Full-text search over security-recipes documents.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| tags | No | ||
| agent | No | ||
| limit | No | ||
| query | Yes | ||
| facets | No | ||
| section | No | ||
| min_quality | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It only states that this is a full-text search, but does not mention pagination, result limits, filtering behavior, or any operational traits that an agent would need to anticipate. This is a minimal disclosure, not a transparent one.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, front-loaded sentence with no wasted words. It is concise and easy to parse, though its brevity borders on under-specification rather than true efficiency.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has 7 parameters and no annotations, yet the description consists of only one vague clause. The presence of an output schema helps with return values, but the description is far too thin to guide an agent on query construction, filtering options, or how this search relates to the broader recipes tool family.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description adds no meaning to any of the 7 parameters. While names like 'query', 'tags', and 'limit' are somewhat self-explanatory, the description does not explain facets, min_quality, agent, or section, leaving the agent without semantic guidance beyond raw property names.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a clear verb ('search') and a specific resource ('security-recipes documents'), so the agent knows what this tool does. However, it does not distinguish this from sibling tools like recipes_cve_search or recipes_match_finding, which may also perform searching over related content.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives such as recipes_cve_search or recipes_list. No context, exclusions, or comparison with siblings is given, leaving the agent to infer usage from the name alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.