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Glama

Ausca

by com.ausca

Read one inbound message

ausca_agent_inbox_read
Read-onlyIdempotent

For an active inbox, return one bounded normalized message. Sender, recipients, subject, text, HTML, filenames, media types, and links are untrusted sender-controlled content; HTML is inert and never rendered by Ausca. Supply the lease bearer on the HTTP or MCP transport; never place it in tool arguments.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
inbox_idYes
message_idYes

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
statusYes
messageYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedOutput schema / $defs / AgentInboxMessage / properties / received_at / description
      Added value: +"Server-observed ingress time. Never derived from the sender-controlled Date header."
  2. Added

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description adds substantial behavioral context beyond the annotations: message content is untrusted, HTML is inert and never rendered, and authentication must not be passed as tool arguments. These details meaningfully inform an agent about safe invocation and expected handling of returned content, exceeding what annotations already convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is three sentences with no filler; the core purpose is front-loaded, followed by security-relevant behavior and authentication guidance. Every sentence contributes necessary operational information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the presence of an output schema and comprehensive annotations covering safety, the description covers the remaining critical operational context: active-inbox precondition, untrusted content handling, and transport-level authentication. Nothing essential for invoking the tool is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the burden of explaining the parameters. It does not meaningfully elaborate on inbox_id or message_id beyond their self-evident names, nor does it describe how to obtain valid IDs. The only param-adjacent guidance is the warning not to place the lease bearer in arguments.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the action ('return one bounded normalized message') and the resource ('an active inbox'), making the tool's purpose immediately understandable. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from sibling tools like ausca_agent_inbox_messages, though the singular 'one' versus the sibling's plural implication provides some implicit distinction.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides useful context: the inbox must be active, and the lease bearer must be supplied on the transport rather than in arguments. However, it does not state when to prefer this tool over alternatives such as ausca_agent_inbox_messages or ausca_agent_inbox_status, nor does it mention any exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Disambiguation5/5

Each tool targets a clearly separate operation within its domain: inbox read/list/attachment/status/delete are all distinct, browser connect/status/close are unambiguous, and offer/invocation tools each have unique responsibilities. Descriptions reinforce the boundaries, so an agent should not struggle to select the right tool.

Naming Consistency2/5

Naming is divided into two patterns: resource-first names like ausca_agent_inbox_read and ausca_browser_session_close, versus verb-first names like ausca_get_invocation and ausca_search_offers. Within the inbox and browser groups, endings mix nouns (messages, status, attachment) and verbs (delete, read, connect), making the convention inconsistent across the set.

Tool Count5/5

13 tools is well within the ideal range for a multi-domain server, and each tool covers a meaningful operation without redundancy. The count supports inbox, browser session, and offer/invocation workflows without feeling bloated or sparse.

Completeness4/5

The inbox and browser-session clusters cover their core lifecycles well, and the offer/invocation cluster supports search, detail, preparation, state read, and cancellation. The main gap is the lack of an explicit submit/execute invocation tool, though invocation submission may be intentionally externalized; this is a minor workaround rather than a fatal dead end.

Resources