Return context-poisoning scan results for registered secure-context sources.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| rule_id | No | ||
| decision | No | ||
| severity | No | ||
| source_id | No | ||
| actionable_only | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It only states 'Return', implying a read-only operation, but does not disclose potential side effects, data freshness, pagination, or any caveats. This is minimal for a tool with no annotation support.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single concise sentence with no redundant words. It is appropriately short, though it may be too terse given the complexity of the tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given 6 optional parameters, no schema descriptions, and no annotations, the description is severely incomplete. An agent cannot determine what inputs to provide or what the scan results entail, despite having an output schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 6 parameters with 0% description coverage, and the description does not explain any of them. Parameter names like 'limit', 'rule_id', 'decision', 'severity', 'source_id', and 'actionable_only' are not elaborated, leaving the agent without clarity on valid values or their purpose.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a clear verb ('Return') and resource ('context-poisoning scan results for registered secure-context sources'). It conveys the purpose effectively, but it does not explicitly differentiate from sibling tools like recipes_secure_context_trust_pack or recipes_secure_context_attestation_pack, though the name itself implies a focused function.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. It does not mention context, preconditions, or exclusions. An agent would have to infer use cases from the name alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.