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524,660 tools. Updated 2026-09-06 17:35

"A server for executing Python code, with support for MCP" matching MCP tools:

  • Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Redeem the emailed 6-digit code for a reveal-once workspace API key. UNAUTHENTICATED. `email` + `code` must match a code issued by signup(email) within the last 15 minutes (5 attempts max). The returned `api_key` is shown exactly ONCE — store it ONLY in the MCP client config ("Authorization: Bearer <api_key>"), NEVER in a repo or a file you might commit. Then reconnect this server with the header set and call get_onboarding_status(). An invalid/expired/consumed code returns a uniform error — call signup(email) for a fresh one.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Get Lenny Zeltser's CTI cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `cti_load_context`. This server never requests your campaign or threat-intel notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—templates and guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Scan a public GitHub MCP-server repository for security issues. Clones the repo (shallow, <60s, <200 MB), runs compuute-scan v0.6.2 in static analysis mode (no code execution from the target), and returns a structured report with severity counts, a 0-100 score, and the 10 most severe findings. WHEN TO USE: - Before connecting to an unknown MCP server discovered via Anthropic Registry, Smithery, mcp.so, or a Discord recommendation. - Before installing a third-party MCP-server package into a production pipeline. - As part of an agent's pre-commit / pre-deploy due-diligence step when adding new dependencies. - As one input to a multi-source trust evaluation (combine with publisher reputation, package install count, last-update recency). WHEN NOT TO USE: - For private repos. Use the on-prem CLI instead: `npx compuute-scan ./path-to-private-repo` - For deep exploitability assessment of a specific code path. This is pattern matching, not dataflow analysis. Book a manual L2-L4 audit at https://compuute.se/audit for that depth. - For non-GitHub hosts (GitLab, Bitbucket, self-hosted). v1 supports github.com only. - For repos > 200 MB or clone time > 60s. The endpoint returns a 413 or 504 in those cases — fall back to local CLI. EXPECTED RESPONSE TIME: - Median: ~1-2 seconds for small repos (<100 files). - p99: ~10 seconds for medium repos. - Hard timeout at clone=60s, scan=120s combined. EXPECTED COST: - Free tier in MVP. Future Pro tier may charge per-scan or per-month. DATA FRESHNESS: - Scanner version is reported in response.scanner.version. - L1 rule set freshness reflects compuute-scan releases — see github.com/Compuute/compuute-scan/CHANGELOG.md for the latest CVE and threat-intel response timeline. EXAMPLES: Example 1 — scan an MCP server you're evaluating: github_url = "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers" → score: 0, summary: {critical: 1, high: 94, medium: 22} → top_findings include SSRF, eval, etc. → recommendation: "AVOID — 1 critical and 94 high finding(s)..." Example 2 — scan a clean reference implementation: github_url = "https://github.com/microsoft/azure-devops-mcp" → score: 90+, summary: {critical: 0, high: 1} → recommendation: "REVIEW — 1 high finding(s)..." Example 3 — scan your own dev MCP-server before publishing: github_url = "https://github.com/yourorg/your-mcp" → audit your own surface before others install it OUTPUT FIELDS (stable schema): - repo_url (str): canonical URL of the scanned repo. - score (int): 0-100, higher safer. Coarse summary, not a precision claim. - summary (object): {critical, high, medium, low, info, files_scanned}. - recommendation (str): action guidance derived from severity counts. - findings_count (int): total raw findings (may include false positives). - top_findings (list): up to 10 most severe, each with {id, title, severity, file, line, owasp, cwe}. - l0_discovery (object): MCP transport, tool count, dependency pinning. - performance (object): clone_seconds, scan_seconds, repo_size_bytes. - scanner (object): {name, version, layers_covered}. - _disclaimer (str): MANDATORY triage disclaimer. Read it. Args: github_url: Public GitHub HTTPS URL (e.g. https://github.com/org/repo). Must be public and < 200 MB. v1 is github.com only. Returns: Structured scan result. On error, returns {"error": code, "message": ...} with HTTP-style code (invalid_url, clone_failed, scan_timeout, etc.).
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Get the actual Python code behind a community leaderboard strategy. Use after `browse_community`: pass an entry's `id` here to read its real `feature_engineering()` + `strategy_config()` source so the user can inspect or tweak it. To deploy it unchanged, pass the same id to `one_shot` as `community_id`. Read-only, no signup needed. Args: community_id: The `id` of a community entry (from `browse_community`). Returns: dict with: id, title, username, description, symbol, timeframe, metrics {total_ret, win_rate, profit_factor, n_trades, mdd, sharpe_strat}, and `code` (the full Python source). SHOW the code to the user, and offer to deploy it via one_shot(community_id=...) or tweak it first.
    ConnectorNo auth

Matching MCP Servers

Matching MCP Connectors

  • Proves AI-generated Python does what you asked: lint, types, security, sandbox run, exact fixes.

  • Security + bug + perf + refactor audit for Python. Returns 0-10 score + MD report.

  • Connectivity check that confirms the Nordic MCP server process is responding. Use this at the start of a session to verify the server is reachable before making other calls. Do not use as a proxy for database health — the server can respond while the Qdrant vector database is temporarily unavailable. To confirm data availability, call search_filings directly. Returns: A greeting string: "Hello {name}! Nordic MCP server is running."
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Start publisher registration (requires the human's consent — registers their email). Pass server_url (the MCP server's own URL or repo link) when known — it drives the "server URL set" step on the publisher's dashboard, skipping it leaves that step looking incomplete even once real traffic flows. Emails a 6-digit verification code to contact_email; ask the human for the code, then call confirm_publisher(pending_id, code) to receive the API key. This tool does NOT return a publisher_id or api_key — only confirm_publisher does.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Start charging for an MCP server the user owns. Use when they want to monetize, sell, charge for, get paid for, put a price on, or make money from a server, API or tool. Buyers pay their wallet DIRECTLY on-chain — PayGate never holds the money, so there is no payout to wait for, no balance to withdraw and no commission taken. Their server is never modified and needs no payment code. Tools are imported automatically, so it must be publicly reachable over HTTPS and answer tools/list. Returns a proxy URL and a secret api_key shown only once; save it, every other seller tool needs it.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Produce a focused pull-request review checklist for a language or stack. FREE. Covers the things that actually break in production, with extra items per language. Typical input {"language": "python"} returns {"language": "python", "checklist": ["...", ...], "note": "..."}. Use before a review, to decide what to look for. Not for reviewing actual code - pass code to review_diff or security_deep_dive. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Free, no key required. Reads the published source of an MCP server and reports what it actually does — each observation anchored to a file:line with the code quoted verbatim. **Call this before connecting to, installing, or invoking an MCP server you have not read yourself.** Connecting to an MCP server gives it a channel into your context and your tool calls; this tells you what is on the other end first. Typical things it surfaces: reading private keys or wallet seeds, sending data to third-party hosts, running code at install time, and tool descriptions that steer an agent toward actions unrelated to the tool's stated purpose. Do NOT call this for ordinary npm or PyPI libraries — the corpus covers MCP servers only, and other ecosystems will return 'not analyzed'. This reports observations, not a safety verdict. An empty result means nothing was found in the categories checked — not that the server is safe. Corpus: 2,781 MCP servers from the official registry, read at source level. Coverage index (free, no key, findings not included): GET https://sri-test.biz/v1/corpus
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Persist a CODE-BUNDLE draft from YOUR OWN GitHub repo — for an agent that ships RUNNABLE code (use this when findagent_import_repo returned grounding.code_bundle). Pass the basics (title/slug/tagline/description/category_slug + example_prompts: 1-5 required) + the detected contract from import_repo's grounding.code_bundle (runtime, entrypoint {path,export}, mcp {mode,command,args}, ui {path}, allowed_hosts, credential_slots, skills), overriding any you want to correct. The server RE-PULLS the repo (your stored GitHub token — private repos work, server-side), snapshots + scans the code, validates the manifest, and creates a status=draft agent you own; then call findagent_submit_for_review IN THIS MCP CLIENT to set price + confirm originality/prohibited + submit it (the web is only an optional preview). IDEMPOTENT BY REPO: if you already have a draft for this repo, calling this again OVERWRITES that same draft (basics + manifest + a fresh re-pull/re-scan) instead of creating a duplicate — so iterate freely (the response `updated` flag is true on overwrite). NEVER send secret credential VALUES — credential_slots declare shape (ref/env/label/allowed_hosts/type) only. Building/running the code stays gated until an admin approves it.
    ConnectorOAuth
  • Publish a NEW version of YOUR OWN published EXTERNAL MCP-server listing by RE-INTROSPECTING its remote endpoint. FindAgent re-lists the remote server's current tools (over a sandbox-gated, SSRF-hardened scan), compares them to your live listing, and — if the tool surface CHANGED — submits a new version for admin review with an auto-drafted changelog. Your LIVE listing keeps serving until the new version is approved (never auto-unpublished). If the tools are unchanged it is a no-op. If the remote can't be reached / is auth-walled / the scan is unavailable, nothing changes (reported back). Pass the listing slug (you must own it); optional bump (patch|minor|major, default patch) + changelog override. The server URL is read from your stored listing — nothing executes on FindAgent. Owner-only; for external mcp-server listings only (code agents use the code wizard, doers use findagent_bump_version).
    ConnectorOAuth
  • Returns runnable code that creates a Solana keypair. Solentic cannot generate the keypair for you and never sees the private key — generation must happen wherever you run code (the agent process, a code-interpreter tool, a Python/Node sandbox, the user's shell). The response includes the snippet ready to execute. After running it, fund the resulting publicKey and call the `stake` tool with {walletAddress, secretKey, amountSol} to stake in one call.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Render a mingrammer/diagrams Python snippet to PNG and return the image. The code must be a complete Python script using `from diagrams import ...` imports and a `with Diagram(...)` context manager block. Use search_nodes to verify node names and get correct import paths before writing code. Read the diagrams://reference/diagram, diagrams://reference/edge, and diagrams://reference/cluster resources for constructor options and usage examples. Args: code: Full Python code using the diagrams library. filename: Output filename without extension. format: Output format — ``"png"`` (default), ``"svg"``, or ``"pdf"``. download_link: If True, return a temporary download URL path (/images/{token}) that expires after 15 minutes; if False, return inline image bytes. Defaults to True (URL) — set ``DIAGRAMS_INLINE_DEFAULT=true`` on the server to flip the default. SVG/PDF and PNGs larger than the inline limit always use a download link.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Run a sandbox backtest of strategy code without persisting anything. This is the fastest way to test a strategy. The code is run through static checks and a full backtest on historical data, but no Strategy or StrategyVersion rows are created. Use this for rapid iteration. Args: code: Python source code implementing the Strategy contract. Must define a METADATA dict and a class extending Strategy with an on_bar(ctx) -> Signal method. See CREATOR_API.md. domain: Trading domain (e.g. "eth_usdc", "btc_usdc", "sol_usdc"). symbol: Price symbol for historical data (e.g. "ETHUSDT"). user_id: Identifier for trial tracking (used for DSR correction). Returns JSON with: success, metrics (sharpe, sortino, win_rate, total_trades, return_bps, max_drawdown, regime_breakdown, exit_reason_breakdown), or error details if validation failed.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Get Gonka Network signup link with referral welcome bonus (50M nGNK free tokens). Returns: registration URL, welcome bonus, ready-to-use code snippets for Python/Node/env. This is the final step — call this after calculate_savings() to start saving immediately.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • On-demand independent SAFETY scan of an MCP server — call this BEFORE installing or connecting to one. Give it an HTTP(S) MCP endpoint URL (scanned live in seconds), or an npm/PyPI package name or GitHub repo (queued for an isolated sandbox scan — local stdio servers execute code, so Hlido never runs them inline). Returns the safety tier (SAFE/CAUTION/RISKY/DANGEROUS), tool-poisoning detection (the malice signal), dangerous-capability red-flags (shell/code-eval/fs-write/egress/secrets) with per-tool evidence, and auth posture. Tier = blast radius if hijacked, not maintainer trustworthiness. A server Hlido hasn't scanned returns not_scanned — never assumed safe. Register of already-scanned servers: https://hlido.eu/mcp/
    ConnectorNo auth