protect_linkEnable capability-token protection on an owned link. Returns a share URL that carries the capability — anyone holding that URL can view the link. A viewer secret code is also set, but it is shown only in the serve console, never here.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| ttl | No | Optional TTL duration (e.g. 24h, 7d). | |
| label | No | Label of the link to protect (optional; defaults to first active link). |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds meaningful behavior beyond the annotations: the returned URL carries the capability, anyone holding it can view the link, and the viewer secret code is set but never exposed here. This is especially useful because the tool has no output schema and the annotations only indicate mutating, non-idempotent, non-destructive behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is three tight sentences with no filler: it states the action, then the output behavior, then an important security note about the secret code. It is front-loaded and structured for quick comprehension.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 2-parameter, no-output-schema tool, the description covers the essential outcome (the share URL), the access implications, and the visibility limitation of the secret code. Minor gaps include not clarifying whether protection can be applied to a specific non-active link, but the optional label parameter and default behavior are already in the schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so both ttl and label are already documented in the input schema. The description adds context like "owned link" and the default-to-first-active-link behavior, but it does not meaningfully elaborate on parameter formats or constraints beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb and resource: "Enable capability-token protection on an owned link." It also clarifies the key behavior—returns a share URL that grants anyone holding it view access—which clearly distinguishes it from siblings like unprotect_link, revoke_link, and renew_link.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool is used when you own a link and want to enable capability-token protection, and it notes the label defaults to the first active link. However, it does not explicitly state when to avoid this tool, mention prerequisites, or compare it with alternatives such as unprotect_link or revoke_link.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools target distinct actions: account_status is account-level, links is inventory, serve/stop_remote are publish/unpublish, and the protection tools form a clear lifecycle. The only possible confusion is revoke_link versus unprotect_link, since both invalidate access in different ways, but the descriptions distinguish them well.
The link-mutation tools follow a consistent verb_noun pattern: protect_link, renew_link, revoke_link, unprotect_link. However, account_status and links are noun-only, serve is a bare verb, and stop_remote uses an inconsistent object, so the naming conventions are mixed.
Eight tools is well-scoped for this server's purpose: account awareness, link inventory, publishing, unpublishing, and protection management. Each tool serves a distinct function and none feel redundant.
The core lifecycle is covered: publish via serve, unpublish via stop_remote, inventory via links, and full protection management via protect/renew/revoke/unprotect. Minor gaps exist such as no explicit update-to-existing-link operation, but agents can likely work around these.