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522,894 tools. Updated 2026-09-06 13:24

"DTS" matching MCP tools:

  • Validate an SPF record and count what it costs. Returns `record_valid` (the record parses as RFC 7208 SPF), `findings` (per-term diagnostics), `has_pass_all` (a `+all` that authorizes the whole internet to send as this domain), `multiple_all` (more than one `all`, which makes everything after the first unreachable), the parsed `terms`, and the lookup count against the limit of 10 with `over_limit`/`near_limit` and the `offending_mechanisms` that push it over. Pass EXACTLY ONE of `domain` (resolves the published record and counts recursively through nested includes) or `record` (parses a pasted record, its own terms only). This is the SPF validator — there is no separate one. Diagnose-only: no SPF fix record is ever returned, because removing a mechanism can silently de-authorize a real sender — relay the findings and let the domain's owner decide what to drop.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Read the monitoring alert log for the domains the caller's account monitors, newest first. Requires an API token. Each row carries id, domain, type, check, summary, a deterministic detail map, created_at, email_sent_at, acknowledged_at and delivery_class — a 'dashboard_only' row was deliberately kept out of the digest mail, so an agent watching only the inbox would never see it; this log is the complete picture. PAGE DOWN BEFORE ADVANCING `since`: next_before is non-null exactly when older rows remain, and a caller that ignores it, takes a full page and moves its watermark to the newest row it saw drops every row it did not receive. `since` is an INCLUSIVE floor, so rows repeat rather than go missing — de-duplicate on id. READ-ONLY by decision: there is no ack and no delete here, because acknowledging an alert is the human's own triage on their dashboard and an agent that acks on their behalf silences a row they have never seen. Report what the log says and let them clear it.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Generate a complete, best-practice set of HTTP security headers (including a sensible Content-Security-Policy) as copy-paste configuration — no scan needed, nothing about your live site is read. Pick a `preset`: 'recommended' is a safe baseline that works for most sites, 'strict' is hardened with a nonce-based CSP for higher security, and 'report-only' puts the CSP in report-only mode so you can roll it out and watch for breakage before enforcing it. Advanced users can instead pass a full `config` object to fine-tune every header; if you pass neither, it defaults to 'recommended'. Returns the resulting headers as name/value pairs, plus ready-to-paste output for nginx, Apache, Caddy, Cloudflare, a Netlify/Cloudflare-Pages `_headers` file, and raw headers, along with any warnings. Use this to set up headers on a new or unscanned site; use analyze_security_headers first when you want to see what an existing site is already missing.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Build an SPF (Sender Policy Framework) record — the DNS TXT record that lists which servers may send mail for a domain. Pass the senders as `mechanisms`: `include` for a provider's own SPF (Google Workspace is `_spf.google.com`, Microsoft 365 is `spf.protection.outlook.com`, SendGrid is `sendgrid.net`), `ip4`/`ip6` for your own servers, plus `useMx`/`useA` to authorise the domain's own MX or A records. The `policy` decides what receivers do with mail from anywhere else: 'fail' (-all, the production choice), 'softfail' (~all, for testing), 'neutral', or 'pass' (+all, which authorises the entire internet and should never be published). SPF is limited to ten DNS-triggering terms during recursive evaluation. This pure builder counts direct mechanisms; include and redirect targets can add nested lookups, so validate the published record with check_spf before treating the count as final. Returns the record, direct lookup count, whether that direct count or the 255-character limit is exceeded, plain-language warnings, and the DNS entry to publish. Use check_spf to resolve and validate a live record, and flatten_spf only when an existing record is over the limit. Nothing is looked up or stored — this is computation only.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Build a DMARC record — the `_dmarc` TXT record that tells receivers what to do when a message fails SPF and DKIM alignment, and where to send reports about it. The risk here is not syntax but policy. `p=none` monitors without affecting delivery and is where every deployment starts; `p=quarantine` sends failures to spam; `p=reject` refuses them outright, which silently destroys legitimate mail from any sender that was missed and gives that sender no explanation. Always publish a `rua` address: without aggregate reports there is no way to see which senders fail before enforcing against them. Use `percentage` to apply an enforcing policy to only part of the mail while rolling out. Returns the record, the host to publish it on (`_dmarc`), and warnings covering the mistakes that actually break mail — enforcing without reporting, reject at full coverage, pct at p=none, and strict alignment breaking subdomain senders and ESPs. Nothing is looked up or stored.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Check whether a payment you already attempted was recorded, BEFORE you retry and risk spending twice. Pass the request_key you sent as the Idempotency-Key header on the paid request. Returns state 'settled' (we hold a receipt — do NOT pay again) or 'not_found' (we have no record — retrying is safe). Use this when a paid call timed out or its response was lost: on rails where the facilitator broadcasts, you never learn the transaction hash unless our response reaches you, so this key is the only thing that can answer. The key is a bearer secret — whoever presents it gets the receipt.
    ConnectorNo auth

Matching MCP Servers

  • F
    license
    Not graded
    quality
    C
    maintenance
    Enables uploading source data, queuing Windows DTS Engine publishing jobs, monitoring them, and downloading hash-verified 3DT results.
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  • A
    license
    A
    quality
    B
    maintenance
    MCP server for DTS Engine 6.1 that enables agents to create, validate, and run 3D digital-twin tile publishing pipelines from shapefiles, photogrammetry, DEM/DOM, BIM, and point clouds, with tools for pipeline introspection, error resolution, and OSGB publishing.
    8
    MIT

Matching MCP Connectors

  • Scan, fix and verify DNS: SPF, DMARC, DKIM, propagation, DNS health, expiry. Validated fixes.

  • Live DNS lookups for agents: A/MX/TXT/SPF/CNAME/PTR with TTLs and DNSSEC, via Google Public DNS.

  • Build the three-record hardening pack that makes a NON-SENDING domain unusable for spoofing: a Null MX, a hard-fail SPF record, and a p=reject; np=reject DMARC record. For parked, redirect and brand-defensive domains only — NEVER for a domain that sends any mail, including transactional or one legacy system. Do NOT set confirm_no_mail on your own judgment or because a scan looked quiet: only the human who owns the domain can confirm it sends nothing, so ask them first. That flag unlocks the question, not the answer — the server re-checks DNS itself (existence, MX, SPF, DKIM selectors) and returns records: null with a rationale when it finds evidence of mail; relay that rationale rather than retrying. A lookup failure is reported as a failure, never as a pack. Publishing is the human's decision: present the records verbatim, in the order given, and let them approve each one.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Read-only DNS record lookup via DNS-over-HTTPS. Pass `type` for a single record type or `types` for an array; if both omitted, returns A records. Returns parsed answers with TTL, raw rdata, and DNSSEC AD bit. Use for arbitrary record queries; use validate_dnssec for full DNSSEC chain validation, or check_dns_propagation for multi-resolver consensus. No auth, no rate limits beyond upstream resolver.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Compare DNS responses across the nine currently configured public and authoritative resolvers to detect propagation lag, missing answers, or inconsistent TTL/data values. Defaults to record type A and region 'all'. Returns every resolver response plus a propagation percentage and explicit inconsistency list. Use when records were just changed and you suspect staleness; for a single DNS-over-HTTPS lookup use lookup_dns instead. Read-only HTTP, no auth, and no destructive actions.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Read-only TLSA/DANE DNS record check. With no port, resolves MX hosts and validates their `_25._tcp` TLSA tuple syntax; with an explicit port, queries `_<port>._<protocol>.<domain>`. Returns parsed usage, selector, matching type, certificate data, syntax errors, and best-practice advisories. It does not fetch or cryptographically match the live service certificate, so pair it with check_smtp_tls for SMTP certificate evidence. Use before publishing DANE records or troubleshooting DANE handover. No auth or destructive actions.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Read-only DKIM check for a domain. Without `selector`, heuristically queries 50 common selectors and explicitly reports that a miss is inconclusive because DKIM has no enumeration protocol. With `selector`, performs one authoritative exact lookup for a selector obtained from a DKIM-Signature header or mail provider. Returns discovery method, coverage note, parsed key tags, public-key strength, and warnings. Use exact mode whenever the selector is known; use check_email_security for the broader SPF/DKIM/DMARC overview. No auth or destructive actions.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Read-only BIMI readiness check. Parses the `default._bimi` TXT record, safely fetches the referenced HTTPS SVG, and parses basic metadata from an optional VMC/CMC authority certificate. Returns record syntax, URL reachability/content type, certificate subject/issuer/validity dates, and explicit issues. It does not certify SVG Tiny PS profile compliance, validate the full mark-certificate trust chain, verify trademark ownership, or guarantee logo display by any mailbox provider. Use for a technical preflight before a formal BIMI/VMC review. No auth or destructive actions.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Read-only fetch of the public IntoDNS.ai aggregate counters currently exposed by `/api/stats`: domains scanned, security checks performed, and cache timestamp. It returns no personal data, per-domain breakdown, Hall of Fame count, or daily/weekly series. Use for a lightweight public usage snapshot or status display; use get_hall_of_fame for top-scoring public domains. Single unauthenticated GET with no destructive actions.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Build the direct SVG badge URL for a domain's security score. Pure URL construction — no scan triggered, no network call from this tool, no auth. Returns a JSON object with `badgeUrl` ready to embed in README.md, GitHub, status pages, or wikis. Style options: flat (default), flat-square, plastic, large. Use for embeddable status badges; use get_pdf_report_link for a downloadable full report URL instead.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Tell the Pipeworx team something is broken, missing, or needs to exist. Use when a tool returns wrong/stale data (bug), when a tool you wish existed isn't in the catalog (feature/data_gap), or when something worked surprisingly well (praise). ONLY for tools served by this Pipeworx connection — if the tool came from a different MCP server in your client (another vendor's Gmail, Splunk, Slack, etc. connector), we cannot fix it and reporting it here only delays you; file it with that server instead. Not sure? Pipeworx tool names are the ones this connection lists. Describe the issue in terms of Pipeworx tools/packs — don't paste the end-user's prompt. Filing without an account returns a `claim_token`; pass it back later as pipeworx_feedback({claim_token:"pwfb_…"}) to read whether it was fixed and what changed. The team reads digests daily and signal directly affects roadmap. Rate-limited to 5 per identifier per day. Free; doesn't count against your tool-call quota.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • ACCOUNT REQUIRED (free — sign in via GitHub at https://pipeworx.io/signup; depth:"thorough" needs a paid plan). If you are not signed in, use ask_pipeworx instead — it works on every tier. Grounded multi-source research across Pipeworx's 1517 STRUCTURED data sources (SEC filings, FRED/BLS economics, FDA, USPTO patents, markets, science, government records, etc.) in ONE call — this is NOT open-web search. Decomposes your question into focused facets, routes each to the right one of 5,798 tools IN PARALLEL, and returns a findings packet: verbatim evidence + confidence + source + fetched_at + a stable pipeworx:// citation per finding, with explicit gaps[] for facets the data couldn't answer (never invented). Best for broad/multi-part questions over structured data ("compare X and Y's regulatory + financial exposure", "research the filings + market picture for ACME"). For a single lookup use ask_pipeworx (one LLM call, not many). For BREAKING or colloquial CURRENT-NEWS / "what's the world saying about X" topics, prefer ask_pipeworx — it routes to live news APIs and the *-news-feeds packs; deep_research returns mostly empty gaps[] when the topic isn't in the structured catalog. Second-hop iteration: depth:"standard" re-angles unanswered gaps (gap recovery); depth:"thorough" additionally chases the best leads from the first pass — so multi-step questions resolve in one call. Every finding carries a `hop` field and a citation_uri — a resolvable pipeworx:// record URI, present only when the source emits one that resources/read can actually serve, so a citation you get back is always fetchable. "standard" and "thorough" also return contradictions[] flagging findings that disagree. Large records are semantically excerpted to the passages relevant to each facet (not head-truncated), so answers deep in a long filing/series aren't missed. Expect 15-60s (thorough with its follow-up + contradiction pass: up to ~90s).
    ConnectorNo auth
  • ACCOUNT REQUIRED (free — sign in via GitHub at https://pipeworx.io/signup; depth:"thorough" needs a paid plan). If you are not signed in, use ask_pipeworx instead — it works on every tier. Grounded multi-source research across Pipeworx's 1517 STRUCTURED data sources (SEC filings, FRED/BLS economics, FDA, USPTO patents, markets, science, government records, etc.) in ONE call — this is NOT open-web search. Decomposes your question into focused facets, routes each to the right one of 5,798 tools IN PARALLEL, and returns a findings packet: verbatim evidence + confidence + source + fetched_at + a stable pipeworx:// citation per finding, with explicit gaps[] for facets the data couldn't answer (never invented). Best for broad/multi-part questions over structured data ("compare X and Y's regulatory + financial exposure", "research the filings + market picture for ACME"). For a single lookup use ask_pipeworx (one LLM call, not many). For BREAKING or colloquial CURRENT-NEWS / "what's the world saying about X" topics, prefer ask_pipeworx — it routes to live news APIs and the *-news-feeds packs; deep_research returns mostly empty gaps[] when the topic isn't in the structured catalog. Second-hop iteration: depth:"standard" re-angles unanswered gaps (gap recovery); depth:"thorough" additionally chases the best leads from the first pass — so multi-step questions resolve in one call. Every finding carries a `hop` field and a citation_uri — a resolvable pipeworx:// record URI, present only when the source emits one that resources/read can actually serve, so a citation you get back is always fetchable. "standard" and "thorough" also return contradictions[] flagging findings that disagree. Large records are semantically excerpted to the passages relevant to each facet (not head-truncated), so answers deep in a long filing/series aren't missed. Expect 15-60s (thorough with its follow-up + contradiction pass: up to ~90s).
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Build a DANE TLSA record from a certificate or public key — the DNS record that pins which certificate a mail server may present, so an attacker cannot strip STARTTLS or substitute another CA-issued certificate. Paste the PEM (a CERTIFICATE or PUBLIC KEY block) as `pem`; the hash is computed here because a language model cannot hash. Never send a private key: none is needed and the request is refused if one is present. The three numbers: `usage` 3 (DANE-EE) pins the end-entity key and needs no CA, `selector` 1 hashes the SubjectPublicKeyInfo, `matching` 1 is SHA-256 — the 3 1 1 profile recommended for SMTP, because it survives certificate renewal as long as the key is reused. `host` must be the mail server hostname from the MX record, not the domain. Two things break DANE and both are reported: a TLSA record in a zone without DNSSEC proves nothing and is ignored, and DANE fails closed, so installing a new certificate before the matching record has propagated stops mail from every sender that validates. Returns the record, the hash, what each number means, and the DNS entry.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Force a fresh scan of a domain and return its full report: seven deterministic checks — SPF, DKIM, DMARC, MX, DNS hardening, domain/TLS expiry and blacklist listing — each with a status (pass/warn/fail/info/temperror), the observed record, and a fixengine-generated fix_record where one exists. Explanations are cache-first. A repeat scan of the same domain within the dedup window (about a minute) reuses the stored report rather than re-reading DNS, so `scanned_at` may predate a DNS change you just made — when you are verifying an edit, check `scanned_at` and call again after the window rather than treating an unchanged report as the new state. Use this when you need current state; use get_report when a recent cached answer will do.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Audit a domain’s nameserver delegation and redundancy. Identifies the DNS hosting provider and, when the infrastructure probe is available, directly compares parent and child NS sets, verifies authoritative AA responses, and checks required glue addresses. Use to detect stale registrar delegations, lame nameservers, and intermittent resolution risk. Part of the scan_domain audit.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Check whether a domain has SMTP TLS Reporting (TLS-RPT) configured. Queries _smtp._tls.<domain> for the v=TLSRPTv1 record and validates its reporting destination (rua= mailto:/https:), flagging a missing record, duplicate records, or an invalid/absent reporting URI. Complements MTA-STS by giving visibility into TLS delivery failures. Part of the scan_domain audit.
    ConnectorNo auth