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Glama

lazaretto

by io.github.jamesdfinance-dev

check_lockfile

Read-onlyIdempotent

Check every EXACTLY-PINNED dependency in a lockfile against published malicious-package advisories (OSV/OpenSSF). Free, anonymous, one call for the whole tree. Accepts the contents of a package-lock.json, yarn.lock, or pnpm-lock.yaml. Only exact versions can be answered: a range like ^5.0.0 has no definitive answer because a compromised release usually sits between clean ones. Fail-closed: anything that could not be checked is returned in unverified, so an empty malicious list is an all-clear only when unverified is empty too.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
lockfileYesThe full text contents of a package-lock.json, yarn.lock, or pnpm-lock.yaml.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
noteNo
formatNoLockfile format detected.
checkedYesHow many exactly pinned versions were actually checked.
skippedNoEntries with no registry identity (file:, link:, workspace:, git:).
maliciousYesPinned versions listed as malware in the advisory corpus. Act on these.
truncatedNo
disclaimerNo
unverifiedYesCould NOT be decided. Never treat these as clean.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "description": "Fail closed: an empty `malicious` list is an all-clear ONLY when `unverified` is also empty.",
+  "properties": {
+    "checked": {
+      "description": "How many exactly pinned versions were actually checked.",
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "disclaimer": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "format": {
+      "description": "Lockfile format detected.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "malicious": {
+      "description": "Pinned versions listed as malware in the advisory corpus. Act on these.",
+      "items": {
+        "properties": {
+          "ids": {
+            "description": "Advisory ids, for example MAL-2025-46969.",
+            "items": {
+              "type": "string"
+            },
+            "type": "array"
+          },
+          "name": {
+            "type": "string"
+          },
+          "version": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "required": [
+          "name",
+          "version"
+        ],
+        "type": "object"
+      },
+      "type": "array"
+    },
+    "note": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "skipped": {
+      "description": "Entries with no registry identity (file:, link:, workspace:, git:).",
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "truncated": {
+      "type": "boolean"
+    },
+    "unverified": {
+      "description": "Could NOT be decided. Never treat these as clean.",
+      "items": {
+        "properties": {
+          "name": {
+            "type": "string"
+          },
+          "reason": {
+            "type": "string"
+          },
+          "version": {
+            "type": "string"
+          }
+        },
+        "required": [
+          "name",
+          "version"
+        ],
+        "type": "object"
+      },
+      "type": "array"
+    }
+  },
+  "required": [
+    "checked",
+    "malicious",
+    "unverified"
+  ],
+  "type": "object"
+}
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnly/idempotent/destructive annotations, the description adds valuable behavioral detail: the call is free and anonymous, one call covers the whole tree, and results fail closed with unverified entries so that an empty malicious list alone is not an all-clear. It also warns about the exact-version limitation, which is essential for interpreting results.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is concise yet dense, with each sentence serving a purpose: what it checks, what it accepts, the exact-version limitation, and the fail-closed result interpretation. The key information is front-loaded, and there is no filler or redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter read-only tool with an output schema, the description provides all necessary context: input format, limitation, service characteristics, and how to interpret results. Any remaining return-value details are covered by the output schema, so nothing critical is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The single parameter has 100% schema description coverage, so the baseline is 3. The description adds meaningful semantics about accepted lockfile formats and the exact-version requirement that tells an agent what kind of content is expected and what its limitations are, going slightly beyond the schema's purely syntactic description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb ('Check') and resource ('every EXACTLY-PINNED dependency in a lockfile') against published advisories, and specifies the accepted lockfile formats. It clearly distinguishes the tool from artifact scanning or attestation siblings by focusing on lockfile contents and malware advisories.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear operational constraints: only exact-pinned versions can be answered, and range specs are not definitive. It also explains the fail-closed interpretation of the results. However, it does not explicitly name sibling tools or state when to choose one over another, so the routing guidance is implied rather than fully explicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Each tool has a distinct target and action: lockfile advisory checks, deep behavioral scans, MCP server scans, local tool-definition checks, hash lookups, and attestation operations. The closest overlap is check_lockfile vs scan_lockfile_deep and check_mcp_tools vs scan_mcp_server, but the descriptions clearly separate free vs paid and local vs remote workflows.

Naming Consistency4/5

Most tools follow a clear verb_noun snake_case pattern: check_lockfile, scan_artifact, scan_mcp_server, find_attestation, verify_attestation. known_bad_lookup is the one outlier, using an object-first pattern instead of a verb-first one, but it is still readable and does not create real confusion.

Tool Count5/5

Eight tools is well-scoped for a security-scanning service covering lockfiles, artifacts, MCP servers, hash lookups, and attestations. Each tool addresses a distinct use case, and the count is neither bloated nor thin for the server's purpose.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers the main security workflows: advisory lockfile checks, deep behavioral scanning, MCP server vetting, local tool-definition analysis, known-bad hash lookups, and attestation discovery/verification. Minor gaps exist around explicitly creating or managing attestations, but scans likely generate them implicitly and the core lifecycle is coherent.

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