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sanctions_screen_entity

Read-onlyIdempotent

Screen a single name or entity against the four major sanctions / denied-party lists (OFAC SDN, EU consolidated, UN consolidated, BIS DPL). Returns matches with confidence scores. This call uses the standard hosted query allowance; the free tier includes 1,000 queries/month and paid plans use the published plan pricing.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesName or entity string to screen.
limitNoMaximum matches to return. Defaults vary per tool.
sourcesNoRestrict screening to a subset of source lists. Defaults to all four. Allowed: OFAC_SDN, EU_CFSP, UN_SC, BIS_DPL.
thresholdNoMinimum confidence score (0..1) for a result to be returned. Defaults to 0.85.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already convey read-only, open-world, idempotent, and non-destructive behavior. The description adds genuinely useful context beyond those annotations, including that matches include confidence scores and that the call consumes a hosted query allowance with free-tier and paid-plan pricing implications.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is three sentences with the core purpose front-loaded, followed by return semantics and cost/quota context. It is concise and every sentence contributes useful information, though the billing sentence is slightly tangential to invocation behavior.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the fully documented input schema and rich annotations, the description is largely complete for a single-entity screening tool. It could be stronger by explicitly routing users to sanctions_screen_address or sanctions_screen_batch when an address or multiple names are involved, but the core behavior is well covered.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3 and the schema already documents name, limit, sources, and threshold. The description adds little parameter-specific meaning beyond reinforcing that a single name or entity is screened and that matches carry confidence scores, so it does not rise above the baseline.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the specific action — screening a single name or entity — and names the exact target resources (OFAC SDN, EU consolidated, UN consolidated, BIS DPL). It also says the tool returns matches with confidence scores. This differentiates it from sibling tools like sanctions_screen_address and sanctions_screen_batch via the word 'single'.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear context: use this when you need to screen a single name or entity against the four major sanctions lists. It does not explicitly name alternatives such as sanctions_screen_batch for multiple names or sanctions_screen_address for physical addresses, but the 'single name or entity' phrasing makes the primary use case clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

Several tool clusters overlap heavily—company due-diligence and risk tools (counterparty_risk_score, company_trust_check, entity_dossier, issuer_diligence_dossier, resolve_entity, entity_resolve), carrier vetting tools, sanctions screening tools, and recall tools all have subtle boundary distinctions. While descriptions are detailed, an agent navigating 294 tools will frequently struggle to pick the right one.

Naming Consistency3/5

Most tools follow a readable snake_case domain-prefix pattern (fdic_, edgar_, sanctions_, congress_), which helps. However, verb placement is inconsistent—search_available_datasets vs cdc_dataset_query, resolve_entity vs entity_resolve—and synonyms like search, lookup, get, detail, fetch, and status are used interchangeably.

Tool Count1/5

294 tools is an extreme number for a single MCP server, far beyond what an agent can reliably hold in context or select from accurately. The presence of tool-group discovery helpers mitigates but does not solve the fundamental scale problem.

Completeness4/5

The data breadth is genuinely extensive, covering finance, health, legal, real estate, transportation, energy, cyber, education, and many other domains, often with generic query fallbacks. Still, some capabilities are shallow or incomplete—package tracking stops at a link, property tools are demo-only in places, and caselaw coverage is limited—so it is not a fully complete surface.