Search for CVEs by keyword, severity, or other filters. Query must be alphanumeric text.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | Yes | Search keyword (CVE ID, technology name, or description) | |
| is_kev | No | Only show CVEs in CISA KEV catalog | |
| severity | No | Filter by severity | |
| has_exploit | No | Only show CVEs with public exploits |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, and the description only mentions a single constraint ('Query must be alphanumeric text'). It lacks details on mutation, rate limits, pagination, or return behavior, leaving a significant gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no wasted words, and the most important information is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a search tool with 4 parameters and no output schema or annotations, the description omits key return format details (e.g., whether results are paginated, fields returned). It is insufficient for an agent to fully understand the tool's behavior.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
All 4 parameters have schema descriptions (100% coverage), and the description adds the 'alphanumeric text' constraint for the query parameter, providing value beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's verb ('Search') and resource ('CVEs'), and lists supported filter types (keyword, severity, etc.). It distinguishes from sibling 'lookup_cve' by implying a broader search.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description does not specify when to use this tool versus alternatives like 'lookup_cve' for specific IDs, nor does it provide exclusions or prerequisites.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have distinct purposes, but 'lookup_cve' and 'get_weaponization_score' both focus on a single CVE, which could cause confusion. However, descriptions clarify their different outputs (full enrichment vs. numerical score).
Naming conventions are inconsistent: some tools use 'get_', others 'list_', 'lookup_', 'assess_', 'scan_url', 'search_cves'. No consistent verb_noun pattern across the set.
14 tools is well within the ideal 3-15 range, covering a broad scope of security assessment and intelligence without being excessive.
Core workflows (scanning, vulnerability lookup, threat stats) are covered, but missing update/delete operations for scans and domain verification tool. Notable gaps exist but core functionality is present.
