Agent Utility MCP
Server Details
Stop your agent before it runs rm -rf /etc or emails your .env. Deterministic preflight checks.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
Available Tools
4 toolsanalyze_tool_callARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Analyze a proposed AI-agent tool call before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) covering destructive actions, sensitive-data exposure, external transmission, privilege changes and irreversible operations, under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default. Filesystem paths outside a known workspace_root are treated as higher risk than paths inside it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| policy | No | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). | |
| context | No | Optional declarative context about the proposed operation. | |
| arguments | Yes | The proposed tool arguments. They are analyzed as data and never executed. | |
| tool_name | Yes | The exact name of the proposed tool. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| risk | Yes | |
| valid | Yes | |
| checks | Yes | |
| signals | Yes | |
| decision | Yes | |
| tool_name | Yes | |
| risk_score | Yes | |
| policy_applied | Yes | |
| schema_version | Yes | |
| ruleset_version | Yes | |
| context_completeness | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is clear. The description adds valuable behavioral detail: the decision is deterministic, policy-aware, and treats workspace paths outside the root as higher risk. It also explicitly states that arguments are 'analyzed as data and never executed', which is not present in annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two clear, front-loaded sentences. The first sentence defines the tool's function and outcome set, the second adds a specific risk rule. There is no redundant or filler content; every sentence contributes value.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity, the description covers the core purpose, the decision set, policy options, risk categories, and the workspace_root rule. An output schema exists, so return values need not be described. The description is complete and self-sufficient for an agent to determine when and how to invoke the tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description goes beyond the schema by explaining how the 'policy' parameter affects the decision, how 'workspace_root' influences risk assessment, and clarifying that 'arguments' are not executed. This adds meaningful context for parameter usage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's purpose: 'Analyze a proposed AI-agent tool call before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision'. It specifies the exact verb (analyze), resource (tool call), and output (allow, notice, confirm, block). This distinguishes it from sibling analysis tools like analyze_url_risk, inspect_command, and inspect_file, which target different inputs.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context for when to use the tool: before executing a tool call to assess risks like 'destructive actions, sensitive-data exposure, external transmission', etc. It mentions the applicable policies and the workspace_root risk factor. However, it does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use the tool, so it falls short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
analyze_url_riskARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Analyze a URL for structural and security risk signals and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes | The absolute URL to analyze. | |
| policy | No | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). | |
| context | No | Optional declarative context. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| port | Yes | |
| risk | Yes | |
| input | Yes | |
| valid | Yes | |
| checks | Yes | |
| domain | Yes | |
| signals | Yes | |
| decision | Yes | |
| hostname | Yes | |
| protocol | Yes | |
| subdomain | Yes | |
| risk_score | Yes | |
| public_suffix | Yes | |
| normalized_url | Yes | |
| policy_applied | Yes | |
| schema_version | Yes | |
| ruleset_version | Yes | |
| context_completeness | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds behavioral context beyond the annotations by stating the decision is deterministic and listing possible outcomes (allow, notice, confirm, block) and the default policy. This complements the read-only and idempotent hints without contradiction.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The single-sentence description is front-loaded with the action and includes all essential context without redundancy or filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the rich annotations, complete input schema, and available output schema, the description sufficiently covers purpose, default behavior, and policy options, making it complete for an agent to invoke confidently.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already documents all parameters with 100% coverage, so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaning by explaining the policy-aware decision logic and default policy, but it does not detail individual parameters beyond what the schema provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool analyzes URLs for structural and security risk signals and returns a deterministic, policy-aware decision, explicitly distinguishing it from sibling tools that analyze tool calls, commands, or files.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies use for URL risk assessment and clarifies the default policy, but it does not explicitly state when to use this tool over alternatives or list exclusions. It provides clear context without formal alternatives.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
inspect_commandARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Analyze a shell command before execution and return a deterministic, policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) without running it, under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default. Paths outside a known workspace_root are treated as higher risk than paths inside it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cwd | No | Optional working-directory context. It is never accessed. | |
| shell | No | The command shell, when known. | |
| policy | No | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). | |
| command | Yes | The complete command text to inspect without executing it. | |
| context | No | Optional declarative context. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| cwd | Yes | |
| risk | Yes | |
| shell | Yes | |
| valid | Yes | |
| checks | Yes | |
| command | Yes | |
| signals | Yes | |
| decision | Yes | |
| risk_score | Yes | |
| policy_applied | Yes | |
| schema_version | Yes | |
| ruleset_version | Yes | |
| context_completeness | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and idempotentHint. The description supplements this by stating the command is 'without running it' and that path risk is based on workspace_root. These behavioral traits are not fully captured by the annotations, adding valuable context without contradicting them.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences and front-loads the primary purpose. It packs essential information—decision enumeration, non-execution guarantee, policy options, and path risk—without redundant phrasing. Every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present, the description does not need to explain return values. It adequately covers the decision types, policy defaults, and risk factors. Although it leaves cwd and shell semantics to the schema, the tool context is sufficiently complete for agent selection and invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the description need not add parameter-level detail. It does add the default policy ('balanced') and the higher-risk heuristic for paths outside workspace_root, but the schema already documents these. Thus a baseline score of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description specifies 'Analyze a shell command before execution' and enumerates concrete decision outcomes (allow, notice, confirm, block). This clearly identifies the resource as shell commands, differentiating it from sibling tools like analyze_tool_call, analyze_url_risk, and inspect_file, which target other resource types.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage by stating the tool inspects commands 'before execution' and explains policy options and workspace_root risk. However, it does not explicitly name sibling alternatives or provide when-not recommendations, so it stops short of full usage guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
inspect_fileARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Inspect a Base64-encoded file locally for deterministic structural and security risk signals without executing it, and return a policy-aware decision (allow, notice, confirm or block) under the applicable policy — permissive, balanced or strict, balanced by default.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| policy | No | Optional policy used to compute the decision: permissive, balanced or strict (default: balanced). | |
| context | No | Optional declarative context. | |
| filename | Yes | The original filename, including its extension. | |
| content_base64 | Yes | The complete file content encoded as canonical Base64 (maximum decoded size: 1 MiB). |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| risk | Yes | |
| valid | Yes | |
| checks | Yes | |
| sha256 | Yes | |
| signals | Yes | |
| decision | Yes | |
| filename | Yes | |
| risk_score | Yes | |
| size_bytes | Yes | |
| detected_type | Yes | |
| policy_applied | Yes | |
| schema_version | Yes | |
| ruleset_version | Yes | |
| declared_extension | Yes | |
| context_completeness | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds substantive behavioral context beyond the annotations: it explains the tool does not execute the file, performs local inspection, and returns specific decision types (allow, notice, confirm, block). This complements the readOnly/idempotent hints with concrete operational details, and there is no contradiction with annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, well-structured sentence that front-loads the core action ('Inspect a Base64-encoded file locally') and efficiently conveys the purpose, safety, and policy aspects without redundant words. Every phrase earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's complexity, the description covers essential aspects: what it does, how it behaves (no execution), the decision output, and policy options. The output schema exists, so return values are already documented. The description is sufficient for an agent to understand and invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description does mention the policy options and default, but this largely restates the schema's enum description. It adds minimal information beyond what the schema already provides for filename/content_base64, so no higher score is warranted.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's function: inspect a Base64-encoded file locally for structural and security risk signals without executing it, and return a policy-aware decision. It distinguishes itself from siblings by focusing on file inspection and explicitly noting non-execution, which differentiates it from tools like inspect_command or analyze_url_risk.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context on when to use the tool—for evaluating a Base64-encoded file's risk locally without execution—and mentions the policy parameter. However, it does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, so it lacks the explicit exclusions that would merit a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
4 tool updates
- First observed
analyze_tool_call - First observed
analyze_url_risk - First observed
inspect_command - First observed
inspect_file
Frequently Asked Questions
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Open the connector listing, choose Claim ownership, and sign in to Glama.
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GitHub identity — fastest for official registry listings. For a namespace such as
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/.well-known/glama.jsonon the same origin as the connector, then choose Check HTTP challenge.DNS challenge — works when you control DNS but cannot change the server. Generate a token, create the exact TXT record Glama shows, wait for it to propagate, then choose Check DNS challenge.
After verification, Glama sends a confirmation email and gives you access to listing details, thumbnails, health checks, and analytics. Keep the HTTP file or DNS record in place: Glama periodically checks it and ownership remains verified while the token is discoverable.
The HTTP ownership file has this structure:
{
"$schema": "https://glama.ai/mcp/schemas/connector.json",
"claim": "glama_claim_..."
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For a connector linked to the official MCP Registry, registry updates continue to replace its name, description, and URL by default. After claiming, open Manage connector and enable Use Glama listing details as the source of truth if edits made on Glama should be preserved. Categories and thumbnails are always managed on Glama; registry linkage and technical connection settings continue to sync.
Control your server's listing on Glama, including description and metadata
Access analytics and receive server usage reports
Get monitoring and health status updates for your server
Feature your server to boost visibility and reach more users
To improve your MCP server's ranking:
Claim ownership of the server listing
Complete the server profile with an accurate description and thumbnail
Provide a test profile so Glama can connect to and evaluate the server
Keep tool definitions clear and complete to earn a high Tool Definition Quality Score (TDQS)
Route real usage through the Glama Gateway; more recorded successful server uses also improve the ranking
For users:
Full audit trail – every tool call is logged with inputs and outputs for compliance and debugging
Granular tool control – enable or disable individual tools per connector to limit what your AI agents can do
Centralized credential management – store and rotate API keys and OAuth tokens in one place
Change alerts – get notified when a connector changes its schema, adds or removes tools, or updates tool definitions, so nothing breaks silently
For server owners:
Proven adoption – public usage metrics on your listing show real-world traction and build trust with prospective users
Tool-level analytics – see which tools are being used most, helping you prioritize development and documentation
Direct user feedback – users can report issues and suggest improvements through the listing, giving you a channel you would not have otherwise
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The server is experiencing an outage
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Credentials required to access the server are missing or invalid
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Glama MCP Gateway
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
TDQS
Each tool targets a distinct artifact: tool calls, URLs, shell commands, and files. There is no overlap in their input types or risk-analysis scopes, so an agent can clearly select the right tool for the situation.
All tool names follow a snake_case verb_noun pattern, but two different verbs are used ('analyze' and 'inspect'). This is a minor deviation from a single consistent verb, yet the pattern remains predictable and readable.
Four tools is well within the ideal 3-15 range and each one addresses a distinct, necessary aspect of pre-execution safety analysis. The count feels purposeful and not bloated.
The set covers the major categories of risky operations (actions, URLs, commands, files). A minor gap is the lack of a tool to configure or retrieve the policy that governs the decisions, but the core analysis surface is adequately complete.