NPMScan

Check an npm package for maintainer/ownership red flags

check_maintainer_changes

Read-only

Reconstructs a package's maintainer-change history straight from the npm packument — every published version carries the maintainers-list SNAPSHOT as it stood at that publish plus who actually ran npm publish (_npmUser), so diffing consecutive snapshots in publish-time order recovers exactly who was added or removed and when, with no extra API calls. Flags: (1) a maintainer added recently who then published a release shortly afterward on a package with real prior history — the account-takeover/hostile-handoff shape behind incidents like ua-parser-js, event-stream, and the 2025 chalk/debug ('qix') compromise; (2) a full, sudden replacement of the entire maintainer list; (3) a long-standing maintainer quietly dropped from the list; (4) a maintainer-list change that happened on npm's site AFTER the latest release — not yet tied to any published version, which is the more urgent case since it means access changed hands but nothing has shipped with it yet. Also cross-checks the declared GitHub repository: whether it still resolves to the same owner/name (a transfer/rename), whether it's reachable at all, and whether the latest npm release landed long after any real push activity there — repository.ownerLogin/ownerAvatarUrl name and show the CURRENT owning account (the new one after a transfer, not the one originally declared in package.json), with ownerAvatarUrl served from our own /api/github/avatar proxy rather than linking avatars.githubusercontent.com directly, both null whenever the repo check itself didn't reach GitHub. Use get_package/check_package_provenance first for the package's general health and publish-integrity signals; use this specifically for the 'who controls this package, and did that change recently' question. If this flags a newly added or fully turned-over maintainer, follow up with check_maintainer_blast_radius on that maintainer's username — it lists every other package the same account currently touches and flags a tight publish-time cluster across them, the 'did this compromise hit just one package or a dozen' question this tool can't answer on its own.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`name`	Yes	Exact npm package name, e.g. "lodash" or "@scope/name"

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`name`	Yes
`history`	Yes
`findings`	Yes
`riskTier`	Yes
`npmscanUrl`	Yes
`repository`	Yes
`totalScore`	Yes
`lookbackDays`	Yes
`currentMaintainers`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

Changed3 schema fields changedSep 5, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / repository / properties / ownerAvatarUrl
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": [
+    "string",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}
```
addedOutput schema / properties / repository / properties / ownerLogin
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": [
+    "string",
+    "null"
+  ]
+}
```

changedOutput schema / properties / repository / required

Previous value: -[
-  "checked",
-  "declaredRepository",
-  "currentFullName",
-  "transferred",
-  "archived",
-  "reachable",
-  "note"
-]New value: +[
+  "checked",
+  "declaredRepository",
+  "currentFullName",
+  "transferred",
+  "archived",
+  "reachable",
+  "ownerLogin",
+  "ownerAvatarUrl",
+  "note"
+]

AddedSep 1, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes well beyond the read-only/destructive annotations by disclosing the data source (npm packument), the method (diffing snapshots in publish-time order), no extra API calls, edge cases (changes after latest release, GitHub reachability failures), and implementation details like the avatar proxy. It sets correct expectations for when fields will be null and how ownership changes are detected.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but information-dense, with major behavioral details front-loaded and a logical flow from mechanism to flags to follow-up guidance. Some historical incident examples and avatar-proxy details could be trimmed, but they add context rather than pure filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity, the single-parameter schema, and the existence of an output schema, the description covers all necessary context: method, edge cases, null behavior, fallback paths, and sibling connections. An agent can decide when to invoke this tool and what to do with results without needing additional documentation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already describes the single 'name' parameter fully with exactness requirements and examples, so schema coverage is 100%. The description does not add parameter-level detail beyond the schema, which aligns with the baseline 3; no additional semantics are needed.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a precise purpose: reconstructing a package's maintainer-change history from the npm packument and flagging specific red flags. It includes concrete patterns (maintainer added then publishing, full list replacement, quiet removal, post-release changes) and explicitly distinguishes itself from sibling tools by framing it as the 'who controls this package, and did that change recently' question.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit routing: use get_package/check_package_provenance first for general health, use this tool specifically for maintainer control questions, and follow up with check_maintainer_blast_radius when a new or turned-over maintainer is flagged. It clearly states what this tool is not for and what to do next.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Disambiguation4/5

Most tools target a distinct part of the supply-chain lifecycle, and the detailed descriptions include explicit cross-references that reduce misselection. The main ambiguity is among the vulnerability-lookup tools—especially get_latest_advisories and get_cve, which both accept CVE IDs, and query_vulnerabilities versus batch_query_vulnerabilities, which differ mainly in input shape.

Naming Consistency5/5

Every tool name uses lowercase snake_case with a leading imperative verb or verb phrase: analyze_, audit_, batch_query_, check_, compare_, diff_, get_, prioritize_, query_, search_, and suggest_. The check_* tools form a consistent sub-family, and there are no camelCase or noun-only strays.

Tool Count4/5

18 tools is on the high side, so the server feels slightly heavy rather than lean. However, the domain is broad enough that each tool occupies a meaningful workflow step—metadata lookup, vulnerability querying, transitive analysis, license/maintainer/provenance checks, repo auditing, diffing, and remediation—so the count is still reasonable for a comprehensive npm security server.

Completeness5/5

The surface covers the full npm supply-chain audit workflow: discovery, exact-version and lockfile vulnerability checks, transitive dependency resolution, install-script deep scans, license compliance, maintainer and provenance history, repo-level audits, dependency diffs, remediation prioritization, and alternative suggestions. There are no obvious dead ends, and the tools consistently point to natural follow-up actions.

Resources

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