mcpcheck
Server Details
Scan any MCP server for tool-poisoning, security, auth & license. Trust score before install.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
Available Tools
2 toolscheck_mcp_trustAInspect
Check if an MCP server is safe to install: returns a trust score (0-100, grade A-F). Accepts a registry name (io.github.x/y), a GitHub repo (owner/repo), or a remote MCP URL. For remote servers it live-connects and analyzes the actual exposed tools for tool-poisoning + capabilities, and checks the backing repo (maintenance, license, security policy, auth). Call BEFORE installing or recommending any MCP server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| target | Yes | Registry name (io.github.x/y), GitHub repo (owner/repo), or remote MCP URL (https://...). |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden. It discloses that remote servers are live-connected and analyzed for tool-poisoning and capabilities, checks the backing repo, and returns a score with grade. It does not mention failure modes or rate limits, but it reveals the key live-connect action, which is important.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-organized: main purpose first, then accepted inputs, then behavior, then usage instruction. Every sentence adds necessary information and there is no filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers the return value, accepted inputs, and remote behavior, which is enough to call the tool. However, it is ambiguous about how registry names and GitHub repos are processed (only remote servers are said to live-connect), leaving a gap in the behavioral model.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema already documents the three accepted target formats with 100% coverage, and the description repeats them without adding new syntax details. It adds some context by noting that remote servers trigger live connection, but this is more behavioral than semantic.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool checks if an MCP server is safe to install and returns a trust score, with a specific verb and resource. It does not explicitly contrast with the sibling scan_mcp_server, so it lacks explicit sibling differentiation, but the purpose is unmistakable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives an explicit usage directive: 'Call BEFORE installing or recommending any MCP server.' This is clear when-to-use context. It does not mention scan_mcp_server or state when not to use this tool, so it falls short of full exclusion/alternative guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
scan_mcp_serverBInspect
Scan and inspect an MCP server for security issues before connecting it: live tool-poisoning analysis, exposed-tool inventory + capabilities, TLS, and repo trust signals. Same engine as check_mcp_trust. Accepts a registry name, GitHub repo, or remote MCP URL.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| target | Yes | Registry name (io.github.x/y), GitHub repo (owner/repo), or remote MCP URL (https://...). |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden and it does disclose what the scan evaluates and that it is a pre-connect, inspect-style action. It remains vague about operational behavior such as whether the scan makes network calls, whether it can execute any tool logic, or what a result looks like.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two tight sentences front-load purpose and capabilities with no filler; the sibling note is compact and adds context without bloating the description.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-parameter security scanner this is reasonably scoped, but there is no output schema and no hint of the returned report shape or side effects. The relationship to check_mcp_trust is mentioned but not resolved, leaving an important decision point incomplete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% and the schema already explains target as a registry name, GitHub repo, or remote MCP URL. The description restates these accepted formats without adding syntax details or constraints, so it stays at the baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific action ('scan and inspect an MCP server for security issues') and enumerates concrete capabilities such as live tool-poisoning analysis, the exposed-tool inventory, TLS, and repo trust signals. It does not, however, differentiate scan_mcp_server from its sibling check_mcp_trust beyond saying they share the same engine.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It clearly frames when the tool is useful ('before connecting it') and states the accepted target forms. It falls short of explicit selection guidance: since check_mcp_trust is described only as the same engine, an agent cannot tell which tool to prefer in a given situation.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
2 tool updates
- First observed
check_mcp_trust - First observed
scan_mcp_server
Frequently Asked Questions
Claiming proves that you control a remote MCP connector. It does not move, proxy, or interrupt the server.
Open the connector listing, choose Claim ownership, and sign in to Glama.
Complete one verification method:
GitHub identity — fastest for official registry listings. For a namespace such as
io.github.alice/server, link the matching GitHub user, then choose Claim with GitHub. An organization namespace such asio.github.acme/serveralso needs that organization to have installed the Glama AI GitHub App and approved its permissions, because GitHub discloses organization membership only to apps it has installed. Use HTTP or DNS when it has not.HTTP challenge — works when you can deploy a public file. Generate a token, publish the exact JSON Glama shows at
/.well-known/glama.jsonon the same origin as the connector, then choose Check HTTP challenge.DNS challenge — works when you control DNS but cannot change the server. Generate a token, create the exact TXT record Glama shows, wait for it to propagate, then choose Check DNS challenge.
After verification, Glama sends a confirmation email and gives you access to listing details, thumbnails, health checks, and analytics. Keep the HTTP file or DNS record in place: Glama periodically checks it and ownership remains verified while the token is discoverable.
The HTTP ownership file has this structure:
{
"$schema": "https://glama.ai/mcp/schemas/connector.json",
"claim": "glama_claim_..."
}Claim tokens are opaque, stable, and bound to the signed-in Glama account. They contain no email address or other personal information. If Glama can no longer discover a verified HTTP or DNS token, it starts a seven-day grace period before removing claim-based access. Restore the same token during that period to keep ownership verified. Never publish an email address, Glama session token, GitHub token, or connector credential as ownership proof.
If verification fails, confirm that you copied the current token exactly. The HTTP file must be public, return valid JSON with a successful HTTP response, and stay on the connector's origin. DNS changes may need more time to propagate. A claim cannot transfer to a different origin or hostname: if the connector target changes, Glama starts the grace period and the new target must be claimed separately after the previous claim is released.
For a connector linked to the official MCP Registry, registry updates continue to replace its name, description, and URL by default. After claiming, open Manage connector and enable Use Glama listing details as the source of truth if edits made on Glama should be preserved. Categories and thumbnails are always managed on Glama; registry linkage and technical connection settings continue to sync.
Control your server's listing on Glama, including description and metadata
Access analytics and receive server usage reports
Get monitoring and health status updates for your server
Feature your server to boost visibility and reach more users
To improve your MCP server's ranking:
Claim ownership of the server listing
Complete the server profile with an accurate description and thumbnail
Provide a test profile so Glama can connect to and evaluate the server
Keep tool definitions clear and complete to earn a high Tool Definition Quality Score (TDQS)
Route real usage through the Glama Gateway; more recorded successful server uses also improve the ranking
For users:
Full audit trail – every tool call is logged with inputs and outputs for compliance and debugging
Granular tool control – enable or disable individual tools per connector to limit what your AI agents can do
Centralized credential management – store and rotate API keys and OAuth tokens in one place
Change alerts – get notified when a connector changes its schema, adds or removes tools, or updates tool definitions, so nothing breaks silently
For server owners:
Proven adoption – public usage metrics on your listing show real-world traction and build trust with prospective users
Tool-level analytics – see which tools are being used most, helping you prioritize development and documentation
Direct user feedback – users can report issues and suggest improvements through the listing, giving you a channel you would not have otherwise
The connector status is unhealthy when Glama is unable to successfully connect to the server. This can happen for several reasons:
The server is experiencing an outage
The URL of the server is wrong
Credentials required to access the server are missing or invalid
If you are the owner of this MCP connector and would like to make modifications to the listing, including providing test credentials for accessing the server, please contact support@glama.ai.
Discussions
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Glama MCP Gateway
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
TDQS
Both tools accept identical inputs, run the same engine, and cover the same security-check workflow; check_mcp_trust and scan_mcp_server are near-duplicates. An agent cannot reliably determine which to call because the descriptions explicitly say they share the same engine and overlapping purposes.
Both names follow a verb_mcp_object snake_case pattern, so the naming convention is recognizable and mostly predictable. The minor inconsistency is that 'trust' is an abstract assessment object while 'server' is a concrete entity, and 'check'/'scan' are semantically close verbs.
Two tools for a narrow security-checking domain is borderline; the functionality could reasonably be a single tool. The count is not harmful, but it feels thin because the second tool mostly duplicates the first.
The pair covers the main input types (registry, GitHub repo, remote URL) and key security concerns such as tool-poisoning, capabilities, TLS, and repo trust. There are minor gaps such as no separate report retrieval or historical scan results, but those are not central to the stated purpose.