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Dropyour

by io.dropyour

Link one app to another

dropyour_link
Idempotent

Let one of your graduated apps call ANOTHER of your apps over the network. By default no app can reach another — that refusal is the platform's isolation, not an oversight. This opens exactly the app you name, by its dropId, and only if it belongs to the SAME account: a link never crosses two accounts. action='delier' revokes it, and revoking asks nothing — taking a right back cannot be harder than granting it. Eight links at most: beyond that it is not a contract between apps any more, it is a network, and it gets decided differently. What this does NOT do: it grants no identity, no token and no shared storage. Your app calls the other one over plain HTTP, and the other one's own guards apply unchanged.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cibleYesThe app to be called. Must belong to the same account.
actionYeslier = open, delier = revoke.
dropIdYesThe app that will CALL.
managementTokenNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations provide idempotentHint=true and destructiveHint=false, and the description complements these well by explaining the platform default (no cross-app access), same-account restriction, revoke semantics, and the limit of eight links. It clearly states it grants no identity/token/storage and that target guards still apply. Minor gap: doesn't explicitly mention whether linking is reversible beyond revoke, but 'delier revokes it' covers that.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is thorough but wordy in places ('taking a right back cannot be harder than granting it' and 'it gets decided differently' are stylistic rather than informative). It front-loads the core linking purpose and keeps the not-do list near the end. It earns its length overall but could be tightened.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description is complete for a tool of this complexity: it explains the default isolation, permissions, same-account constraint, revoke behavior, limits, and exclusions. No output schema is present, so the return format is not described, but the tool's core behavior is fully specified.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 75% with meaningful descriptions for cible, action, and dropId. The description adds context about same-account verification and plain HTTP but doesn't add new details for managementToken, which is undocumented in schema. The action enum is well explained in the schema, so the description adds limited extra value.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb (link) and resource (apps by dropId), and explicitly contrasts with what it does NOT do (no identity, token, storage). It also differentiates from siblings like dropyour_call and dropyour_egress_deny by clarifying network reachability.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explains the default isolation, when to use this (to allow one graduated app to call another), the same-account constraint, and implicitly contrasts with dropyour_egress_deny and dropyour_call by specifying plain HTTP and no shared storage. It also notes the eight-link limit and the revoke action.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Dropyour toolsInspect
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TDQS

A4/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target clearly distinct resources and actions, and descriptions do a good job separating overlapping areas like call/release/status or read_content/read_app_files. The main risk is momentary confusion between publish/replace/release and the two read-content tools, but careful reading resolves it.

Naming Consistency3/5

All names share the dropyour_ prefix and use snake_case, but the overall pattern is mixed: read_* and list_versions use verb-first naming, while records_list, secret_set, secret_delete, and secrets_list use noun-first naming, and logs/status/whoami are bare nouns. Still readable, but not a consistent verb_noun convention.

Tool Count3/5

23 tools is on the heavy side for a single server and spans several distinct subdomains: drop lifecycle, graduated apps, data, records, secrets, scheduling, and auth. Each tool appears purposeful, but the surface could reasonably be split into focused servers.

Completeness5/5

The set covers the full drop lifecycle — publish, replace, release, rollback, delete, status, settings — plus graduated app concerns like files, logs, versions, store records, app data, secrets, and scheduling. There are no obvious dead ends for the stated domain.

Resources