Call an allowed read-only tool on a configured upstream MCP server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| arguments | No | ||
| server_id | Yes | ||
| tool_name | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden and does disclose the important trait that the tool is read-only and restricted to allowed tools. It does not describe error behavior, permission enforcement details, or argument pass-through behavior, so an agent gets only a partial behavioral picture.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single front-loaded sentence with no filler; every word contributes the core action, scope, and safety qualifier. It is concise but not informative enough to be a 5 because it omits usable parameter guidance.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a generic dispatch tool with three parameters, no annotations, and zero schema description coverage, the description is too thin: it does not explain how to identify the server_id or tool_name, what arguments should contain, or what 'allowed' means in practice. The presence of an output schema helps clarify returns but does not make the call usable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description only loosely implies that server_id refers to the configured upstream MCP server and tool_name to the allowed tool; arguments is not mentioned at all. Since the description does not name or explain the parameters, it only partially compensates for the missing schema descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('Call'), a clear resource ('an allowed read-only tool on a configured upstream MCP server'), and the tool's scope. It also distinguishes itself from sibling tools such as recipes_mcp_upstream_servers and recipes_mcp_upstream_tools, which manage or list upstream servers/tools rather than invoke them.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'configured upstream MCP server' and 'allowed read-only tool' imply the precondition that the server is configured and the tool is permitted, and that this is the invocation path for upstream tools. However, it gives no explicit when-to-use versus alternatives, such as using recipes_mcp_upstream_tools first to discover tool names or using a local tool when no upstream call is needed.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.