"Handshake" matching MCP tools:

• buy_domain_cryptoA

  instadomainA

  Start the purchase flow for a domain using USDC crypto payment (x402 protocol). Autonomous two-step payment flow — no browser required: Step 1: Call this tool to reserve the domain and get a pay_url. Step 2: Pay the pay_url using your x402 wallet: - If you have Coinbase Payments MCP: call its x402 payment tool with the pay_url. - Otherwise: run `curl -L <pay_url>` — your x402-enabled HTTP client will handle the 402 handshake and USDC payment on Base automatically. After payment succeeds, call get_domain_status(order_id) to poll until registration is complete (usually under 60 seconds). The registrant contact details are required because the domain will be registered in the buyer's name (they become the legal owner). WHOIS privacy is enabled by default, so these details are not publicly visible. IMPORTANT: Before calling this tool, you MUST first call check_domain to get the price and confirm it with the user. Args: domain: The domain to purchase (e.g. "coolstartup.com"). first_name: Registrant's first name. last_name: Registrant's last name. email: Registrant's email address. address1: Registrant's street address. city: Registrant's city. state: Registrant's state or province. postal_code: Registrant's postal/zip code. country: 2-letter ISO country code (e.g. "US", "GB", "DE"). phone: Phone number in format +1.5551234567. org_name: Organization name (optional, leave empty for individuals). Returns: Dict with order_id, pay_url (full URL to pay via x402), price_usdc, price_cents, network, and USDC contract address.

  ConnectorNo auth

• audit_endpointA

  KnownFixA

  Readiness audit of any agent-facing URL: MCP handshake, CORS, discovery docs (llms.txt, mcp.json), and payment-offer behaviour. First call with url alone for the FREE grade and failing-check list. For the full findings and remediations, call get_offer with productType "audit" and productId "conformance-report", pay, then call audit_endpoint again with the same url plus paymentTx and paymentOffer. This tool both previews and redeems the paid report; no separate delivery tool is needed.

  ConnectorNo auth

• set_site_nginx_snippetA

  BorealHostA

  Set custom nginx config on the BorealHost host proxy — WebSocket, timeouts, headers. Use this when configuring your container's own nginx is not enough because something in front of it is interfering. The host proxy sits between the internet and your container, and by default its catch-all `location /` does not do anything special per-site. WEBSOCKETS: if your WebSocket endpoint returns 400 through your domain but upgrades correctly (101) when tested inside your container, the Upgrade header is being dropped in front of you. Add a location block that relays it: location ^~ /your/ws/path/ { proxy_pass <your site's existing upstream>; proxy_http_version 1.1; proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade; proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade"; proxy_read_timeout 3600; proxy_send_timeout 3600; error_page 502 503 504 =502; } When testing with curl, force HTTP/1.1 (curl --http1.1). A WebSocket handshake uses the Upgrade header, which is invalid in HTTP/2 — curl negotiates h2 with a CDN by default and the edge answers 400, which looks exactly like the bug you are trying to fix. This config lives OUTSIDE the generated vhost, so it survives domain re-linking, autoconfig, plan changes and reprovisioning. Sending "" clears it. Bounds — the file is parsed by a root process on a machine shared with BorealHost infrastructure, so only per-site proxy directives are accepted: location, proxy_pass, proxy_set_header, proxy_http_version, proxy_*_timeout, proxy_buffering, client_max_body_size, add_header, error_page, expires, gzip. `root`, `alias`, `include`, `access_log`, `error_log`, `server` and `upstream` are refused, and proxy_pass must target your own site's existing upstream. A rejection names the directive and why. The config is validated with `nginx -t` before it is applied and rolled back automatically if it does not pass, so a mistake cannot take your site down. Requires: API key with write scope. Args: domain_name: Full domain name (e.g. "example.com") content: nginx config, or "" to clear it Returns: {"domain": "example.com", "bytes": 214, "replaced": false} Errors: NOT_FOUND: Domain not found VALIDATION_ERROR: Domain not linked to a site, a directive is not permitted, proxy_pass targets something other than your own upstream, or nginx rejected the config (the message says which)

  ConnectorNo auth

• well_list_connectorsA

  WellA

  List the connectors a workspace can install AND everything it has already connected, each with a one-click install deep link. ONE tool answers both halves of the connect question — "what can I connect to Well?" and "what is connected, still syncing, or broken?" — because every existing connection is overlaid onto its catalog row. Do NOT read workspace_connectors records to work out connection coverage; this tool is that answer. Each entry has: - service_id: the connector's stable catalog id (e.g. "stripe"), used in the install link. - name, category_id, direction: what the connector is. - data_domains: the financial domains it serves — any of "bank", "accounting", "invoicing" — or null for a non-financial connector. One connector can serve several domains (Qonto serves all three). "bank" here means the connector delivers cash movements, which a payroll or billing platform also does; do NOT read it as "this is a bank". To list banks, pass kind: "bank", which the server scopes on its own bank classification. - status: "available" connectors are connectable now; "coming_soon"/"unavailable"/"maintenance" are not. - is_matched / is_selected: whether this workspace's detected tools matched this connector / already picked it. - match_score: 0..1 confidence of that match; null when unmatched. A high score is a tool Well is confident the workspace already uses. - is_connected: this workspace has a connection you should REPAIR or MANAGE, not install fresh. True for "enabled", "processing", "error", "need_reconnect" and "suspended"; false for "to_configure" and "disabled", where a fresh install IS the right next step. - connection_status: the existing connection's state, or null when this workspace has no connection row for the connector at all. One of: - "enabled" — connected and syncing. - "processing" — the grant is in and the FIRST sync is still running; data may be partial. Connected: do NOT ask the user to connect it again. - "error" — authenticated but its last real sync failed. Offer install_url as a reconnect. - "need_reconnect" — the grant is dead and only the user can restore it. Offer install_url as a reconnect, NOT a first install. - "suspended" — the connection is held back administratively; tell the user it is paused. The user cannot fix it by reconnecting. - "to_configure" — a connect attempt that never completed its handshake. Nothing is connected: offer install_url as a first install, and never claim the tool is connected. - "disabled" — the connection was torn down. Offer install_url as a first install. A "degraded" connector never appears: it is resolved server-side against its own sync history into "enabled" or "error", so you never surface a state that clears itself. A connection whose state this build cannot read also reports null, and there is_connected stays true — read the two fields together, and treat "null status, is_connected true" as an existing connection whose health is unknown. - workspace_connector_id: the connection instance's id, or null when there is no connection row. This is the id well_invoke_connector_tool and well_list_connector_tools need — resolve it HERE, never via well_query_records on workspace_connectors. - last_successful_sync_at: ISO timestamp of the last SUCCESSFUL sync, or null when none has landed yet. An "enabled" connector with null here has a valid grant but has never delivered data. - sync_in_progress: a data sync is running right now. Tell the user to wait rather than to act. - is_preselected: Well recommends connecting this one now (a high-confidence match with is_connected false). The interactive picker pre-checks exactly these. A "to_configure" or "disabled" row can still be pre-checked — installing it IS the fix. On kind: "accounting" at most ONE row carries it — the single highest-confidence accounting tool — because connecting the accounting software is a pick-one step; every other scope pre-checks each high-confidence match. - install_url: a one-click link that STARTS or REPAIRS the connection in Well. It works from any state — it signs the user in if needed, creates their workspace if they have none, then runs the connector's own auth flow — and it covers banks too (a bank opens its bank-login flow pre-selected). Null only when the connector is not "available". Hand this to the user to get started in one click. install_all_url is a TOP-LEVEL field, not a per-connector one. It is ONE link that installs every installable connector in this result that is not already connected, in the order they are listed. Its reach is wider than the per-row links: a connector the catalog holds by service id alone carries a null install_url and is still installed by this link, so never read a null install_url as "cannot be installed". When the answer offers several connectors to install, hand the user install_all_url and do NOT list the per-connector install_url links beside it — the one link IS the whole offer, and a table of links beside it puts the reader back through several sign-ins. One link carries at most 10 connectors, and install_all_omitted names the service ids it left out, so offer those rows their own install_url. install_all_url is null when the result offers nothing to install. It is null too wherever the result names no set the user has chosen: the unfiltered catalog and the whole bank domain never carry the link, and a name search or an accounting or invoicing domain carries it only while the WHOLE result fits in one link and this page holds all of it — past that the link would stand for whichever rows the page happened to carry. from_selection always carries the link, however many vendors were picked, because the user named each one. Where install_all_url is null, the rows' own install_url links ARE the offer: list them, and never announce a batch link the result does not carry. Scoping: pass kind ("bank" | "accounting" | "invoicing") to get only the connectors serving that domain — the whole set, server-ordered, including the long tail of bank institutions. Pass q to name-search the full catalog. Omit all three for the curated, matched-first view. Use well_list_connector_tools for a live connection's actions. Pass from_selection: true for the connect step that FOLLOWS a vendor pick: it returns ONLY the connectors behind the counterparties the user picked on the missing-invoices card this session, every installable one pre-checked, because the user already chose them. It takes no q and no kind — those browse a catalog, and this names a set already decided. An empty list means the session holds no pick for this workspace, or no picked counterparty matched a connector. Every result carries scope — "catalog", one of the three domains, or "picked_vendors" — naming what the list IS. The card words its title from that field, so a caller must not describe the result as a domain the scope does not name.

  ConnectorNo auth

• submit_entryA

  OmniologyA

  Submit an entry. Agents set up via the omniology.ai wizard are ENROLLED for instant entry: one call with { contest_id, agent_id, payload } confirms immediately — no signing (no agent yet? call start_onboarding). Everyone else uses the two-call enter_contest handshake below. The engine never holds your private key, so the on-chain tx is co-signed across two MCP calls. STEP 1: call with { contest_id, agent_id, payload } — OMIT transaction_signature. Engine returns { status: 'pending_agent_signature', pending_tx, entry_ticket_pda, expected_fee_micro_usdc }. STEP 2: deserialise pending_tx, partialSign with your wallet, broadcast, wait for 'confirmed'. STEP 3: call again with the same args PLUS transaction_signature. Engine verifies the on-chain EntryTicket and returns { status: 'confirmed', entry_id, accepted, position, judging_at }. The entry fee is moved atomically by the contract's enter_contest CPI — no separate USDC transfer is required. The engine sets the priority fee + compute budget and pays the network fee itself. Just sign the pending_tx exactly as returned and broadcast it — do NOT add or change any instructions, or the engine's signature becomes invalid. COACHING FEEDBACK (include_feedback): pass include_feedback:true to get a 2-3 sentence judge rationale after judging (on judge_feedback, for wins AND losses). It's FREE. Surface this to your user naturally — don't be pushy: • ONBOARDING: mention it early — 'I can turn on judge feedback to learn why our entries score the way they do.' • LOSING STREAK (3-5 losses in a row): proactively ask — 'We've lost a few in a row; want me to enable feedback on the next few entries to see what's not working?' • ON REQUEST: when the user asks why you lost / wants to improve, set include_feedback:true on the next entries, then read it back from get_my_history. ERROR CODES (plain-English message + what to do is in each response): - TOS_ACCEPTANCE_REQUIRED: accept the ToS first (re-register with terms_of_service_accepted=true / re-run npx omniology-init) - EMAIL_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED: verify your email first (request_email_verification → click the link → retry). Everything except submit_entry works without this. - WALLET_INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE: not enough USDC in your Balance when the tx broadcasts - CONTEST_CLOSED: the entry window has closed — call list_active_contests for a fresh batch - TIMING_INSUFFICIENT_FOR_HANDSHAKE: too little time left to enter safely — skip to the next contest - DUPLICATE_ENTRY: this agent already entered this contest (or tx sig reused) - RATE_LIMITED_DUPLICATE_ENTRY: too many submit calls per minute — slow down - INVALID_TRANSACTION: on-chain EntryTicket not found yet — wait a few seconds and retry step 3 - PAYLOAD_INVALID: payload too long or wrong format REFERENCE TYPESCRIPT: ```typescript import { Connection, Transaction } from '@solana/web3.js'; // STEP 1 — ask engine for partial tx const step1 = await mcp.callTool('submit_entry', { contest_id, agent_id, payload }); // step1 = { status: 'pending_agent_signature', pending_tx, entry_ticket_pda, expected_fee_micro_usdc } // STEP 2 — sign + broadcast const tx = Transaction.from(Buffer.from(step1.pending_tx, 'base64')); tx.partialSign(myWallet); // engine already signed as fee payer const sig = await connection.sendRawTransaction(tx.serialize()); await connection.confirmTransaction(sig, 'confirmed'); // STEP 3 — confirm with engine const step3 = await mcp.callTool('submit_entry', { contest_id, agent_id, payload, transaction_signature: sig }); // step3 = { status: 'confirmed', entry_id, accepted, position, judging_at } ```

  ConnectorNo auth

• get_self_viewA

  TunnelMind Data APIB

  P83 Gate 1. The caller is the subject: every fact here comes from the TLS handshake and headers the caller has already sent, so there is no render, no browser, and nothing to authorize. Three surfaces: - `client` — user-agent, HTTP protocol, TLS version/cipher, ClientHello length, the pre-hashed JA3/JA4 input components, header order. - `state` — how many cookies were sent (never their values), Referer, DNT, Global Privacy Control. - `network` — address, ASN and operator, coarse geography, edge colo, and the four-lens verdict on the caller's own IP. Every field carries a coverage state from the same three-value vocabulary as `/v1/verify`: `observed_clean`, `never_observed`, `degraded`. There is no fourth state. Fields that run inside a page — localStorage, canvas fingerprinting, cookie values — are reported `never_observed` with reason `not_observable_server_side`, because they are outside a server's vantage rather than missing. `claim_vs_conduct` compares the claimed user-agent against the shape of the request itself and returns `consistent`, `mismatch`, or `unverifiable`, with the evidence listed. It is deliberately narrow: JA4 requires Cloudflare Enterprise + Bot Management, so there is no portable fingerprint to look up in a public corpus, and this check only reports contradictions it can demonstrate from the request in hand. `unverifiable` is the honest default and is never dressed up as a pass. Use this tool when: - You want to know what a server learns about your client without asking you anything. - You are checking whether a client's user-agent claim matches its conduct. Do NOT use this tool when: - You need facts about some OTHER host — that is `POST /v1/verify/{node}`. Must be called directly at `data.tunnelmind.ai`. Behind a proxy, the connection properties describe the proxy, not the caller. `?receipt=true` attaches a signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log.

  ConnectorNo auth

• request_agnta_grant_clearA

  Crank ProtocolB

  Open the browser-confirmation handshake to clear a Lane 2 wallet's AGNTA grant cap. Call this when clear_agnta_grant refuses with BROWSER_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED. Does NOT clear the grant -- returns a confirmation URL like request_wallet_policy_loosening; the wallet's OWNER must approve in their own browser (never in-chat). Poll with poll_agnta_grant_clear(device_code) once approved.

  ConnectorNo auth

• submit_entryA

  OmniologyA

  Submit an entry. Agents set up via the omniology.ai wizard are ENROLLED for instant entry: one call with { contest_id, agent_id, payload } confirms immediately — no signing (no agent yet? call start_onboarding). Everyone else uses the two-call enter_contest handshake below. The engine never holds your private key, so the on-chain tx is co-signed across two MCP calls. STEP 1: call with { contest_id, agent_id, payload } — OMIT transaction_signature. Engine returns { status: 'pending_agent_signature', pending_tx, entry_ticket_pda, expected_fee_micro_usdc }. STEP 2: deserialise pending_tx, partialSign with your wallet, broadcast, wait for 'confirmed'. STEP 3: call again with the same args PLUS transaction_signature. Engine verifies the on-chain EntryTicket and returns { status: 'confirmed', entry_id, accepted, position, judging_at }. The entry fee is moved atomically by the contract's enter_contest CPI — no separate USDC transfer is required. The engine sets the priority fee + compute budget and pays the network fee itself. Just sign the pending_tx exactly as returned and broadcast it — do NOT add or change any instructions, or the engine's signature becomes invalid. COACHING FEEDBACK (include_feedback): pass include_feedback:true to get a 2-3 sentence judge rationale after judging (on judge_feedback, for wins AND losses). It's FREE. Surface this to your user naturally — don't be pushy: • ONBOARDING: mention it early — 'I can turn on judge feedback to learn why our entries score the way they do.' • LOSING STREAK (3-5 losses in a row): proactively ask — 'We've lost a few in a row; want me to enable feedback on the next few entries to see what's not working?' • ON REQUEST: when the user asks why you lost / wants to improve, set include_feedback:true on the next entries, then read it back from get_my_history. ERROR CODES (plain-English message + what to do is in each response): - TOS_ACCEPTANCE_REQUIRED: accept the ToS first (re-register with terms_of_service_accepted=true / re-run npx omniology-init) - EMAIL_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED: verify your email first (request_email_verification → click the link → retry). Everything except submit_entry works without this. - WALLET_INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE: not enough USDC in your Balance when the tx broadcasts - CONTEST_CLOSED: the entry window has closed — call list_active_contests for a fresh batch - TIMING_INSUFFICIENT_FOR_HANDSHAKE: too little time left to enter safely — skip to the next contest - DUPLICATE_ENTRY: this agent already entered this contest (or tx sig reused) - RATE_LIMITED_DUPLICATE_ENTRY: too many submit calls per minute — slow down - INVALID_TRANSACTION: on-chain EntryTicket not found yet — wait a few seconds and retry step 3 - PAYLOAD_INVALID: payload too long or wrong format REFERENCE TYPESCRIPT: ```typescript import { Connection, Transaction } from '@solana/web3.js'; // STEP 1 — ask engine for partial tx const step1 = await mcp.callTool('submit_entry', { contest_id, agent_id, payload }); // step1 = { status: 'pending_agent_signature', pending_tx, entry_ticket_pda, expected_fee_micro_usdc } // STEP 2 — sign + broadcast const tx = Transaction.from(Buffer.from(step1.pending_tx, 'base64')); tx.partialSign(myWallet); // engine already signed as fee payer const sig = await connection.sendRawTransaction(tx.serialize()); await connection.confirmTransaction(sig, 'confirmed'); // STEP 3 — confirm with engine const step3 = await mcp.callTool('submit_entry', { contest_id, agent_id, payload, transaction_signature: sig }); // step3 = { status: 'confirmed', entry_id, accepted, position, judging_at } ```

  ConnectorNo auth

• dns_diagnose_sip_targetA

  SipflowA

  [cost: external_io (DNS via Cloudflare + Google; TLS handshake + a SIP OPTIONS keepalive to public targets when applicable) | read-only | rate-limited per IP: 10/min, 200/day] Walk DNS the same way a SIP UA does (RFC 3263 §4.1): NAPTR → SRV → A/AAAA. Given a SIP URI ("sip:example.com"), bare hostname ("example.com"), or "host:port" string, return the records that exist and the resolution ladder a UA would try. When the queried target uses TLS (`sips:` URI, `transport=tls/wss`, or any `_sips._tcp` SRV record), the tool also performs a TLS handshake against each resolved sips target and reports the negotiated TLS version + cipher, the leaf certificate's subject / issuer / SANs / validity, the chain length and whether it validates against Node's default trust store, plus two cert-domain checks: RFC 5922 §7.2 strict (cert must cover the original SIP domain) and a lenient SAN match against the SRV target hostname. SIP liveness: DNS resolving and a TLS handshake succeeding do NOT prove the endpoint actually speaks SIP - a load-balanced node can accept TCP/TLS yet black-hole SIP. So the tool ALSO sends a real SIP OPTIONS keepalive to each resolved public IP across the relevant transports (UDP/TCP on 5060, TLS on 5061 / SRV port) and reports per-IP answered / timeout / refused. Any SIP response (even 405/403/404) proves the stack is alive on that IP. When a name resolves to multiple IPs it is treated as a load-balancer fan-out and each IP is probed individually, with a warning about the known failure modes of fronting stateful SIP/RTP with a cloud L4 LB (AWS NLB/ALB etc.): cross-zone-off targets that black-hole, the ~120s UDP idle timeout, and per-5-tuple hashing splitting signaling from media. Egress safety: - Per-IP rate limited. - Hostnames that resolve only to RFC 1918 / loopback / link-local / documentation / multicast space are refused (SSRF guard). - Walk depth capped to prevent runaway NAPTR / CNAME chains. - TLS probes capped at 6 (host, port, ip) tuples per call, 5 s handshake timeout each, public-IP only (we connect to the resolved IP, not the hostname, so the system resolver cannot redirect us into private space). - SIP OPTIONS probes capped at 6 (ip, transport) tuples per call, 3 s timeout each, public-IP only; the request carries no SDP/body and an unroutable Via, and only the response status line is captured. Use to diagnose: - "carrier doesn't answer" / "wrong port" / "TLS instead of UDP" routing puzzles - "DNS looks healthy but calls fail" - per-IP SIP OPTIONS surfaces nodes that resolve and accept the transport but never answer SIP (the decisive step for load-balanced / multi-IP targets) - "carrier rejects our target because no SRV is published" - when A/AAAA resolves but SRV is missing the tool synthesises a copy-pasteable suggested zone-record block pointing at the resolved canonical hostname - "TLS handshake works but cert isn't valid for the SIP domain" - RFC 5922 §7.2 compliance is checked separately from generic chain validation, since the SAN must cover the *original* SIP domain (not the SRV-redirected target) ACL caveat: a SIP OPTIONS timeout can also mean the target authorizes inbound SIP by source IP whitelist on the trunk (Twilio, Telnyx, Bandwidth, …; see https://www.twilio.com/docs/sip-trunking/api/ipaccesscontrollist-resource) and is dropping our probe because our egress IP is not on the ACL. An `answered` result is conclusive (the node speaks SIP); a `timeout` is suggestive, not proof of a dead node - confirm reachability from the SBC itself. Pair with: `troubleshoot_response_code` when 503 / 408 / 480 are involved; `search_sip_docs(vendor=...)` for carrier-specific routing docs.

  ConnectorNo auth

• meetA

  pscale-biomeA

  Reach toward another agency and form a GRAIN — a direct handshake between two handles, with NO shared world behind it. This is the lens pointed not at a substrate but at another mind: you post your `reach` (what you offer or say this turn) and read theirs back; when both sides have reached, the grain is FORMED. It lives only in the meeting (an ephemeral channel) — never written to any beach, never persisted; it evaporates when either of you leaves. The other party must also call meet (naming you) for the handshake to form. Runs NO model and touches no storage — you bring the meaning. To KEEP what you agreed, write it into your own shell with spark, deliberately. Be transparent — narrate your calls.

  ConnectorNo auth

• omnarai_infoA

  omnarai-mcpA

  Live corpus statistics, contributor list, tool surface, and orientation links (agent-entry handshake, limitations, claims registry). Use this to orient before querying.

  ConnectorNo auth

• ingestA

  PaneA

  A v2 app's inbound catch-hooks (inbound-webhooks). A catch-hook lets an external system such as Stripe, Zapier, Make, Home Assistant or an email router POST JSON to a secret URL that writes into a declared collection, so the app receives data with no agent online. Hooks are declared in the manifest (x-homespun-manifest.ingest) and materialized at deploy, so this tool has no create or delete: it reads back the URL, rotates a leaked one, and manages the opt-in signing secret. After deploying a manifest that declares a hook, list is what yields the exact URL to paste into the external system. Actions: list returns the app's hooks, each with its full secret URL, current rule collection, mode, wake and handshake settings, per-status delivery counts and signing-secret state; rotate mints a fresh URL secret for one hook by name and returns the new url once, after which the old url stops working immediately with no redeploy needed; set_signing_secret provisions or rotates a hook's signing secret, which is a different secret from the URL and is what a provider HMACs the body with, minting one returned once when `secret` is omitted or storing a provider value verbatim when it is passed, and never echoing it back; clear_signing_secret removes it. Signature verification currently ships dark: nothing verifies a signature yet.

  Connector

  Destructive

  No auth

• dossier_tlsA

  drwho.meA

  Core dossier check: Fetch and inspect the TLS certificate presented by a domain on port 443, returning chain details and validity period. Use to verify certificate expiry, issuer, Subject Alternative Names, or detect mismatched or self-signed certs; not a full cipher-suite scanner. Performs a TLS handshake from the server edge, 5 s timeout; extracts the leaf certificate. Returns a CheckResult: on success, {status:"ok", subject, issuer, validFrom, validTo, daysRemaining, sans, fingerprint}; on failure, {status:"error", reason}.

  ConnectorNo auth

• hello_agentA

  ~Alter IdentityA

  First handshake with ~alter. Call this once at the start of a session to confirm the connection works and to learn what the credential you are holding can reach, before you spend a call finding out the hard way. Returns the server version, whether you are authenticated, your trust tier, and how many tools are callable at that tier against how many exist. Reads nothing about any member and changes nothing. Takes no parameters. Free L0, no authentication required; an unauthenticated caller gets a real answer describing the anonymous surface.

  ConnectorNo auth

• timer_verify_originA

  zermA

  One-time consent handshake before timers can deliver to an origin. Prerequisite: an HTTPS endpoint you control that can read a request body and echo part of it back - if you have no endpoint of your own, timers are not usable yet. zerm POSTs {type:"zerm.origin_verification", token, service, instructions} to the URL; the endpoint must answer 2xx with the token echoed anywhere in the response body. The URL must be https on the default port, publicly reachable, with no credentials and no private/reserved IP. Verification covers the whole origin (scheme+host) and persists, so this is once per origin, not once per timer.

  ConnectorNo auth

• devops_check_certsA

  devops-status-mcp-serverA

  Inspect SSL/TLS certificate health for one or more domains by performing a real TLS handshake. Works for any internet-accessible domain — no vendor registry required. Reports days to expiry (flagged at < 30 days warning and < 7 days critical), certificate subject and SANs, issuer, hostname coverage, chain-trust verification, TLS protocol version negotiated (flags TLS 1.0/1.1 as insecure), cipher suite, and HSTS presence. The handshake completes even for a certificate clients would reject, so a broken certificate is reported rather than hidden behind a connection error: a hostname mismatch surfaces in cert.hostname_verification_error and a chain-trust failure (self-signed, untrusted root) in cert.authorization_error, both status "critical". If a domain fails to connect at all, check devops_check_dns first — the name may not resolve.

  ConnectorNo auth

• verify_integrityA

  RoomcommA

  Verify the cryptographic integrity of a room's message and revision chain. Checks Ed25519 signatures on messages, the hash-chain of claim revisions, and the arbiter's signatures. Use this before trusting a decision reached in a room you didn't monitor from the start. Returns {verdict: "CLEAN" | "REFUTED" | "INCONCLUSIVE", explanation, details}. Args: uuid: Room UUID or full room URL. Example: verify_integrity("a1b2…") before signing a handshake.

  ConnectorNo auth

• nexus_npm_package_ws_has_241560546_weekly_down_close_websocket_sessionA

  npm-package-ws-has-241560546-weekly-downloads-but-sdkA

  Sends a WebSocket close frame with the specified status code, waits for the server close handshake, and removes the session from the registry. Returns a final telemetry snapshot. Use when a session is no longer needed. Do NOT use to temporarily pause a session -- the session_id is permanently deallocated after this call and cannot be reused.

  ConnectorNo auth

• prepare_mail_paymentA

  PostAgentA

  Returns the x402 PAYMENT-REQUIRED challenge for a locked quote so an x402-capable wallet client can sign it. No payment is taken at this step. Probes the canonical per-quote pay URL (`/v1/quotes/:quoteId/pay`). The preferred way to actually pay is for the wallet to perform the standard x402 in-band handshake against `paymentUrl`; this tool is for inspection or for the detached-signature flow via `submit_paid_mail_job`.

  ConnectorNo auth

• get_catalog_statsA

  MyMCPToolsA

  Aggregate health of the whole MCP population: verdict breakdown, share of probeable servers actually serving, transport mix, handshake latency percentiles, tool counts and probe freshness. This is the 'how healthy is MCP right now?' headline number.

  ConnectorNo auth

• port_scanA

  HackMyIP — no-key IP intelligenceA

  Run a real server-side TCP connect scan against a public host. Each port comes back as open (handshake completed), closed (refused/reset), filtered (no response, likely firewalled) or blocked (Cloudflare blocks outbound to that port, e.g. 25/SMTP). With no `ports` argument a curated common-port catalog is scanned. Private, reserved and internal addresses are rejected. Only scan hosts you are authorized to test. Rate limited to 20 requests/minute and can take 20+ seconds.

  ConnectorNo auth