Return the OpenTelemetry-aligned agentic telemetry and redaction contract.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| check_id | No | ||
| decision | No | ||
| workflow_id | No | ||
| signal_class_id | No | ||
| required_attribute | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden, but it only says 'Return' and gives no detail about side effects, authentication, filtering behavior, or what the contract contains. 'Return' implies a read-only operation, but no behavioral traits beyond that are disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single front-loaded sentence with no filler or redundant phrasing. It is concise, though it achieves conciseness by omitting useful guidance.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with five optional parameters and no annotation support, the description is too thin to be fully actionable. The output schema may cover return shape, but the description does not explain the purpose of the parameters or the context in which this contract should be requested.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description does not explain any of the five parameters (check_id, decision, workflow_id, signal_class_id, required_attribute). The agent cannot tell how these optional parameters affect the returned contract. Description adds no semantic value beyond the bare schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses the specific verb 'Return' and names a concrete resource: the OpenTelemetry-aligned agentic telemetry and redaction contract. This is clear enough to know what the tool does, though it doesn't explicitly differentiate itself from the many sibling recipe tools beyond the unique contract name.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance on when to use this tool, what scenarios call for it, or how it relates to sibling tools like recipes_secure_context_evidence_contract or recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard. The description only states what it returns, leaving the agent to infer usage.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.