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scalix_auth_configure

DestructiveIdempotent

Configure end-user authentication for the project — require MFA, require email confirmation, and set the allowed auth providers. Needs an admin API key: organization admin scope is never delegated to a connected app, so this tool fails on an OAuth connection.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
mfa_enabledNoRequire multi-factor authentication
allowed_providersNoAllowed auth providers (e.g., ["email", "google", "github"])
require_email_confirmationNoRequire users to confirm their email before a session is issued

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. Changed5 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / allowed_providers / description
      Previous value: -"List of allowed auth providers (e.g., [\"email\", \"google\", \"github\"])"New value: +"Allowed auth providers (e.g., [\"email\", \"google\", \"github\"])"
    • removedInput schema / properties / magic_link_enabled
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "Enable passwordless magic link login",
      -  "type": "boolean"
      -}
    • changedInput schema / properties / mfa_enabled / description
      Previous value: -"Enable multi-factor authentication"New value: +"Require multi-factor authentication"
    • addedInput schema / properties / require_email_confirmation
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Require users to confirm their email before a session is issued",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
    • removedInput schema / properties / signup_enabled
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "Allow new user signups",
      -  "type": "boolean"
      -}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already indicate a destructive, non-read-only, idempotent operation. The description adds valuable context beyond annotations by disclosing the admin API key requirement and the failure mode on OAuth connections, which is significant for an agent invoking the tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is two sentences long, front-loaded with the core action, and includes the critical usage caveat. Every sentence earns its place with zero redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's moderate complexity, lack of output schema, and fully documented parameters, the description covers the necessary elements: purpose, key settings, and an important authentication constraint. It does not explicitly describe return behavior, but that is not required without an output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has 100% parameter coverage, so the description need not explain parameters. The description essentially restates the three parameter purposes (MFA, email confirmation, allowed providers) without adding new semantics beyond what the schema already provides. Baseline of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's function with specific actions: configure end-user authentication, requiring MFA, email confirmation, and setting allowed providers. It uses a specific verb and resource, distinguishing it from sibling tools like database or compute tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description specifies the context (project-level authentication configuration) and provides a critical usage precondition (requires admin API key, fails on OAuth connections). It does not explicitly name alternatives, but given there is no comparable sibling tool, the guidance is sufficient.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Tools are grouped by service prefix and generally target distinct resources/actions. A few execution surfaces could be confused (sandbox_run vs computer_exec vs fn_invoke; build_create vs fn_deploy vs run_deploy), and storage_list is overloaded for both buckets and objects, but descriptions clarify the boundaries well.

Naming Consistency4/5

The scalix_ prefix plus snake_case is used throughout, and most tools follow <service>_<verb>_<noun>. Minor deviations like scalix_search, scalix_status, and scalix_usage omit a service-domain qualifier, but the overall pattern is predictable and easy to navigate.

Tool Count2/5

53 tools is a very large surface. While the server covers a broad multi-service cloud platform, the count falls well beyond the 25+ threshold and will likely feel overwhelming; many service areas could reasonably be split into separate servers or trimmed.

Completeness2/5

Several service lifecycles have obvious gaps: the KV store has get/list/set but no delete, storage has upload/download/list but no delete for objects or buckets, functions have deploy/list/invoke but no delete/update, and cron has create but no list/delete. These missing operations create dead ends for agents managing common resources.