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Glama

LastPing

by dev.lastping

get_monitor

Destructive

Get a single LastPing monitor by UUID. Returns the monitor's full configuration including its output assertions (the assertions field: conditions a successful run's ping body must satisfy; absent when the monitor has none) and its metric guards (the guards field: ceilings on a number the job reports about itself; absent when the monitor has none) and its alert ROUTING (the routes field: which destinations receive which event type; absent when the monitor has none). Read this before calling update_monitor with assertions or guards, and before calling set_route — every one of those three writes REPLACES a whole set, so an agent that did not read the current one first will silently drop assertions, guards or destinations somebody else configured.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesMonitor UUID.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior1/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, while the description describes a read operation that only returns configuration ('Get', 'Returns', 'Read this before...') and warns about writes made by other tools. Because the description directly contradicts the destructive/read-only annotations, it scores 1 per the contradiction rule. The text itself is behaviorally transparent, but the annotation conflict is disqualifying.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the core action, then adds return-field details and the read-before-write warning; every sentence earns its place. It is longer than minimal, but the length is justified by the warnings about silent replacement and the absent-field semantics.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter get tool with no output schema, the description covers the essential return fields and their absence behavior, and it explains why those fields matter. It does not detail errors or the remaining 'full configuration' fields, but for the intended pre-update use case the critical behavioral context is present. The contradictory annotations slightly undermine completeness, but the description itself is sufficient.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The only parameter `id` is fully documented in the input schema as 'Monitor UUID,' and the description repeats 'by UUID.' With 100% schema coverage and no enums or nested objects, the description need not add more; it provides no extra semantics beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with 'Get a single LastPing monitor by UUID,' naming the verb, resource, and identifier. It then enumerates the returned configuration sections (assertions, guards, routes), which clearly distinguishes it from list_monitors and other siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly says to read this tool before calling update_monitor with assertions or guards and before calling set_route, and explains why: those writes replace whole sets and could silently drop existing config. This provides concrete conditional guidance with a consequence, not just a vague usage hint.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Tools are organized by clear resource domains, and the long descriptions carefully separate similar reads. The main ambiguity is create_monitor's upsert behavior overlapping with update_monitor, and list_incidents vs list_open_incidents could be confused from names alone.

Naming Consistency4/5

Almost every tool uses verb_noun snake_case with a consistent CRUD vocabulary like create_, list_, get_, update_, and delete_. Minor deviations exist: get_alert_templates is really a list operation, and discover_monitors_reconcile is an awkward verb-object-verb construction.

Tool Count2/5

Thirty-six tools is a heavy surface for an agent to navigate, even for a full monitoring platform. Most tools are individually purposeful, but the count exceeds the range where an agent can quickly scan and select, and the set would be easier to handle if split across domains.

Completeness4/5

Coverage is strong: monitors, destinations, agents, status pages, API keys, routes, alert templates, incidents, run history, discovery, and Terraform export all have read and lifecycle operations. Minor gaps remain, such as no explicit single-incident view and no acknowledgment/resolution action beyond notes, but core workflows have no dead ends.

Resources