Skip to main content
Glama

roastify_update_operator_credential

Add or update a single operator secret field.

Merges into the operator's stored credentials without touching the others — the field-level counterpart to re-delivering the whole bundle over Secure Courier. Use it to rotate one secret (a reissued btcpay_api_key, say) without restating the six you did not change, where any field omitted from a courier reply is destroyed.

The value is never echoed back. RESTRICTED to the operator — requires proof (nsec-signed kind-27235 or a cached dpop_token phrase); patron proofs are rejected.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
fieldYesThe operator credential field to set. Must be declared in the operator's credential template.
valueYesThe value to store.
dpop_tokenYesOperator proof for this tool.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are present, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses merge semantics, auth requirements, operator-only restriction, patron rejection, and the fact that the value is never echoed back. This is far beyond a generic update description.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the core action and then adds focused, non-redundant detail on use case, merge behavior, and security restrictions. It is slightly dense with domain terminology but every section earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a privileged mutation with no output schema, the description covers the invocation-critical points: field-level merge, auth proof, restriction, and non-echoing of the value. It leaves out explicit return or error behavior, but the schema plus security context make successful invocation well specified.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already documents all three parameters at high coverage. The description adds useful context, especially for dpop_token as proof, and reinforces that field must be template-declared, adding some meaning beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Add or update a single operator secret field.' It further distinguishes itself from the full credential-bundle delivery and from patron-oriented tools by stating it is the field-level counterpart and that patron proofs are rejected.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It clearly explains when to use this tool: rotate one secret without restating untouched fields, contrasted with re-delivering the whole bundle over Secure Courier, where omitted fields are destroyed. It signals operator-only usage, though it does not name a specific sibling tool as the alternative.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target clearly distinct resources—patron balances vs. operator Authority balances, design text vs. full design fetches, operator vs. patron credentials—and the verbose descriptions carefully separate request/receive flows. A few pairs could still be confused at a glance, such as service_status/session_status, forget_coupon/delete_coupon, and get_design_text/fetch_design.

Naming Consistency4/5

All tools share the roastify_ snake_case prefix and mostly follow a verb_noun pattern like list_, get_, update_, delete_, and create. However, several noun-only names (service_status, session_status, account_statement, oracle_about) and the inconsistent forget_ vs. delete_ distinction for credential/coupon removal keep it from being fully consistent.

Tool Count1/5

69 tools is an extreme count for a single MCP surface and far exceeds the 25+ threshold. Even though the tools span many subdomains—design, payments, coupons, credentials, pricing, notarization, oracle—the sheer number will be heavy on agent context and selection accuracy.

Completeness3/5

Core workflows are largely covered: design storage/editing, coupon lifecycle, credential vaults, credit purchasing, pricing models, notarization, and the oracle all have reasonable read/write surfaces. However, session_status explicitly tells not_registered operators to call register_operator, which does not exist in the tool set, and design editing lacks any delete-element operation, leaving notable dead ends.