Return secure-context attestation subjects, verification policy, and recertification state.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | No | ||
| source_id | No | ||
| artifact_id | No | ||
| workflow_id | No | ||
| subject_type | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It implies a read-only retrieval action with 'Return,' but it does not disclose side effects, authorization requirements, rate limits, or any caveats. The description adds some behavioral context (what is returned) but leaves important safety and operational traits unstated.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single front-loaded sentence with no filler or redundancy. Every phrase contributes to stating what the tool returns. The structure is compact and immediately readable, which is appropriate for a straightforward retrieval-style tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given five optional parameters, no annotations, and a large sibling family, this one-sentence description is incomplete. It fails to explain how the output categories relate to parameters, when to invoke this pack instead of a similar one, and what behavioral expectations the caller should have. The output schema helps, but it cannot substitute for missing usage and parameter guidance.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate by explaining how the five optional parameters affect behavior. It does not mention status, source_id, artifact_id, workflow_id, or subject_type at all. The only faint connection is that 'subjects' might echo subject_type, but this is not explicit enough to guide invocation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description has a clear verb ('Return') and identifies the resource ('secure-context attestation') along with its three main output categories: subjects, verification policy, and recertification state. It is understandable in isolation, though it does not distinguish this pack from closely related secure-context siblings such as recipes_secure_context_trust_pack or recipes_secure_context_evidence_contract.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives no guidance about when to use this tool, what conditions favor it, or which alternatives to prefer. With dozens of sibling recipe tools covering related security and attestation concepts, an agent receives no explicit or implicit selection criteria beyond the tool's own name.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.