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Glama

LiveDataLink

by io.github.blackboxfoundry

security_exposure

Read-onlyIdempotent

One-call known-vulnerability exposure for a vendor/product/package, built on the LiveDataLink cyber domain. Fans out to NVD (CVE search by vendor+product or keyword), the CISA KEV catalog (actively-exploited flag - the highest signal), FIRST EPSS (exploit-probability scores for the most-severe CVEs), and aggregates MITRE CWE weakness types from the matched CVEs. Returns total CVEs, counts by CVSS severity band, KEV membership with the actively-exploited CVEs listed, the highest EPSS score, the critical CVEs, top CWE weakness types, an overall exposure rollup (KEV present -> high), and an evidence list. No matches returns a friendly 0-exposure result; if the cyber source is unavailable that is noted per-source. Exactly one NVD call per invocation. INFORMATIONAL security research, not advice. Package-registry maintenance/staleness signals are out of scope for this tool.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
vendorNoOptional vendor to narrow the NVD CPE match (e.g. 'apache', 'openbsd').
productYesProduct or package name to assess (e.g. 'log4j', 'openssl', 'struts').
versionNoOptional version string (informational; shown in the report).
max_cvesNoMax CVEs to pull from NVD for analysis (default 40).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnly/idempotent annotations, it discloses the exact fan-out to NVD, KEV, EPSS, and CWE; the detailed return fields including the 'KEV present -> high' rollup; no-match behavior returning 'a friendly 0-exposure result'; per-source unavailability notes; and 'Exactly one NVD call per invocation'. This gives the agent strong behavioral expectations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but dense and non-redundant, front-loading the core purpose before enumerating sources, outputs, and edge cases. Every sentence adds useful information, and the structure compensates for the lack of an output schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the full burden of explaining return values, and it does so thoroughly: counts, severity bands, KEV membership, EPSS, CWEs, exposure rollup, evidence list, no-match behavior, and source-unavailability handling. The multi-source aggregation is complex, and nothing critical to invoking it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents vendor, product, version, and max_cves with examples and defaults. The description adds little new parameter-level meaning beyond the 'Exactly one NVD call' hint, which clarifies max_cves does not multiply calls. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening phrase 'One-call known-vulnerability exposure for a vendor/product/package' states a specific verb, resource, and scope. Its 'fans out to NVD... CISA KEV... FIRST EPSS... MITRE CWE' clearly distinguishes it from narrower siblings like cve_lookup, epss_score, or kev_status_check.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description establishes a clear context: use this aggregate tool when you need consolidated exposure for a vendor/product/package, reinforced by 'One-call' and the list of aggregated sources. It also states one exclusion ('Package-registry maintenance/staleness signals are out of scope'), though it does not explicitly name sibling alternatives such as kev_status_check or cve_search_by_keyword.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

Several tool clusters overlap heavily—company due-diligence and risk tools (counterparty_risk_score, company_trust_check, entity_dossier, issuer_diligence_dossier, resolve_entity, entity_resolve), carrier vetting tools, sanctions screening tools, and recall tools all have subtle boundary distinctions. While descriptions are detailed, an agent navigating 294 tools will frequently struggle to pick the right one.

Naming Consistency3/5

Most tools follow a readable snake_case domain-prefix pattern (fdic_, edgar_, sanctions_, congress_), which helps. However, verb placement is inconsistent—search_available_datasets vs cdc_dataset_query, resolve_entity vs entity_resolve—and synonyms like search, lookup, get, detail, fetch, and status are used interchangeably.

Tool Count1/5

294 tools is an extreme number for a single MCP server, far beyond what an agent can reliably hold in context or select from accurately. The presence of tool-group discovery helpers mitigates but does not solve the fundamental scale problem.

Completeness4/5

The data breadth is genuinely extensive, covering finance, health, legal, real estate, transportation, energy, cyber, education, and many other domains, often with generic query fallbacks. Still, some capabilities are shallow or incomplete—package tracking stops at a link, property tools are demo-only in places, and caselaw coverage is limited—so it is not a fully complete surface.

Resources