nukez-mcp

nukez_recompute_verify

Byte-level integrity proof: re-downloads every file from storage, recomputes content hashes, rebuilds the merkle tree, and compares the result against the persisted attestation. Returns match=True when storage bytes still match the recorded hashes, match=False when they have drifted. Cost: scales with total locker bytes (re-downloads everything). Slower than nukez_verify — reach for this only on audits, post-migration sanity checks, or when you suspect drift between storage and the persisted manifest. For routine integrity checks, nukez_verify is the right tool (sub-second, structural). Requires payer authorization (a signed locker:read envelope): signer-mode deployments sign automatically via the SDK; keyless deployments get action_required='sign_envelopes' with the exact envelope spec, then re-call with envelope=.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`envelope`	No
`receipt_id`	No

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`result`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

Changed1 schema field changedAug 10, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / envelope

Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "additionalProperties": true,
+      "type": "object"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ],
+  "default": null,
+  "title": "Envelope"
+}

First observedJul 29, 2026

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description fully discloses behavior: it re-downloads every file, scales with total locker bytes, returns match=True/False, and requires payer authorization via signed envelopes. It also details the action_required='sign_envelopes' response for keyless deployments, going well beyond a simple read-only label.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but efficiently organized: the first sentence defines the core operation, the second covers cost and comparison, and the third handles authorization. Every sentence adds essential context without unnecessary filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex tool with no annotations, the description covers purpose, usage conditions, cost, authorization flow, and key return outcomes. It leverages the output schema for detailed return structure while mentioning the critical match=True/False cases. The only minor omission is receipt_id semantics, but overall it is complete for the tool's complexity.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It explains the envelope parameter thoroughly, especially in the keyless deployment flow ('re-call with envelope=<signed result>'), but does not explain receipt_id. With two parameters and one unexplored, the description leaves a notable semantic gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's function as a byte-level integrity proof: it re-downloads files, recomputes hashes, rebuilds the Merkle tree, and compares against the persisted attestation. It also explicitly distinguishes itself from nukez_verify by noting it is slower and for different use cases.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides explicit guidance: 'Slower than nukez_verify — reach for this only on audits, post-migration sanity checks, or when you suspect drift' and 'For routine integrity checks, nukez_verify is the right tool.' It also explains the authorization flow for signer-mode vs keyless deployments, which directly informs when each approach is relevant.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.6/5.0

Disambiguation3/5

Some tools have overlapping boundaries: nukez_store, nukez_create_file, and nukez_upload_chunk all handle file ingestion, while nukez_verify and nukez_recompute_verify both verify locker integrity. The descriptions do clarify when each should be used, but an agent could still mis-select between upload paths or verification levels. nukez_setup also overlaps conceptually with the quote/pay/provision workflow.

Naming Consistency4/5

All tools share the nukez_ prefix and use lowercase snake_case, which creates a strong sense of consistency. Most follow a verb or verb_noun pattern, but a few like nukez_setup, nukez_status, and nukez_recompute_verify deviate from the dominant verb_noun structure. There is no convention mixing, so the naming remains predictable.

Tool Count4/5

At 15 tools, the server is at the upper edge of a well-scoped set, and the count is largely justified by the multi-stage storage workflow: quote/pay/provision, file upload paths, memory recall, and integrity verification. Some tools are very specialized, such as nukez_confirm and nukez_upload_chunk, but they support real necessary flows. It is slightly heavy because a few could be consolidated, but not bloated for the domain.

Completeness5/5

The server covers the full storage lifecycle: setup and status, payment steps, file store/create/upload/confirm/retrieve/delete, memory remember/recall, and both structural and byte-level verification. There are redundant paths but no obvious dead ends. The workflow from first purchase through provisioning, mutating storage, and later proving integrity is well covered.

Resources

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