get_findingReturn one finding with evidence-safe lifecycle history and related asset metadata.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| findingId | Yes | ||
| workspaceSlug | Yes | Workspace slug selected during agent authorization. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The annotations already cover the safety profile with readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, so the description does not need to restate those. It adds that the result includes lifecycle history and asset metadata, but it does not clarify what 'evidence-safe' means or describe auth or error behavior. There is no contradiction with the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One direct sentence with the key scope front-loaded and no filler. It communicates the main purpose without wasting words, which is appropriate for this tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only tool with two required parameters and strong annotations, the description is nearly sufficient: it names what is returned and the scope. It is slightly cryptic about 'evidence-safe lifecycle history' and does not describe the exact return shape, but given the low complexity and available schema, this is acceptable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is only 50%: workspaceSlug has a description, but findingId has none. The tool description does not compensate by explaining findingId's meaning or constraints beyond implying it identifies the finding. The agent is left without adequate parameter-level guidance for one of the two required arguments.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action ('Return') and resource ('one finding'), and it adds scope ('evidence-safe lifecycle history and related asset metadata') that helps separate it from list_findings and get_asset. It is not as explicit as the strongest examples, and 'evidence-safe' is somewhat jargon-heavy, but the core purpose is clear.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance, and no alternative tool is named. The singular 'one finding' and the required findingId imply this is the detail-retrieval counterpart to list_findings, but the description leaves that inference to the agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Each tool targets a distinct resource-action pair: get/list/search for CVE records, begin/check for domain authorization, prepare/launch/cancel for assessment lifecycle, and get/list for assets, findings, and reports. There is no meaningful overlap that would confuse an agent selecting a tool.
All tools follow a consistent lowercase snake_case verb_noun pattern, such as list_assessments, get_finding, launch_assessment, and search_public_cve_records. Naming conventions are uniform across the entire set, making tool behavior predictable.
With 22 tools, the server is on the heavier side and falls into the borderline range for tool count. The tools are individually justified by a broad domain, but the surface area is larger than a typical focused server needs.
The core assessment lifecycle is well covered: domain authorization can be created and checked, assessments can be prepared, launched, cancelled, and retrieved, and findings/reports/assets have read and list support. Minor gaps exist around explicit authorization removal or workspace switching, but these do not block the primary workflow.