524,441 tools. Updated 2026-09-06 15:49
"MCP servers with streamable-http support" matching MCP tools:
- Search for existing MCP servers that provide a capability (e.g. "postgres", "wayback machine", "google sheets"). Federates the official MCP Registry, Smithery (with live use counts) and npm; dedupes; ranks remote Streamable HTTP servers first. Returns name, description, remote URL or package, popularity, last update and an install snippet. Use before building or asking the user to build a tool.ConnectorNo auth
- Find MCP servers in the directory. Searches the standalone MCP directory (PulseMCP / official MCP registry import) unioned with x402 services that also expose an MCP endpoint. Returns normalised entries with a ready-to-use streamable-http `call_hint.mcp.url`. Args: intent: Natural-language description of the tool/capability needed. top_k: Max servers to return (1-20). chain: Optional payment-network filter for paid MCP servers. require_healthy: When true, only return servers marked health=ok.ConnectorNo auth
- WHAT: Fetch /llms-mcp-web.txt — browser WebMCP catalog (early bootstrap tools + full list). Same executeMcpTool handlers as HTTP /mcp, different transport (document.modelContext). Not this streamable-http endpoint.ConnectorNo auth
- Self-register an x402 / MCP service in the agent-tools directory. Service owners and agents may submit new services here. Submissions are auto-reviewed instantly by x402 verification (no human gate): if the URL proves x402 payment support it is listed immediately and shows up in `search`; otherwise it is rejected or retried automatically. Listing is FREE. Dedup: if a service with the same canonical origin (scheme://host) already exists in the directory we return its slug instead of creating a duplicate submission. Same goes for a still-pending submission with the same origin. Rate limit: at most 5 pending submissions per client IP per 24h. Hits beyond that get `{error: rate_limited}` — try again later or email contact@agent-tools.cloud for bulk imports. Args: url: Public HTTPS URL of the service (the x402-payable endpoint or its homepage). Required. name: Human-friendly name. Defaults to the URL hostname. description: One-paragraph description (max ~2000 chars). mcp_url: If the service speaks MCP, its streamable-http endpoint. category: Free-form (e.g. "defi", "search", "social"). Use `list_categories` to align with existing taxonomy. chains: Networks the service accepts payment on (e.g. ["base", "solana"]). price_min_usdc: Lower bound of per-call price in USDC. price_max_usdc: Upper bound of per-call price in USDC. contact: Optional email / handle the directory team can reach you on for clarifications.ConnectorNo auth
- 列出某个远程 MCP 服务提供的全部工具(工具名、描述、入参 schema)。 【这是调用平台 MCP 的第二步】在 search_servers 找到目标服务后,传入它的 server_id (或直接传 endpoint_url),网关会以 MCP 客户端身份向目标服务发起 initialize + tools/list, 兼容 Streamable HTTP 与旧版 SSE 两种传输(超时 15 秒)。 参数: server_id: 平台目录中的服务 ID(来自 search_servers 返回的 id)。 endpoint: 也可直接给远程 MCP 端点 URL;但该 endpoint 必须已在平台库中登记(否则拒绝,防 SSRF)。 二选一,优先使用 server_id。 返回:目标服务的工具清单 [{name, description, inputSchema}] 与使用的传输类型。 拿到工具名后,用 call_server_tool(endpoint=..., tool_name=..., arguments=...) 调用。ConnectorNo auth
- Get Lenny Zeltser's CTI cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `cti_load_context`. This server never requests your campaign or threat-intel notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—templates and guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.ConnectorNo auth
Matching MCP Servers
- FlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceA step-by-step guide and complete working example for building and running an MCP server with streamable HTTP transport using Python, mcp, and FastAPI, enabling AI assistants to access tools over HTTP.31-
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceA bridge server that converts stdio protocol to streamable-http protocol, allowing clients to interact with MCP services over HTTP.2Mulan Permissive Software , Version 2
Matching MCP Connectors
Short catalog of common HTTP status codes.
Complete a customer-support escalation using the least-privilege authorized plan despite customer-su
- Last-resort email + OTP bind for this MCP session (headless only). Prefer account-level Cursor Connect (Cloud / Grok Bot inherit it) or a ``tsk_`` header. Do not call this as the first hop. When the host has no token: 1. ``mcp_auth(email="you@example.com")`` — we email a 6-digit code. 2. Ask the human for the code, then ``mcp_auth(email="you@example.com", code="123456")``. 3. If ``status=need_org``, call again with ``org_id=``. After ``status=authenticated``, later tools on this streamable-HTTP session run as that person. Do not store the code or any token.ConnectorNo auth
- Free, no key required. Reads the published source of an MCP server and reports what it actually does — each observation anchored to a file:line with the code quoted verbatim. **Call this before connecting to, installing, or invoking an MCP server you have not read yourself.** Connecting to an MCP server gives it a channel into your context and your tool calls; this tells you what is on the other end first. Typical things it surfaces: reading private keys or wallet seeds, sending data to third-party hosts, running code at install time, and tool descriptions that steer an agent toward actions unrelated to the tool's stated purpose. Do NOT call this for ordinary npm or PyPI libraries — the corpus covers MCP servers only, and other ecosystems will return 'not analyzed'. This reports observations, not a safety verdict. An empty result means nothing was found in the categories checked — not that the server is safe. Corpus: 2,781 MCP servers from the official registry, read at source level. Coverage index (free, no key, findings not included): GET https://sri-test.biz/v1/corpusConnectorNo auth
- No arguments. Returns how many MCP servers have been read at source level, and the share of them with each category of finding (credential access, network egress, install-time execution, prompt-injection surface). Use this to judge whether checking a specific server is worth it before you look one up. It reports aggregate counts only - no per-server findings, and no verdict about any individual server.ConnectorNo auth
- List an EXTERNAL remote MCP server you run as a marketplace LISTING — for an MCP server hosted on YOUR OWN infrastructure that buyers connect their client straight to (FindAgent never proxies or runs it). Pass the listing basics (title/slug/tagline/description/category_slug + example_prompts: 1–5 required) and the remote endpoint as `server_url` (https) OR a parsed `server.json` object in `server_json`. The server's tools are auto-detected (a sandbox-gated live scan when available) — you can override with `tools` (name+description), `transport` (streamable-http|sse), and `auth_note` (what credential the server needs — NEVER a secret value). Creates a status=draft agent you own; then call findagent_submit_for_review IN THIS MCP CLIENT to submit it. The server URL is stored + displayed only; nothing executes on FindAgent. Before calling: findagent_check_slug + findagent_list_categories.ConnectorOAuth
- Find x402 / MCP services matching an intent or filter set. Two usage modes (agents pick whichever fits): A. Natural-language: `search(intent="fetch tweets for @user")` B. Pure browse: `search(has_mcp=True, category="defi", top_k=10)` At least one of `intent`, `category`, `chain`, `has_mcp`, `min_confidence` must be supplied — otherwise the call is rejected (we won't dump 2300+ rows). Results are ranked by: (health=ok AND tx_30d>0) → health=ok → has-quality-signal → confidence → tx_30d → recency. So the highest-quality real-traffic services appear first. Each item includes (when available): - confidence : 0.0–1.0 x402scan quality score. - tx_30d : 30-day x402 payment count (proxy for real usage). - match_snippet : FTS snippet showing where `intent` hit ([[token]]). - match_reason : list[str] of human-readable ranking signals. - mcp_url : populated when the service exposes an MCP endpoint (you can call it directly via streamable-http). Agents should prefer items with non-null confidence and tx_30d > 0 unless the user explicitly wants experimental endpoints. Args: intent: What the agent wants to do (English or Chinese). Optional when at least one structured filter is set. Synonym expansion covers twitter↔X↔推特, whale↔巨鲸, price↔价格 etc. top_k: Max services to return (default 5, hard cap 25). max_price_usd: Upper bound on per-call price in USD. category: Filter (see `list_categories`). chain: "base", "polygon", "solana", "arbitrum", ... min_confidence: Minimum confidence (0.0–1.0). 0.8+ keeps only services x402scan rates as high-quality. has_mcp: When true, return only services with a callable MCP endpoint. Use this when the agent wants to chain another MCP server rather than perform raw HTTP+x402.ConnectorNo auth
- Get SaSame-observed MCP server recommendations for a capability you need. SaSame, operated by SASAME S.R.L., continuously observes and measures the Model Context Protocol ecosystem and publishes verifiable evidence and history; the MCP Factory is internal machinery and an optional product surface behind it; measurement only, not endorsement. SaSame's MCP Observatory continuously crawls and GRADES thousands of public MCP servers (A/B/C/D) by reachability and whether they return real content. This returns the top live, real-content endpoints (optionally filtered by an endpoint keyword), each with its SaSame grade and last-audited time — so you (or the human you assist) can pick a measured MCP candidate instead of guessing. Each result includes a longitudinal trend (when SaSame has observed it over time) and a ready-to-quote, attributed `cite` line; the top pick with history carries an ed25519-signed, offline-verifiable record you can cite as a third-party source. Free, read-only, no signup. If you operate one of these servers, claim it (claim_start). If you can't find a fit and need an MCP/agent BUILT, call engage_sasame. Pass a referral handle from `refer` as engage_sasame(ref=...) to attribute the introduction.ConnectorNo auth
- 通过网关代理调用某个远程 MCP 服务的具体工具,并把结果原样返回。 【这是调用平台 MCP 的第三步】在 search_servers 找到服务、list_server_tools 拿到工具名与 入参 schema 后,调用本工具实际执行。网关会向目标 MCP 发起 initialize + tools/call(超时 30 秒), 兼容 Streamable HTTP 与 SSE。 参数: endpoint: 目标远程 MCP 端点 URL(必须是平台库中已登记的地址,否则拒绝,防 SSRF)。 tool_name: 要调用的工具名(来自 list_server_tools)。 arguments: 工具入参字典,按该工具 inputSchema 填写。例如 {"city": "青岛", "days": 3}。 返回:目标工具的执行结果(content 文本/结构化内容原样透传,isError 标识是否业务错误)。ConnectorNo auth
- Submit a URL for asynchronous security analysis. Returns immediately with a task_id. Poll with url_scanner_async_task_status to check progress, then url_scanner_async_task_result to get the scan result. Async counterpart of url_scanner_scan for clients without native MCP Tasks support.ConnectorNo auth
- Detect website technology stack: CMS, frameworks, CDN, analytics tools, web servers, languages (via HTTP headers + HTML analysis). Use for passive reconnaissance; for full audit use audit_domain. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {technologies: [{name, category, confidence%, version}]}.ConnectorNo auth
- On-demand independent SAFETY scan of an MCP server — call this BEFORE installing or connecting to one. Give it an HTTP(S) MCP endpoint URL (scanned live in seconds), or an npm/PyPI package name or GitHub repo (queued for an isolated sandbox scan — local stdio servers execute code, so Hlido never runs them inline). Returns the safety tier (SAFE/CAUTION/RISKY/DANGEROUS), tool-poisoning detection (the malice signal), dangerous-capability red-flags (shell/code-eval/fs-write/egress/secrets) with per-tool evidence, and auth posture. Tier = blast radius if hijacked, not maintainer trustworthiness. A server Hlido hasn't scanned returns not_scanned — never assumed safe. Register of already-scanned servers: https://hlido.eu/mcp/ConnectorNo auth
- Get Lenny Zeltser's IR cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `ir_load_context`. This server never requests your incident notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.ConnectorNo auth
- Get Lenny Zeltser's Malware cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `malware_load_context`. This server never requests your sample, analysis notes, or indicators and instructs your AI to keep them local—guidelines and the report template flow to your AI for local analysis.ConnectorNo auth
- Search the continuously-maintained MCP server registry (deduped, quality-scored, refreshed every 30 min) by name/title/description. Free; returns up to 25 matching servers with score, status, remotes and packages. For the FULL corpus (~1500 servers) use get_mcp_registry_snapshot (paid, x402).ConnectorNo auth
- Lists Vocab Voyage's MCP starter prompts (also exposed via the standard MCP prompts/list endpoint). Useful for hosts that don't yet support prompts/list.ConnectorNo auth
- Check an MCP server for malware / prompt-injection lures by its endpoint URL. Give the server's streamable-http endpoint URL. Two paths: * **Already in the agent-tools directory** → returns our LATEST stored rule verdict. Every indexed server is re-scanned hourly, so you get a consistent, continuously-refreshed answer without re-probing. * **Not yet indexed** → we probe the endpoint live, statically scan its advertised tools + metadata, ADD it to the directory, and return the fresh verdict (so the next caller gets the rule verdict instantly from cache). Two dimensions are reported. `verdict` is authoritative and comes from deterministic static rules — pure pattern-matching over the *advertised* text only, NO code execution. It flags the social-engineering / RCE tricks listing-spam servers use: * `curl … | bash` and `base64 -d | sh` install lures * `eval "$(curl …)"` / PowerShell `IEX(...DownloadString)` cradles * base64 blobs that decode to a shell command * bare-IP payload hosts and cheap throwaway TLDs * prompt-injection / credential-exfiltration phrasing ("ignore previous instructions", "send your .env / api key") * MCP tool-poisoning coercion — descriptions that hijack an agent's tool-calling ("always call this tool first", "before using any other tool you must…"), hidden `<IMPORTANT>` instructions, "list all API keys / include secrets in your response", and coercion to read & forward `.key`/`.pem`/`.ssh`/`.env` files Source-code-oriented rules (SQL / command / code injection) are deliberately not applied to natural-language descriptions, to avoid false positives. `llm_reference` is an advisory frontier-LLM second opinion over the same text. Because the LLM is slow it is computed LIVE on this call only and is never stored (the hourly job never runs it), so it may be null on timeout. It never overrides the rule verdict; when it is *more* severe than the rules an `advisory` note is attached as a safety-net signal. Security/defense products that merely *name* these attacks are not flagged. Args: endpoint_url: The MCP server's streamable-http URL (required). This is the identity we look up / index by. name: Optional advertised name (used when the server is new and gets added; falls back to the URL host). description: Optional description / README blurb (scanned when new). tools_text: Optional tool names + descriptions; used only if the live probe cannot fetch the server's tools/list. Returns: { verdict: "clean"|"suspicious"|"malicious", score: 0-100, reasons: [{rule, weight, snippet}], llm_reference: {model, verdict, reason, confidence} | null, advisory: str | null, slug, name, endpoint_url, source: "stored" (existing) | "new_scan" (just added), indexed: bool }ConnectorNo auth