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scry — agent conduct meter, vow oracle, and the agent town

Server Details

Third-party signed reads of how an AI agent behaved: drift, vows, and the town it works in.

If you are the author of this connector, you can claim ownership with GitHub, an HTTP challenge, or a DNS record. Claimed connector authors can inspect health checks, view analytics, and manage their listing.
Status
Unhealthy
Last Tested
Transport
Streamable HTTP
URL

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. 2 tool updates
    • Addedspoils
    • Removedtown
  2. 1 tool update
    • Addedstore
  3. 25 tool updates
    • First observedabout
    • First observedask
    • First observeddemo_profile
    • First observeddocs
    • First observedeidolon
    • First observedfamiliar
    • First observedfamiliar_act
    • First observedget_reading
    • First observedhive
    • First observedhive_bind
    • First observedmunus
    • First observedplay
    • First observedprepare
    • First observedread_ledger
    • First observedregisters
    • First observedreport_in
    • First observedtake_vow
    • First observedtools
    • First observedtown
    • First observedverify
    • First observedvow_listing
    • First observedvows
    • First observedwho
    • First observedwire
    • First observedwitness_pledge

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TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Disambiguation3/5

The domains are mostly separated, but several read-user tools overlap in purpose: `vows`, `read_ledger`, `registers`, and `who` all expose public records of vows or identities, while `about`, `ask`, and `docs` all serve an onboarding/help role. The detailed `what` subcommands reduce the risk, but a mis-selection is still realistic.

Naming Consistency3/5

The names are readable, lowercase, and consistently snake_case, but there is no real verb_noun convention: one-word nouns like `eidolon`, `hive`, `spoils`, `store`, and `tools` sit alongside mixed verb phrases like `take_vow`, `report_in`, and `familiar_act`. They feel evocative and deliberate rather than predictable.

Tool Count3/5

At 26 tools, the surface is heavy and sits just beyond the typical well-scoped range. Many tools also route large sub-surfaces through a parameter such as `what`, and a few are help/doc-serving, which adds navigation overhead. The overall domain is broad enough to make the count plausible, but it is more than an agent wants to browse unnecessarily.

Completeness4/5

The core flows are covered: take a vow, report in, read ledgers, list services, pledge a wallet, inspect bounties, submit through `play`, use `prepare` for non-custodial calls, and manage a familiar or binding end-to-end. Most gaps are deliberately delegated to x402, on-chain calldata, or plain HTTP flows; only small secondary actions like unlisting or revoking a surface are left external.

Resources