Get evidence, recipe authority, and a bounded code/config/file change plan for one exact CVE.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve | Yes |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must carry the full burden. It describes what the tool returns (evidence, recipe authority, bounded change plan) but does not disclose side effects (read-only vs. write), permission requirements, or error behavior. While 'Get' likely implies read-only, this is not explicitly stated. The description adds some context but lacks depth on operational behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Single sentence, front-loaded with the core purpose, with no unnecessary words. The description is efficient and self-contained.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has an output schema that presumably describes the return structure, and the description covers the purpose and parameter semantics. It does not mention prerequisites (e.g., CVE existence) or error handling, but for a simple get operation with one parameter, it is reasonably complete. The description provides enough context for an agent to decide when to call it and what to pass.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema only defines 'cve' as a string without description (0% coverage). The description compensates by specifying that the tool works for 'one exact CVE', clarifying that the parameter should be a specific CVE identifier. This adds meaningful semantic context beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb ('Get') and a clear resource ('evidence, recipe authority, and a bounded code/config/file change plan') for one exact CVE. This distinguishes it from sibling tools like recipes_cve_search (which searches) and recipes_cve_catalog_info (which provides catalog info). The scoping to 'one exact CVE' adds precision.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Implies usage when the agent has a specific CVE identifier (as opposed to searching). The phrase 'one exact CVE' provides context, but it does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use this tool. No exclusionary guidance is given, so a 4 is appropriate.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.