Recent CVEs published in the last N days (default 7, max 120). Optional vendor and severity filters (CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| days | No | Lookback window in days (1-120). | |
| limit | No | Max results (default 50). | |
| vendor | No | Optional vendor filter. | |
| severity | No | Optional CVSS severity filter: CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, or LOW. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, openWorldHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely new behavioral context: the lookback-window semantics ('published in the last N days'), the default of 7 days, the max of 120, and the available filter dimensions. No contradiction with annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two compact sentences that front-load the core purpose first and then enumerate the filters. There is no filler, no repetition of annotation content, and every clause contributes either scope, a default, or filter information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple filtered-list tool this is nearly complete: annotations carry the safety profile, the schema documents all four optional parameters with 100% coverage, and the description covers purpose, defaults, and filters. Minor gaps are the absence of any note about the shape of returned CVE data (no output schema) and no routing to the sibling CVE tools when the agent needs historical or ID-based lookup.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so every parameter (days, limit, vendor, severity) is already documented in the schema. The description adds only the default-7-days detail for the lookback window (the schema only gives the 1-120 range); the severity enumeration duplicates the schema. Marginal value over the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource with a clear temporal scope: 'Recent CVEs published in the last N days (default 7, max 120)' plus optional vendor/severity filters. The time-window framing inherently differentiates it from sibling tools cve_lookup, cve_search_by_keyword, and cve_search_by_vendor without needing to open any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The usage context is unambiguous: this tool is for time-bounded CVE discovery, and the optional filters are spelled out. However, it does not explicitly exclude alternatives or name when to prefer cve_search_by_vendor (which also accepts a vendor filter) or cve_lookup (for a known CVE ID); the temporal framing carries most of the differentiation weight.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Several tool clusters overlap heavily—company due-diligence and risk tools (counterparty_risk_score, company_trust_check, entity_dossier, issuer_diligence_dossier, resolve_entity, entity_resolve), carrier vetting tools, sanctions screening tools, and recall tools all have subtle boundary distinctions. While descriptions are detailed, an agent navigating 294 tools will frequently struggle to pick the right one.
Most tools follow a readable snake_case domain-prefix pattern (fdic_, edgar_, sanctions_, congress_), which helps. However, verb placement is inconsistent—search_available_datasets vs cdc_dataset_query, resolve_entity vs entity_resolve—and synonyms like search, lookup, get, detail, fetch, and status are used interchangeably.
294 tools is an extreme number for a single MCP server, far beyond what an agent can reliably hold in context or select from accurately. The presence of tool-group discovery helpers mitigates but does not solve the fundamental scale problem.
The data breadth is genuinely extensive, covering finance, health, legal, real estate, transportation, energy, cyber, education, and many other domains, often with generic query fallbacks. Still, some capabilities are shallow or incomplete—package tracking stops at a link, property tools are demo-only in places, and caselaw coverage is limited—so it is not a fully complete surface.