Return agent non-human identity, delegation, scope, and audit contracts.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_class | No | ||
| identity_id | No | ||
| workflow_id | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of disclosing behavior. 'Return' weakly implies a read-only operation, but the description does not state whether this is purely a lookup, how results are scoped when optional parameters are omitted, whether any side effects occur, or how the returned contracts are assembled.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with no filler. Every word carries meaningful content, and the description is appropriately brief for what little it commits to.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Although an output schema exists, the description leaves important intent ambiguous: what an 'identity ledger' contains, what selecting by identity_id versus workflow_id does, and how this tool relates to the large sibling set. A caller would likely need external documentation to choose and invoke this tool safely.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description provides no parameter-level explanation. The three optional parameters (agent_class, identity_id, workflow_id) remain semantically unexplained, and the description does not connect its contract categories to these parameters.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a clear verb ('Return') and specifies a resource composed of distinct contract types: non-human identity, delegation, scope, and audit. It is concrete enough to separate it from many generic sibling tools, though it does not explicitly distinguish it from similar ledger/profile tools like recipes_secure_context_lineage_ledger.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance about when to use this tool versus any of the many sibling tools. The description gives no context for when a caller should select this ledger instead of an agent card, trust profile, handoff boundary, or lineage ledger.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.