and optionally 'params', 'description', 'agent_id'. However, it does not define the types or expected formats for these fields, leaving ambiguity.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the verb 'Evaluate multiple actions at once against the governance policy' and distinguishes from the sibling 'evaluate_action' by emphasizing batch processing. It also lists the required fields for each action dict, making the purpose unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It implicitly advises using this tool for batch evaluation of multiple actions rather than single-action evaluation, but does not explicitly contrast with alternatives like 'evaluate_action' or state when not to use it. Could be more explicit about the batch vs. single distinction.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_policyA
Get the current governance policy rules.
Returns all configured rules with their action patterns, targets, risk levels, and approval requirements.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations provided, so description carries full burden. It accurately describes a read-only retrieval operation without misleading claims. Could mention caching or latency but not necessary.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two concise sentences that are front-loaded with the purpose and then detail. Every sentence adds value; no wasted words.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Tool has no parameters and has an output schema. Description explains what the output contains. For a simple retrieval tool, this is complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
No parameters defined; schema coverage is 100%. Description adds no parameter detail because none exist, which is appropriate. Baseline 4 per rule.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states 'Get the current governance policy rules' and enumerates what is returned (action patterns, targets, risk levels, approval requirements). It distinguishes from siblings like update_policy.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No explicit guidance on when to use vs. alternatives (e.g., check_risk). Implied by name, but lacking explicit when-not or context for choosing this tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
update_policyA
Hot-reload the governance policy from a YAML string.
The new policy takes effect immediately for all subsequent evaluations.
Args:
yaml_content: YAML string containing the policy rules.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| yaml_content | Yes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description states the effect: 'takes effect immediately for all subsequent evaluations,' which provides behavioral transparency. Since no annotations are provided, the description carries the full burden, and it adequately conveys the impact.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise with two sentences and an Args section, front-loaded with the main action. No unnecessary information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given that an output schema exists and the tool is simple, the description covers the input and effect adequately. It could mention error handling or validation but is mostly complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The description includes an Args section that explains the yaml_content parameter as 'YAML string containing the policy rules,' adding meaning beyond the schema, which has 0% description coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: 'Hot-reload the governance policy from a YAML string.' It specifies the verb (hot-reload), resource (governance policy), and input (YAML string), distinguishing it from sibling tools like check_risk, evaluate_action, evaluate_batch, and get_policy.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description mentions that the new policy takes effect immediately, implying real-time usage. However, it does not provide explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives or when not to use it.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
5 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
check_risk - First observed
evaluate_action - First observed
evaluate_batch - First observed
get_policy - First observed
update_policy
TDQS
Tools have distinct purposes, but 'check_risk' and 'evaluate_action' overlap conceptually as both assess actions, with 'check_risk' being lighter. This could cause confusion, though descriptions help differentiate.
All tool names follow a consistent 'verb_noun' pattern in snake_case (e.g., 'check_risk', 'evaluate_action', 'get_policy'), ensuring clarity and predictability.
With 5 tools covering risk checking, single evaluation, batch evaluation, policy retrieval, and policy update, the count is well-scoped for governance policy management.
The tool set covers all core operations: quick risk checks, detailed evaluations (individual and batch), and policy management (view and update), with no obvious gaps.
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