Return capability-based residual risk scores for agentic workflows.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| decision | No | ||
| risk_tier | No | ||
| workflow_id | No | ||
| minimum_residual_score | No |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure, but it only says 'Return ... scores.' It does not state whether the operation is read-only, whether it computes or retrieves scores, whether filters are required, or how the residual risk scoring behaves.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is one short sentence with no filler and the main action is front-loaded. However, it is under-specified for a tool with four optional parameters and no other context, so conciseness is achieved at the expense of usefulness.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Because an output schema exists, the description does not need to explain return values, but it still lacks parameter semantics, usage guidance, and sibling differentiation. An agent cannot reliably determine what inputs to provide or what makes this tool different from the many adjacent risk-related tools.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the description does not mention any of the four parameters: decision, risk_tier, workflow_id, and minimum_residual_score. The parameter names hint at their purpose, but the description adds no meaning beyond the bare schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: it returns capability-based residual risk scores for agentic workflows. It is clear on its own, but it does not explicitly distinguish itself from closely named siblings such as recipes_agentic_aivss_risk_scoring_pack or recipes_agentic_catastrophic_risk_annex.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance about when to use this tool instead of the many related risk-scoring and recipe tools listed among the siblings. It neither names alternatives nor provides any selection criteria.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Many tools return 'pack' artifacts with nearly identical descriptions, such as recipes_agentic_assurance_pack, recipes_agentic_posture_snapshot, and recipes_agentic_readiness_scorecard, or recipes_mcp_connector_intake_pack versus recipes_mcp_connector_trust_pack. Distinct domains like CVE lookup and playbooks are clear, but dozens of evidence/profile packs blur together and will cause misselection.
All names use the recipes_ prefix and snake_case, and most pack tools follow a [domain]_[topic]_pack pattern, which aids recognition. However, verbs are placed inconsistently and mixed with noun-only names: recipes_get, recipes_cve_get, recipes_mcp_server_get, recipes_refresh, and many pure 'pack' names.
Seventy-five tools is an extreme count for any MCP server, especially when the majority are highly specialized 'pack' endpoints with narrow outputs. The sheer number creates major selection overhead and makes the tool surface difficult for an agent to navigate reliably.
The server covers its apparent read-only scope thoroughly: recipe search/get, CVE lookup, playbook planning, MCP server catalog, upstream MCP introspection, and extensive evidence packs. There are no obvious dead ends, though the massive pack proliferation makes it harder for agents to know which tool to call.